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INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Debt-for-nature swaps are a new phenomenon in world politics. Initiated as a response 
to third world debt problems and the urgent need for environmental protection, debt-for-nature 
swaps represent a very interesting development in the areas of international finance, 
international negotiation and international roles for non-state actors. To date, at least nineteen 
swaps have taken place, and according to some observers, they fit a niche that will exist for 
some time to corne. 
Debt-for-nature swaps are an arrangement whereby certain international environmental 
groups have purchased discounted portions of debt on the secondary market. These groups 
have negotiated with the government of the country whose debt they purchase to exchange the 
U.S. dollar-denominated debt with the central bank. for local funds to be committed for 
environmentally beneficial purposes, and to have the collaboration of local environmental 
groups for the identification, design and implementation of the projects. The money helps the 
purchase of private or government-owned land, the conversion of these lands into national 
parks, and the payment for their maintenance. Other uses include funding environmental 
research, educational programs for local populations on farming techniques and problems of 
degradation, and other similar protection and conservation projects. 
Since the debt crisis in the early 1980s, banks which had been threatened with collap e 
have been gradually reducing their exposure to troubled 'Third World debtsl. One method for 
accomplishing this is to sell or exchange those loans on their books in a 'secondary loan 
market' created for this purpose. This financial innovation has been accompanied by others, 
of which debt-for-nature swaps are one. 
1 The terms Third World' and 'Less Developed Countries' refer to a category that is long since obsolete, in th til do nol 
accurately portray the vast difference between many Southern countries. Although I am constrained when citing or quoting the 
literature to using the e terms, I will use LDCs to mean those developing countries that are i) nOl newly industrializing (NIC ); 
ii) not Eastern European. Appendix I gives a categorisation from the Human Development Report 1991, and when I use 
LDCs, I will usually be referring to countries that are not in the High Human Development Categoric . 
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This sub-thesis considers the origins, present status and future prospects of debt-for-
nature swaps in the context of the international political economy. I will trace the trends of 
change in international political economy and look at the social coalitions operating within these 
parameters as they concern the emergence, spread, success and possible future demise of 
nature swaps as an arrangement dealing with Third World debt, development and 
environmental problems. 
In the first chapter I will look at the nature of the context in which debt-for-nature 
swaps emerged. This context is set by a conjunction of political , economic, social and 
environmental factors. I am interested in discerning the interaction of these factors that created 
the opportunity for nature swaps to arise. What can be termed the 'greening of international 
relations' 2 forms the first set of strands in the background weave of debt-for-nature swaps. 
The growing awareness of and the emerging evidence on global environmental problems, and 
the adoption of environmental considerations in many areas of world politics is reflected in the 
actors and agendas involved in the swaps. The debt crisis of the Less Developed Countries 
(LDCs) features as the second set of threads. The rest of the 1980s was characterized by 
prolonged financial difficulties for the LDCs, and a simultaneous crisis in development. 
Despite the significant progress which the LDCs made towards development over the last three 
decades, both in human and in economic terms, the previous decade saw the reversal of many 
of those gains, as well as a general set back in the rate of improvement. The pressures on the 
populations of many countries from continued or increased poverty exacerbated the stre s on 
the environment, already under great strain and abuse. A third set of intersecting fibres comes 
from the shifts in the international political economy, which include renewed government and 
political support for market-liberalist practices and ideologies, the globali ation of finance, 
both in public and private international sectors, and the emerging trend towards market-based 
solutions and economic instruments to deal with environmental problems. This completes the 
backdrop on which the debt-for-nature swaps phenomenon is embroidered. My argument is 
that the opportunity for these swaps resulted from a very particular combination of factors, 
2 This tenn was used by Jim MacNeill as the title ofms article in International Journal, Vol. XLV(I), Winter 1989-90, pp. 1 -
35, which surveyed the rise of environmental affairs on the international diplomatic agenda. 
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where certain social groups could form a coalition and mutually realize their interests through 
the arrangement of swaps. 
I will proceed to examine the present 'state' of debt-for-nature swaps in the second 
chapter. After a brief overview of the current swap transaction process, I will survey the 
interests of the parties involved. I will then consider the progress made and in terms of the 
objectives of the participants. The issues of debt relief and environmental protection will be 
considered, along with other goals towards which the swaps may contribute. In the third 
chapter, the progress will be contrasted with the problems and criticisms which the swaps 
encounter. The problems in transaction and implementation will be evaluated with regard to the 
participants' interests and to the viability of the social coalition on which the swaps depend. 
The criticisms will be reviewed to expand from the consideration of functional difficulties to the 
broader political interpretations and opposition of the swaps. 
Finally, in the last chapter, I will consider the future of debt-for-nature swaps. This 
discussion will involve a consideration of the wider context of the international political 
economy. The developments in the areas of debt and international finance, and the 
development and environment debate will be analyzed for their impact on the window of 
opportunity for nature swaps. Lastly the more specific outlook of nature swaps in tenns of the 
immediate future interests in swaps, and the tendency towards their institutionalisation into 
mainstream international politics in the areas of debt and environment will be evaluated. I will 
argue that on their own terms, these swaps are worthwhile and most of their problems are 
sunnountable - they are certainly environmentally beneficial in a conte t where the environment 
is under severe attack. Nevertheless, the confluence of interest on which they are based 
operates under particular constraints. 
Yet in consideration of the trends in the international political economy and the 
indications of continuing environmental problems, there wiU be many more future challenge in 
achieving development, conservation and environmental su tainability to which the 
international political economy will have to addre s itself. Debt-for-nature swaps are an 
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important phenomenon because they highlight the impact of structural changes in the 
international political economy on the role of the global environment in human affairs. As a 
private initiative to address a fundamentally public, and indeed a global public goods problem, 
nature swaps can be seen as a signpost on the path of increasingly transnational environmental 
politics in a situation of growing emphasis on market-based solutions for LDC development in 
general and for environmental problems in particular. Their limitations, their present progress 
and their future prospects reflect the immensity of the debt, development and environmental 
problems facing the world, and indicate some of the pitfalls and some of the opportunities to be 
found in the changing international political economy. 
CHAPTER 1 5 
The Origins of Debt-for-Nature Swaps 
This chapter will examine how and why debt-for-nature swaps arose as a way of 
dealing with environmental problems in the current international political economy. There are 
three main sets of factors that interacted to provide the opportunity for the development and 
implementation of the debt-for-nature swap: the greening of international relations, the 'Third 
World' debt crisis, and the structural changes in the international political economy. 
1.1 The 'Greening of World Politics' 
[The authors of Our Common Future] found that the issues 
of environment and development were interlocked and were 
reshaping national and international affairs." 1 
There has been a growing public, academic and institutional awareness of international 
environmental problems since the Stockholm Conference of 1972 on the Human Environment. 
The Club of Rome report Limits to Growth and the Founex report Environment and 
Development during the first half of the 1970s recognized the environmental dimension of 
international political and economic affairs . However, it is only a decade later that this general 
awareness reached a critical threshhold, and gained its present momentum. With the growth of 
scientific research and evidence on a number of global and regional environmental problems, 
the awareness and adoption of environmental considerations onto the mainstream international 
agenda is rapidly taking place. 
In the academic realm, a quick survey of the international relations literature illu trates 
the growing awareness2. At the most basic level , the news analy is magazines have reflected 
1 Jim MacNeill , "The Greening ofInternational Relation "'/nternationalJoUTnai, Vol. XL V(1), Winter 19 9-
1990, p. 4. 
2 Other cliscipline related to international affairs have al 0 shared thi trend, with international law, international 
negotiation, bu iness and development joumaJ publi hing a growing number or articles on the environment 
For instance, see the pecial i sue or the Harvard Internauonal Law Journal on the environment (Vol 30(2), spring 
1989). 
! T 
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this trend, with The Economist printing since 1989 a yearly 'Environment Survey'. It covers 
government policies, business behavior, industry and other sectors' responses, as well as 
ecological problems and trends. In the main disciplinary journals, a sudden profusion of 
articles began in 19883. To date, three have published special issues on the environment and 
international affairs4. As for the texts, quite a few are including the environmental dimension 
in their discussions, such as Gill & Law's The International Political Economy; Susan 
Strange's Paths to International Political Economy; the most recent of the Eagles series on 
American Foreign Policy, and Barry Buzan's second edition of People, States and Fear5, 
Furthermore, the current debate on security in the disciplines of international studies, both 
strategic and political, is being conducted in light of the emerging awareness of global 
environmental problems and increasing pertinence of natural resource issues to international 
affairs. 
In the international and regional institutional domain, the greening has also been 
gathering pace. The United Nations Environment Program, founded in 1980, has gained 
growing recognition for its work, and for the necessity of increasing its budget. Discussion of 
the need for an environmental security council is currently taking place in many fora, whenever 
the capacity of the international institutional structure to handle environmental problems is 
considered. The international financial institutions are acquiring environmental staff and 
criteria of environmental sustainability and impact reports for their assistance projects, as have 
the aid departments of many donor countries6. The European Community is in the process of 
establishing its own equivalent to the United States' Environmental Protection Agency. Even 
the GATT is coming under scrutiny for its role regarding the environmental a pect of the 
3 While environmental matters have been discussed in the discipline in relation to nuclear conflict, it is only 
recently that the intimations of a 'new environmental paradigm (see Lester W. Milbraith , Environmentalists: 
Vanguard for a New Society State University of New York Press, Albany, 1984) have been expres ed in the 
wider literature. Some ear~ works appeared in 1983-4, ie. Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", International 
Security, 8(1), Summer 1983; RicharifBarrett (ed.) International Dimensions of the EnvtronmenW Crisis, 
Westview Press, 1984; but the appearance of this theme picked up in 1988. 
4 International JournalA Vol. XL Vel), Winter 1989-90, "Greening of International Affairs"; Millenium, Vol. 19(3), Winter 1990, " \.Jlobal Environmental Change and lnternauonal Relations"; and Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 44(2), Winter 1991. 
5 Stephen Gill & David Law, The Global Political Economy' Perspectives Problems and Policies, Harve ter 
Wheatsheaf, London, 1988; Susan Strange, Paths to International Political Economy, George Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1984; Barry Buzan, People States and Fear An Agenda for International Security Studies in the POSL-
~old War Era, Second Edn, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991. 
For a di cuss Ion of economic IUd and the envlfOnmenl, see an article by the same utJe by Robert Repetto m the 
EPA Journal, V 01.1 6(4) , July/Aug 1990. 
T 
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international trading order. The State of the World 1990 Report went so far as to announce a 
new age of environmental diplomacy, signalled by the the amount of attention and of space 
given to the issues of climate change, ozone destnlction and deforestation in the final 
communique of the 1989 Group of Seven Summit? Certainly the profusion of international 
conferences and meetings on the subject reflect the evolution of a certain environmental 
consciousness at the international institutional level. The most notable conference is the 
upcoming United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Brazil in 
June1992. It will produce the public presentation of many states ' policy promises in 
environmental issues, and commits a great deal of institutional attention to the topics on the 
agenda. Conventional wisdom in the field currently acknowledges that environmental security 
issues are now sharing the stage with the more traditional economic and military concerns8. 
In the public arena, the environment has become a "mainstream preoccupation - of 
political parties and voters in Western democracies, of popular pressure in Eastern Europe, of 
indigenous peoples whose livelihoods are affected throughout the South"9. Magazines, 
newspapers and popular literature reflect this trend. An indication of its breadth shows in the 
twenty languages in which the State of the World Reports are now published, soon to become 
twenty-four. Furthermore, not only the public awareness but al 0 the public involvement has 
increased. The number of people in groups concerned with environmental issues has 
mushroomed. The dramatic resurgence of public concern and involvement has many origins. 
Since the 1960s, non-governmental organizations (NGOS)10 have struggled to bring attention 
to many urgent issues of ecological damage and maldevelopment. More recently and more 
well-known, the issue of the destruction of the ozone layer attracted much attention by the 
surprise with which the scientific community reacted to evidence of damage greater than 
anticipated. As this and other environmental topics came into the mainstream, a public debate 
7 Lester R. Brown, et al ., State of World Reoort 1990, Norton, New York. 1990. p.14. (Hereafter State of 
World Report 1990). 
8 State of World Report 1990. p.13. 
9 Keesing's Record of World Events. Special Reference Section: Politics and the Environment. June 1989. p. 
36782. 
10 Yap appropriately notes the different uses and definition of the the term NGO. In international relation usage, 
ngo aRPlies LO all groups outside government. which indud busine • profes ional, religiou • union and other 
issue-focu ed group. Taking my cue from that article, in this work. the term will denote LO grouQ! with paid or 
volunteer staff that do not directly serve the interests of ~government or indu try. Nonita Yap. "NGOs and 
Sustainable Developmem",/nlernalionalJournai. Vol. XLV(l). Winter 19 9-90, pp.75. 
I 
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on environmental sustainability commenced, and was boosted by the publication of the 1987 
Brundtland Report Our Common Future. Other factors which contributed to mobilizing public 
awareness include the experience of various recent environmental catastrophes, such as 
Chernobyl, the Exxon Valdez spill, the Bhopal disaster, the Sahel drought and famines, and 
more recently the environmental consequences of the Gulf war. These disasters affected the 
public perception and faith in development policies, technology and industrial safety standards, 
and generated broader enquiries about the long-tenn health of the environment. 
The emerging evidence and awareness of the foremost transnational environmental 
problems, the ozone layer hole and the enhanced greenhouse effect, contributed greatly to this 
revival and change. These truly global environmental issues have forcefully highlighted the 
cumulative and aggregate impact of separate, individual, and local human activities. The 
gradually emerging public, institutional and activist consciousness, spurred by the above 
mentioned factors and drawing on the realization of global ecological interdependence heralded 
by ozone loss and global warming, both resulted from and prompted in their turn the greening 
of international relations with regard to other issues. Thus the pressing environmental 
problems of the less developed countries (LOCs) of deforestation, species loss, salinization, 
soil erosion were more swiftly taken up in the mid-1980s. This greening of international 
relations and of international public opinion prepared the way for the positive reception of the 
debt-for-nature concept, and facilitated its inception by those groups involved in the swap 
arrangements. One of those groups is the international environmental NGO (IENGO), whose 
evolution in the international scene testifies to the greening of the world politics. 
Evolution of Environmental NGOsll 
As noted above, the NGOs played an important role in the education of international 
public opinion, and in promoting green issue at the international institutional level. The 
11 The following paraw:aph ; present material mainly derived from Yap' article, in particular pp. 76-81. which is 
the only up-to-date article in the international relations literature that di cusses the evolution of environmental 
NGO and their present prominence. Having surveyed the literature on NGO , I have found it dated and 
unhelpful in reOecting the many and important changes of the role played by th group at both the intra and 
interstate levels. 
! 
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emergence of environmental NGOs has its roots in the environmental movements of the rnid-
1960s and early 1970s in North America and Western Europe. These movements were 
concerned with the increasingly noticeable deleterious impacts of industrial expansion on the 
environment, damaging both for people and wildlife. However, as Yap notes, while western 
governments responded by institutionalizing the environmental concerns and the search for 
solutions, environmental NGOs were still considered by government and industry to be fringe 
groups without consistent mainstream public support until the mid 1980s. Since then, both 
public concern and governmental activity have revived forcefully, and according to many 
observers, now mark a sea-change in the general attitude about the human enterprise and its 
relationship with nature. 
The internationalization of the nonhern environmental NGOs began in the 1970s. At 
the 1972 Stockholm conference on the Human Environment, a coalition of participating 
environmental NGOs formed the Environmental Liaison Center (ELC), which subsequently 
played a crucial role in facilitating the links between NGOs and relevant governmental and 
intergovernmental institutions. With evolving scientific consensus on ozone destruction and 
climate change, a broader range of organizations became involved in international activities. A 
large number of groups now work to influence international decisions of the bilateral and 
multilateral institutions. More domestic groups are expanding their operations, enabled by their 
growing memberships and financial capacities. While there are no figures on the present 
number of environmental NGOs, a good indication of their phenomenal growth is the 
membership of the ELC. It went from a few northern NGOs to its current level of over 230 
groups. The Center also maintains contact with 7000 (mostly southern-ba ed) groupSl2. 
Other authors speak of more than a hundred million people belonging to hundreds of thou ands 
of organisations across the developing world, though the majority of these would be gras -
roots development-oriented groupS13. The increased role of NGOs in the international cene 
effected a broader analysis of global ecological issues, and advanced different tyle of policy 
12 These are likely to be a mix of environment, development and indigenous rights group . 
13 Alan Durning, "People Power and DeveloQment", Foreign Policy, No. 76, Fall ' 9; cited in R. Broad, 1. 
Cavanagh, and W. Bello, "Development: The Market i Not Enough", Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, No. 81 , 
Winter 1990-91, p. 153. 
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advocacy amongst the groups. In widening the range of action and objectives, the 
internationalization facilitated the opportunity for certain groups to sponsor nature swaps. 
International Conservation Goals 
The involvement of certain IENGOs in the debt-for-nature swap phenomenon must be 
seen in the light of the development of the objectives of these types of groups. Before the 
Stockholm conference, very few northern NGOs dealt with environmental issues in the 
South 14. The foremost concerns of those groups that did were wildlife and wildlife habitat 
preservation. In this sense, the protection of genetic diversity has always been an objective of 
the environmental NGOs' work, though the urgency of this issue has only come to the fore 
recently. Following the North-South debate on center stage in the international arena during 
the mid-1970s, more environmental NGOs became involved with southern environmental 
issues of a broader developmental nature. The rise of deforestation, biodiversity and 
sustainability issues combined with concern about the role of tropical forest destruction in 
releasing greenhouse gases. The increasing urgency of these problems, for LDCs in 
particular, but also for the indusoialized counoies, helped spur the IENGOs to act upon the 
concept of nature swaps when the window of opportunity opened. 
The rise of the green movements into more mainstream political activity can be 
interpreted in a number of ways. The well-known peace researcher 10han Galtung considers 
the green movement to be a general reaction to the malfunctioning of the Western social 
formation 15. Galtung views the environmental movement like other social movements to be 
part of the socio-historical dialectic. Another view would consider orne parts of 
environmental movement as belonging to the wider step towards participatory grass-root 
involvement in the process of development or community politics, as part of a broader 
emancipatory direction. Whatever the sociological explanation as igned to the greening, 
however, it is clear that the configuration of interest among t groups in the international 
14 Yap, QlM<i.l.. p.79. 
15 Johan Galtung, "The Green Movement" in David C. Pill (Ed.)The Future of the Environment; The Social 
Dimensions of Conservation and Ecological Alternatives, Routledge, London, 1988. 
I 
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political economy is changing, and that the environment cause is providing some common 
ground. 
1.2 The Debt and Deyelopment Crises 
Next to the greening of world politics, the second set of factors that created the 
opportunity for debt-for-nature swaps lies in the 'Third World' debt crisis. The important 
factors that explain the emergence of the opportunity concern the effects of the crisis, its 
management from the perspectives of the creditors and debtors, and the linkage between the 
crisis and environmental degradation, of which the nature swaps took advantage. 
Starting in the early 1980s, the debt crisis affected more than two-thirds of the countries 
of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa and several Asian countries. Since 1982, these 
debtor countries have suffered almost continuous economic decline, and while orne small 
signs of improvements surfaced after 1986, the 1980s are generally known as the 'lost decade 
for development'16. An overall decline in economic and human development indicators 
reflected the conditions in the debtor countries. In Latin America, the average per capita GOP 
decline was 7% between 1980 and 1988; or 16% if resource outflow and declining terms of 
trade are taken into account17 . In Africa, the per capita income fell 25%, or 30% when 
counting the deterioration of trade terms. 
Many variables combined to create and prolong the debt crisis. Protectionism in the 
North hindered LOC access to markets, and Northern substitution for raw material import 
made earning the foreign exchange necessary to meet interest payments more difficult. The 
shrinking demand and the export-based IMF programs resulted in a over upply and falls in 
prices for commodities. The shortage of new lending compounded the drain on foreign 
16 Wiarda contends that the situation improved considerably for mo t of Latin America after 1986 through reform, 
structural change, and the expansion and diver ification of exports. Wiarda, Howard J., "The Politic oTThird 
World Debt", Political Science & Politics, Vol XXill(3). September 1990, pA 1 5. However, most other article 
that I consulted on the debt crisis did not draw uch favorabfe conclu ion . ror in lance, ee Robert We son, 
"Wrapping UP. the Debt Problem". Political Science & Politics, Vol XXllI(3), September 1990, ppA19424. and 
David Felix. Larin America's Debt Cri i ", World Policy Journal. Fall 1990. pp.733-77 I. 
17 Human Development Report 1990. UNDP, Oxford Univer ity Pre s, New York, 1990, p.79. 
i 
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currency reserves, leading to a net outflow of capital. Private foreign investment also shrank 
during that period. Hyperinflation, high interest rates and increasing macroeconomic disorder 
exacerbated the situation. Along with the compulsory capitalization of arrears in debt 
servicing, the debt burden was further increased by the 'socialization' of private foreign 
liabilities into the public sector debt. During the first restructuring negotiations , the 
commercial banks refused to extend their loans unless the LDC governments took 
responsibility for the private loans along with their own public ones. By 1987, the private 
debts had become 80% of the total from just over 50% in 198218 . 
In human tenns, this translated into falling employment, cuts in real wages, lost 
purchasing power and general decreases in the gains made in the fields of health, education and 
nutrition. This partially manifested itself in increased mortality rates and child malnutrition. In 
the poorest LDCs, heal th spending per capita decreased by more than 50% in the 1980s, 
education by more than 25%19. It cannot be a coincidence that the massive cholera epidemic in 
Latin America, presently endangering 25% of the region's population, follows on the heels of 
real cuts in government spending in health and other social services sectors, where vaccination 
and other 'social investment' programs were eliminated under the structural adjustment 
programs20. Generally, a drop of 10% or more in living standards in LDCs is being attributed 
to the debt and development crises21 . As the 1990 Human Development Report soberly notes, 
the problems with the collection and calculation of social data mean that few official statistics 
have started to reflect the real effects of the 1980s crisis on human development. 
Nevertheless, the economic statistics on the net transfer of resources is stark enough: it 
changed dramatically from a positive flow of $42.6 billion in 1981 to a negative flow of $32.5 
billion in 198822. 
18 Fe lix,~p.737. 
19 Human Developmenl Reporl 1990, ~ p. 79. 
20 While social services pending were nOl CUl disproporuonalely more than lolal spending, in lwo-lhird of Latin 
American and African countries, real government spending declined. Canberra Times, Sawrday, April 27, 1991 
'Cholera Epidemic', World News secMn. 
21 Su an George, A Fale Worse lhan Debl, Grove Weidenreld , New York, 1989, p.195. 
22 This figure includes lhe OPEC and lhe Newly Industrializing Countries (NlCs). 
I 
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The International Monetary Fund (lMF) austerity programs, implemented as a condition 
for loans, produced the 'structural adjustment' of currency devaluation, the lifting of trade 
restrictions and barriers to foreign investment and foreign currency controls, the privatisation 
of government enterprises, the abolition of price controls, cuts in government spending on 
food and other consumption subsidies, and tight monetary policies to help decrease inflation. 
Although most countries accepted structural adjustment programs to ameliorate their economic 
conditions, improvements did not necessarily follow. In Africa, per capita incomes fell both in 
countries with and without strong reform programs23 . One author comments that "for the 
development establishment...developing countries' only hope rests with exporting their way to 
Nle status through the purgatory of structural adjustment"24, regardless of whether the 
particular conditions which existed were conducive to producing the intended results. Epstein 
states that the IMF stabilisation policies were disastrous for the majority of the people in those 
countries undergoing them25. Another author, David Felix, points to the worsening inflation 
and macroeconomic disorder that resulted directly from the free market restructuring that 
occurred in Latin America26. By the mid-1980s, many IMP programs had been renegotiated 
or suspended, but the debt crisis, though regarded as less urgent in the North, continued. 
Management of the debt crisis 
Not only the existence of the debt crisis itself, but also the way in which it was handled 
by various parties created the opportunity for nature swaps. Although somewhat 
oversimplified, the main categories of groups involved in the management are the financial 
community, the creditor governments, and the debtor country governments. These three 
groups are important for their part in the social coalition that forms to conduct nature swaps. 
Financial community and creditor governments 
23 Human Development Report 1990, ~ p.79. 
24 R. Broad, et. aI, QD&iL, p.149. 
25 Gerald Epstein, "The Triple Debt Crisis", World Policy Journal. Vol. 2(4).1985. p.64l. 
26 Felix. QD&iL. p.735. 
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The financial community of commercial banks closely allied themselves with the 
creditor governments for the management of the crisis. 
The initial threat to the international financial system was perceived to be serious enough such 
that the two groups collaborated closely at debt negotiations in order to keep the system going. 
As the problem endured their collaboration also ensured advantageous outcomes to 
themselves27. The giant cornmerciallenders dominated the decision-making process in the 
early years, exerting a disproportionate influence over official attitudes on debt, and were 
backed by the U.S. Federal Reserve and Department of Treasury. They exploited the 
fragmented structure of policy assignments within national governments and the hierarchical 
structure of the banking community to push their needs and preferences to the fore28. 
Interpretations of the United States administration strategy vary from 'containment', a 
high level of intervention at times of genuine crisis to 'laissez-faire'29. The close collaboration 
of the Reagan administration with the banks has also been named a 'quiet revolution in 
international finance' by another commentator30• Whatever the label, it does seem clear that the 
U.S. administration and Federal Reserve geared a great deal of their crisis management to 
saving the banks, allowing them to socialize the costs over the long term. 
The creditors (both bankers and governments) stated early on their goals were to 
prevent an international banking crisis, restore LDC credit and access to capital market, 
restructure LDC economies for sustained economic activity, and to induce economic 
restructuring based on market liberalization31 . Felix provides a useful analy i of the evolution 
of the creditors' strategy, which went through distinctive phases reflecting the hift in focus 
from the international banking system, as the threat receded , to "restoration of economic 
growth and and creditworthiness ... with market liberalization emerging a the ine qua non for 
27Benjamin J. Cohen, "A Global Chapler 11 ", Foreign Policy, No. 75, Summer 1989, p.ll6. 
28 Cohen, .ibi.d., p.1l6. 
29 Containment fTOm Cohen, i.bid..., intervention from Paul Krugman, "Debt Relief is Cheap", Foreign Policy, 
No. 80, Fall 1990, lai ez-faire from Wes on, ~. 
30 Richard E. Feinber~American Power and Third World Economies", in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, 
and Donald Rothchild,gle ReSurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy", Litile, Brown and 
rompany, Boston, 1986, p.l47. 
1 Feli ,Ql2.&i.1.. p.736. 
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achieving them"32. The first three, leading up to the first arrangements of debt for nature 
swaps in 1987, will concern us here.33 
The first phase took place between 1982 and 1985. Following the Mexican emergency 
the initial effort centered on postponing amortization by rolling over bank loans, and later on, 
obtaining new loans to help pay the interest bill of the commercial banks. While the banks, 
especially the less exposed regional and foreign banks, were reluctant, joint financing from the 
IMP and World Bank provided the incentive. The IMF restructuring programs that 
accompanied the new loans fared badly, accompanied by worsening conditions in the LDCs. 
The second phase began with the inauguration of the Baker Plan in 1985 and lasted 
until 1987. The focus here was on the revival of economic growth and market liberalization to 
reverse the economic depression and financial turmoil. Amongst the creditor governments the 
United States in particular was concerned about the possibility of political instability and leftist 
inclinations coming to the fore. Thus the Baker Plan aimed at reducing negative resource 
transfers by relying on concerted [involuntary] lending for three more years. So long the 
prospect of new loans existed, the debtor countries were induced to continue trying to service 
their debts. However, the Plan did not offer much new lending, a mere $29 billion over three 
years in contrast with the negative resource transfers which averaged $30 billion for Latin 
America, and $40 billion for the 17 most indebted countries. Loans were conditional upon 
IMP approval and World Bank criteria. 
The emphasis on the so-called 'concerted lending' did not yield the anticipated results, 
and by 1987, commercial banks were exiting from the coerced loan cycle. The secondary loan 
market was revived by banks wishing to balance out their vunerabilities among particular 
regions and to reduce their debt exposure by selling or exchanging debt. The larger banks 
were also establishing loan loss reserves by early 1987 to bolster themselves in ca e of 
32 Felix, il2i.d... 
33 The nexl few paragraphs derive mo l of their infonnation from Felix, ~ pp.736-757. 
, 
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default34. The European banks had increased their loan-loss reserves at a much faster rate than 
United States banks, so the focus of secondary market activity was the work of U.S . banks 
dealing on the huge loans outstanding in Latin America, around $400 billion35 . Many bankers 
became very active in it over a relatively short period of time, and the market grew to 
approximately $6 billion in 1986. 
In the third phase, from 1987 to 1989, the creditor governments and the commercial 
banks focused on the 'market menu' of options, with debt workouts through conversions and 
equity swaps. It is from the equity swap model that the nature swaps arose. During 1987, the 
crisis seemed to intensify. The Wall Street Journal reported that the lending of the World Bank 
had not increased enough to cover the decrease in involuntary lending by commercial banks36. 
The US money-centers and the heavily exposed regional banks, bracing themselves for losses, 
initiated an "aggressive debt reduction policy", with twelve of the eighteen most exposed US 
banks selling approximately $3.8 billion in the first half of 198837. The LDC economies 
continued to stagnate as the market strategy, by consensus in the financial community, failed to 
work38 . 
Debtor country governments 
During the first phase, the debtor countries found it in their intere ts to acquiesce in the 
Fund imposed austerity programs and renegotiations instead of repudiating their debt 
obligations. The consequences of default were widely recognized to be the stigma of 
untru tworthiness, the ineligibility for new loans the seizure of many national as et , the 
setback of development prospects, the additional penalties that could be levered by the 
34 Citicorp declared an increased loan-lo s reserve policy in May 1987 of $300 billion dollars, and was 
subsequently followed by many other banks. 
35 This is reinforced by the fact that mo t of the information about the secondary market deals almo t exclu ively 
with Latin American countries. 
36 Wall Street Journal, "Lo ing Interest", Vol. CCIV, No. 99, Nov. 19, 1984, p.l; Richard Evans, "Secondary 
~arkets: Anomalous but Profitable", Euromoney, special supplement on Global Debt, January 1988, pp.25-31. 
7 Feinberg, Richard E., and Hanson, Gordon H., "LDC Debt Will Re tructure U.S. Banlcing", Challenge, Vol. 
~~, March/April 1989, p. 45. 
Cohen, ~p. 109. 
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international financial community and the creditor governments, and the potential 
destabilization of political systems39 . But despite (or according to some authors because of) 
the restructuring programs, the conditions in many indebted countries worsened. Because of 
the particular configurations of political power in the debtor countries and in their interactions 
with their creditors, the LDCs continually promised to pay, participated in constant 
renegotiations, and endured the austerity programs40. 
By the onset of the second phase in the creditors' strategy, however, the increase in 
arrears became a definite panern, ascending to unilateral cessations of debt service after 198641 . 
During this time, the total amount of debt ceased to grow, because of the banks' withdrawal 
from the lending scene, starving the debtor countries of new money. In contrast to the close 
collaboration of the financial community and creditor governments, the indebted countries had 
difficulties in achieving unity, and seemed unwilling to move collectively. The huge diversity 
of conditions and prospects, the competition with each other for the best debt rescheduling 
deals, the different timing of financial crises, dissimilar foreign strategic links, internal political 
systems, personalities and values of the individual debtor countries' decision-makers created 
the barriers which kept (and still keep them) apart 42. 
During the third phase, the number of countries showing difficulties in servicing their 
debt did not slow down. One-third of the Latin American countries were in arrears in 1986, 
and the proportion grew to three-quarters by 198943. One author comments that they achieved 
most of the benefits of repudiation without actually adopting common repudiation po itions44• 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the burden of adjustment has fallen on those lea t able to affect 
government policy, and the food riots, protests, strikes, looting and violent demonstrations are 
39 Wiarda, ~p.412. 
40 Cohen, QJ2.Ql.. p. Ill. 
41 Wesson,~.422 
42 Cohen, QJ2.Ql.. p.114. 
43 Cohen, ~ p.lIS Those countries in serious arrear or having unilaterally ceased debl ervice are 
Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, Peru, Venezuela, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Nigeria, Zaire; participating in nature 
swaps are: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Zambia. 
44 Wiarda, QJ2.Ql.. p.41S . 
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just the surface reflection of this. The poverty increased and endured partly as a result of the 
management style by both creditors and debtors. 
Although the powerful domestic groups within the debtor countries managed to retain 
their privileges by obtaining special treatment and by moving their assets, their sensitivity to the 
costs of maintaining the full debt service had been growing45. Their receptivity to Northern 
calls for environmental protection and sustainability priorities increased as the internal pressure 
in their countries also been mounted. The May 1987 announcement of the World Bank policy 
change concerning environmental impact criteria for project funding, and the emerging changes 
in overseas development poLicies of other aid agencies augered the importance of the need to be 
seen to be concerned with environmental matters. But the budget constraints of the debt and 
austerity conditions meant that environmental expenditures were being cut The arrival of debt-
for-nature swaps offered a way to respond to the demands for action. 
The Poverty-Environment Connection 
While it may be difficult to establish the exact causal link between the debt crisis and the 
degradation of and a major effect of environmental degradation and economic decline"46. As 
we have already seen above, the debt crisis throughout the 1980s exacerbated the conditions of 
poverty. The poverty contributed to the intensity and pace of land exploitation and degradation 
in LDCs. Marginalized peasants are pushed onto fragile eco ystems by skewed land 
distribution, and their subsistence agriculture in these areas result in degradation47. The 
environment is put under stress not only by people seeking to eke a living, but also by the 
strategies designed to promote development. Under pressure to increase export , countries 
often resort to short-term heavy exploitation of natural re ources: timber export ca h crops, 
and mining, in a manner that cannot be sustained over the long run becau e of the cumulative 
damage to the environment. Whether the environmental destruction then cau es poverty, or 
45 Cohen, ~ p. Ill. 
46 MacNeill, Ql2.&i1.. p.2. 
47 Broad et aI. cite a World Bank report on Co ta Rica, El Salvador and Haiti describing lhi ph nomenon, 
Qll..Ql.. p. lSI. 
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the poverty and the attempt to change it cause the environmental destruction, the result is a 
vicious circle that characterizes the situation of many LDCs. The debt and development crises, 
therefore, not only created the situation under which nature swaps were in the interests of the 
debtor governments, but also contributed to the environmental damage that debt-for-nature 
swaps intended, if only in a very small way, to alleviate. 
1.3 Changes in the International Political Economy 
The third aspect that bears discussion when considering the the context in which debt-
for-nature swaps arose are the changes in the international political economy. The emerging 
trends denote a larger change in the structure of the international political economy, and have 
played their part in influencing the debt and development crises and the problem of 
environmental destruction. 
The first most noticeable trend is renewed government and political support for market-
liberalist practices and ideologies throughout the international arena which characterized 
the 1980s. This resurgence of support reflects the response of governments and political 
groups to a broader change in the international political economy4s. The use of 'economic' (a 
opposed to regulatory or administrative) instruments in dealing with many problems under 
governmental purview is on the rise. For both environmental and LDC debt matters, the u e 
and advocacy of these instruments has grown. With regard to environmental protection, an 
increasing interest shown in economic instruments at national and international level is visible. 
The OECD recently published a book on different economic instruments and their 
effectiveness49 . Their findings point to a general rejection of additional environmental 
48 In many cases, the governments may perceive thalthey do nOl have an alternative, and thalthe forces of change 
are beyond their control. 
49 Johannes Opschoor & Hans Vos, Economic Instruments for Environmental Problems, OEeD, Pari , 
1989. 
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regulation to attain environmental protection standards. The debate on carbon dioxide 
emissions taxes or marketable permits in emissions as a potential strategy for dealing with 
greenhouse gases also illustrates this trend. Equally, the use of 'free-market' strategies for 
dealing with Third World debt has grown, as was discussed in the previous section. The 
policies of debt-equity swaps and other market-based workouts urged by the government and 
bank creditor groups exemplifies this. Altogether, the Northern policies on North-South issues 
have been marked by a neo-conservative ideological ascendancy during the 1980s50. 
Another trend that began in the previous decade was the decline in aid given to the 
LDCs. Between the late 1960s and early 1970s, aid decreased and was being tacitly replaced 
by commercial lending. Wesson notes that the lending was "something of an adjunct of 
political influence when foreign aid for economic development was being phased out"51. The 
overseas development assistance from the OECD has fallen from 0.48% of GNP in 1965 to 
0.34% in 1970, and has remained at that level since then52. This decline meant that LDC 
development became increasingly predicated on commercial lending, and vunerable to any 
changes in the flows of international finance. Moreover, according to Christopher Patten, the 
role of aid in development is being again redefined in the last few years through the growing 
awareness of the private sector, mirroring the shift discussed above53. 
The gradual long-term decline in the terms of trade for LDC exports is an additional 
feamre of the contemporary global economy. The reduced demand for raw material from the 
manufacturing industry, due in some sectors to efficiency gains in proces ing the materials, 
partially contributed to the decline. This decline coincided with world overproduction, the 
'fallacy of composition' resulting from multitude of structural adjustment program impo ed on 
the LDCs. The combined effect of the reduced demand and overproduction was a seriou dip-
50 Hi&&ott, Richard, "Global Structural Conflict Beyond the Nonh-South Divide in the International Economic 
Order, in Browetl. John, Gertze~1 Chel!)'. and Leaver, Richard (ed .), "Rethinking Development I ue : 
Opportunities and Con traints in we 1980: ". Papers and Proceeding, Workshop, Flinders University of South 
Australia. 13-15 May. 1987, p.26. (Conference Papers Series No.5. Center for Development Studies. 
Flinders University. March 1988.) Hereafter t:linders Workshop Papers. 
51 Wesson, QQ&il.. p.421. 
52 World Development Report 1990. The World Bank. 0 ford University Pre • New York, 1990. p.214. 
53 Christopher Patten. "The global hift in overseas development aid", The World Today, Vol. 44(12). December 
1988. p.215. 
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in some cases an all-time low - for the real prices of many primary products54. The dramatic 
depression in prices caused one academic to suggest that the Prebisch/Singer argument about 
the inevitable secular decline in terms of trade for commodity exporting LDCs may deserve 
reconsideration55. Another author recently presented an argument of the decoupling of the 
industrial economy from the primary products economy, analysing the trend of decline over the 
last decade56 . As mentioned above, the difficulties many LDCs had in earning foreign 
exchange from their exports additionally protracted the debt and development crises. 
Structural Change in the Global Political Economy 
All of the above trends signal a larger change in the international political economy, one 
of structural dimensions - the globalisation of production and finance. This globalisation has 
had unprecedented impact in the ways in which economic matters are conducted between 
different groups within and between states. Following the demise of the labor-capital accord 
that organized the postwar structure of accumulation, the orientation of social groups is 
changing around the emerging configurations of production and finance. While this transition 
is taking place, the absence of any kind of order in the international economic arena, manifested 
in the chaotic financial markets and in interstate monetary (dis)coordination, is causing 
instability that negatively affects the LDCs. This is both directly in terms of the debt and 
development crises and indirectly in terms of its protraction through the continued absence of 
conditions promoting economic recovery on a general scale. Altogether, this structural change 
has resulted in an unparalleled degree of differentiation in the international political economy, 
characterized by regression and polarization at national and internationallevels57. According to 
one academic "so far as the course of development in the periphery is concerned, this 
internationalisation of finance has been an unmitigated disaster"58. 
54 John RavenhiU, "Discussant's Comments", p.58 in Flinders Work hop texL 
55 RavenhiU, illlit,. 
56 Peter F. Drucker, "The Changed World Economy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64(4), Spring 1986, pp.768-79I. 
57 John Browett and Richard Leaver, "Cri es for Global Capitalism and Crises in Development Thinlcing", in 
FI inders Workshop text, p.l 0; Higgon, Ql2&i1., p.27. 
58 Browett & Leaver, QJ2&i.1.. , p.13. 
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Yet in a paradoxical sense, the rise of private economic power has both created the 
conditions that necessitated debt-for-nature swaps (through the debt and development crisis) 
and the opportunities for arranging the swaps (through the secondary market, and the ability of 
NODs to exercise financial clout in buying up debt parcels). Debt-for-nature swaps rides on 
the swell of private economic power, and represents a private response, insofar as NOGs are 
considered as belonging to civil society, to a new public goods problem, new because of its 
global ramifications. Cox has noted that changes in production and fmance will structure the 
future orientation of social groups, the coalitions that will form and the new social contracts 
that will emerge59. Debt-for-nature swaps have arisen on the basis of a new social alliance 
between state and non-state agents and, one could also venture, have fonnulated a new, though 
obviously small, contract on the basis of economic and environmental imperatives. 
59 Robert W. Cox, "Production, the State and Change in World Order", in Czempiel, Em t-Otto, and Ro enau, 
James N. (cd .), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges' Approaches to World Politics for the ]990s, 
Lexington Books, Lexington, 1989, pA8. 
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The State of Debt-for-Nature Swaps 
Against the background of these interwoven crises, and accompanied by a rising 
awareness of the need for environmental protection, the debt-for-nature concept made its 
appearance. In 1984, Thomas Lovejoy, then Vice-President for Science at the World Wide 
Fund for Nature - U.S. wrote an opinion piece for the New York Times advocating discounts 
or credits for debtor countries taking steps to solve their environmental problems: 
Under the best of circumstances, debtor nations find it hard to 
address critical conservation problems because of multiple 
social needs. Stimulating conservation while ameliorating debt 
would encourage progress on both fronts. 1 
This first public suggestion that Third World debt could be transformed into support for 
conservation projects elaborates on debt-for-development themes developed by Osvaldo Sunkel 
and his group at the Chilean UN office of the Economic Commission on Latin America2. The 
World Wide Fund for Nature and other international environmental NGOs (IENGOs) began to 
work on this concept. The Frank Weeden Foundation was the first organization to commit 
funds to the realisation of a debt-for-nature swap, in allocating grants worth $300,000 to 
environmental organisations to finance such agreements3. Conservation International signed 
the first agreement with Bolivia in August 1987, thereby initiating the nature swap 
phenomenon. 
This chapter will examine the state of debt-for-nature swaps. Because a case by case 
approach is beyond the scope of this work, the issues will be considered with reference to 
particular examples. Section one of this chapter will survey the present ba i of the swap , 
the interests of the parties involved and consider the overlap that enables thi ocial coalition to 
I Thomas .E. Lovejoy 3d, "Aid Debtor Nations' Ecology", New York Times, October 4, 19 4, p. A 31. 
2 Hultk:rans, "Greenbacks for Greenery", Sierra, p.44; Susanna Hecht and Ale ander Cockburn, The Fate of the Forest: 
Developen; Destroyers and Defenden; of the Amazon, Verso. London, 19 9, p .226. Hecht and Cockburn Slale that" Sunkcl 
and colleagues initially devised the scheme as a means of compensating those who were repaying the debt through the hardship 
and poor quality of their daily lives". 
3 The money was to protect undeveloped lands, help spur the independent efforlS of developing country governments and 
environmental organizations and prompt the U.S. government and World Bank to encourage similar agreements, Timothy B. 
Hwnlin, "Debt for Narure Swaps", Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol 16(4), 1989, p. l 068. 
.. 
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form. Section two will look at the progress of the swaps in attaining their goals, dealing in 
tum with the financial, environmental, and other aspects. 
2.1 Present Basis of the Swaps 
Around nineteen swaps have been arranged to date, and another four or more either 
have been already arranged or are indicated for the near future4. Appendix II shows the 
nineteen swaps listed according to the chronological order in which the exchanges took place 
and Appendix ill offers greater detail on their specific components. To understand how the 
swaps arose as a private response to a 'public goods' problem, it is necessary to consider the 
actors involved and their interests in participating in the social coalition that performs the 
swaps. 
Who and How 
Before considering the interests of each party in turn, I will briefly review the actors 
and the steps that comprise a debt-for-nature transaction. The main parties in debt-for-nature 
swaps are the sponsoring international environmental organizations, the debtor country 
environmental organizations, the commercial banks, the debtor country governments, and the 
creditor country governments. Negotiations take place between all these groups, and possibly 
other parties as wellS. 
The process of conducting a debt-for-nature swap is a complicated one, with each step 
encompassing a variety of issues that need to be agreed upon. Certain parties participate only 
in those phases of the negotiations on matters relevant to them; for instance, the commercial 
bank will be pre ent in the phase concerning the purcha e and transfer of the debt. While 
subsequent swaps in the same country involve less work than the initial ones, von Moltke 
4 These are not included on Appendix II as no details are available to confirm them from sources other than the ones in which 
they were initially reported. They are also not indicated in the up-to-{jate literature listing swaps that have take place. 
S Othcr parties affected or involved in negotiations arc other NGOs. local civic organisations. industrial interest groups. 
indigenous grouP. aid agcncies and multilateral development banlcs. 
The Debt-lor-Mature Process 
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notes that swaps will not soon become routine events, due to the large numbers of actors and 
the complexity of some issues6, The pertinent factors vary with each swap, but the general 
pattern of the steps is as follows, (please also refer to the illustration overleaf), 
1) A debtor government and/or a local environmental NOO discusses the feasibility or 
appropriateness of a debt-for-nature swap with an international environmental N007, When 
the decision is reached to pursue a swap, negotiations for the agreement are conducted on (i) 
financial terms of debt package and conversion8 , (ii) the general projects to be funded and (iii) 
the local NGO partnership with regard to the administration of the funds9, 
2) The international environmental NOO sponsoring the swap raises funds, then locates and 
purchases the commercial debt on the secondary market10 , The complexity of debt-
conversions usually necessitates using financial intermediaries with pecial expertise in order to 
identify and prepare the requisite documents11 , The LDC debt may need to be traded amongst 
several banks to obtain the right amount for the right country, (Please see Appendix IV for a 
chart of secondary market prices for LDC debt), 
6 Konrad von Moltke, and Paull. Delong, ''Negotiating in the global arena: debt for nature swaps", Resolve, No. 22, The 
Conservation Foundation, 1990, p . lO. 
7 1. Eugene Gibson & Curtis, and Randall K. Curtis, "A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint", Colwnbia JoumaJ o[TransruJlionai 
Law, Vol. 28(2), 1990, p.344; they maintain that the swaps up to October 1990 have been initiated by debtor cOlmtry or ngo 
within that country. This statement has been disputed by others who indicate that the international sponsoring organisation has 
on occasion initiated the discussions - personal interview, Nancy Pritchard, Conservation International, Sept 26, 1991. 
8 Debt package issues include denominations, discount rales, size of debt note's face value or ceiling of total face value of debt 
that can be swapped in a given time period. Conversion deals with the exchange rate, redemption percentage, the conditions 
of payment - maturation schedules, recipient designation. The government's decision on conversion is made in light of many 
factors, including the current value of their debt on the secondary market, the restrictions of any debt restructuring agreements 
that have been entered into and the benefits possible from an increase in foreign exchange earnings from eco-tourism which the 
swap could support. Gibson & Curtis, op.cit., p .347. 
9 The selection of a partner NGO involves issues of which groups, what eligibility criteria and what accountability measures 
are to be used. Often, the local NGOs have previously worked with the sponsoring NGO, and they have already participated 
in the initial discussions on the feasibility of a swap. Administration issues include the delegation of management 
responsibilities, the decision-making structures and parties, and implementation monitoring. Uses of the fund determine the 
allocation to land acquisition and management, research. education, habitat protection, su tainable development programs and 
other expenditures. Gibson & Curtis, op.cit. p .346; involves legal agreement with the beneficiaries as to the auditing and 
evaluation, future determination of fund use, projects to be implemented, and steering boards and program committees, etc. 
The support role of the international NGO, in terms of providing technical and administrative expertise must also be 
determined. 
10 The debt is purchased in U.S . dollars/other hard currencies. (Donations of debt will be discussed in chapter 3). The prices 
for debt vary a great deal, with the lower prices reflecting the poor economic conditions of the countrie , the risks involved. 
The lower prices are attractive to the sponsoring organizations, because when the central bank redemption is high. this creates 
the 'leverage' or multiplication of their funds. However, a low secondary market price indicates the estimated payback 
potential, and insofar as it implicitly reflects poor future economic conditions, it can also indicate the potential ruk to the 
government's ability to honour the payment of conservation bonds (especially if stretched out over a long period of time). 
11 Often the intermediaries have provided advice and acted as agents for the international NGOs without charging the fees that 
they normally eam for arranging commercial debt-equity swaps. 
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3) The sponsoring NGO transfers the title of the debt to the local NGO or to the central bank. 
(This step is technically very complex, and can vary as to who the actual purchaser of the debt 
is I2. The reasons for the variations are financial and tax-related.) 
4) The central bank of the debtor government converts the debt into a local currency 
instrument, cash or bonds, or executes its side of the exchange with measures to protect 
designated areas, or conducts some combination of the above. 
5) The agreed-upon conservation measures and programs are implemented, either by local 
groups and/or by the requisite government agencies. This final step achieves the ultimate goal 
of the swap. If the local currency instrument is in the form of bonds, the principal of the bond 
may serve as an endowment for the local organisation (or some other body) and the interest is 
used to support the programs on an ongoing basis. 
The Interests of Parties 
The relatively simple idea of the swap, though technically complex in its execution, 
relies on a particular confluence of interests of the parties involved. The social coalition that 
conducts a debt-for-nature swap is perhaps unprecedented, representing a new alliance between 
the financial community, environmentalists of both creditor and debtor countries, and 
government officials of both countries. The parties each have different objectives, but can use 
the intersection of interests to achieve the benefits of cooperation. Von Moltke and Delong 
point out that the differences can also be constructive, "one of the major advantages in debt-for-
nature swaps is the difference in the interests of the various actors that allows a range of 
solutions to problems that may arise. "13 The interests of the groups are de cribed in the 
12 R. M. Sadler, "Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Assessing the Future", Journal o/ConJemporary Health Law and Policy. Vol. 6, 
1990, pp. 322-3. Sadler states that it can be the acquisition of the debt by the international NGO which is then donated to the 
local NGO, or the donation of necessary resources for the local NGO to directly acquire the debt, or the donation of the debt 
directly to the local NGO; however, von Moltke & Delong report in 1990 that all of the swaps to date have involved either a 
conservation organization in the creditor country or the creditor country government, which donated it in turn to the local 
conservation organization in the debtor country, 2l2£i.!... pJ. 
13 von Moltke & Delong, Qlliih. p.5. 
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following paragraphs, along with the benefits and the deterrents to participating in debt-for-
nature transactions. 
Sponsoring international environmental organisations 
The purchasing environmental organizations (generally based in the United States or 
Europe) have been the large international conservation-oriented groups, the World Wide Fund 
for Nature, The Nature Conservancy, and Conservation International (hereafter WWF, TNC 
and CI)14. This is because the smaller groups do not have access to the financial or personnel 
resources necessary to arrange such a transaction. The larger organizations are well-placed in 
the international scene to enter into these coalitions for two reasons, the first of which is their 
access to sufficient financial means. Secondly, they often have long histories of collaborative 
relationships with the local environmental groups as well as the requisite governmental I 
agencies in the debtor countries, which facilitate the arrangement and the implementation of the 
swaps. For instance, in the case of the Madagascar, WWF has been actively supporting 
conservation efforts in the country for over 24 years l5 . Brand remarks that the longstanding 
relationships have 'undoubtedly contributed to the success of swap activity to date'16. 
The environmental groups' main objective is to promote environmental con ervation. 
Debt-for-nature swaps provides them the opportunity to protect ecosystems and species to a 
greater extent than through straight cash contributions exchanged on the official currency 
market. They can multiply the value of their conservation funds by using the leverage from 
debt swaps, which is a product of the discount they receive from the secondary market 
combined with the higher redemption price from the central bank t7 . For instance, in the first 
Ecuadoran swap, WWF paid 35.4 cents per dollar for the debt, but obtained a 100 cents worth 
of sucres from the central bank. This swap was estimated to have produced 3 dollar and 
14 Between them, these three groups have conducted 17 of the 19 swaps. They have also combined with smaller ones · the 
Natural Resources Defense C01.U1cil, the Smithsonian, the World Resources Institute and the National Wildlife Federation · to 
form the Debt-for-Nature Ad Hoc Working Group which promotes the nature swaps. Other groups which endorse debt-for· 
nature swaps are: Cultural Survival, Greenpeace USA; Earth Island Institute, Calif, USA; Environmental Defense Fund, 
Washington, DC. 
15 Sadler, QJ2..£i1., p.333. 
16 Monica L. Brand, "Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Moving From Peril to Promise", U.S. Agency for International Development 
LAC/DP, August 1990, p.14. 
17 The exchange rate is also an important variable in the leverage formula . 
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future interest income for every single dollar that the World Wildlife Fund purchased lS . 
Therefore, financially speaking, their interest is to maximize the discount and redemption rate 
to obtain the greatest leverage on the purchased debt. Their other interests include creating 
effective programs with their funds, in order to set off the opportunity cost of alternative uses 
of the finances l9 , and the promotion and development of local environmental groups, who will 
then be able to pursue expanded and more effective conservation. 
The environmental groups draw other benefits beyond the securing the "maximum 
conservation benefit with limited funds"20. These include education of top policy-makers 
domestically and internationally as to the importance of conservation, the creation of 
environmental awareness in communities and generally good publicity. The nature swaps are 
also valuable to the groups if the funds attracted corne from new donors, such as bank-donated 
debt. Additional bonuses are the strengthened links to banks and financial institutions, and 
financial know-how from the experience of conducting a swap. The financial context in which 
the sponsoring groups operate may also create another advantage. Many conservation 
organizations are not permitted to have significant levels of capital formation in their borne 
countries. If they use their money in swaps, even when high inflation may threaten the ability 
of the local organizations to conserve the available capital, they gain financially. However, this 
holds true only to the extent that the interest payments from the swap-produced bonds are more 
beneficial than the opportunity cost of alternative uses of funds21 . 
A number of obstacles to achieving the intended results of the swap also exist to 
dissuade sponsoring groups' participation. First of all, the transaction co ts are high, a the 
complexity and length of time to arrange a swap places large demands on limited resources. 
The groups' other projects may suffer, and their general program priorities may become 
IS Marilyn Post., 'The Debt-for-Nature Swap: A Long-Tenn Investment for the Economic Stability 
of Less Developed Countries", The International Lawyer. Comment Section, Vol. 2A(4), Winter 1990, p.l 0 6. citing WWF 
news release. 
19 Eve Burton. "Debt for Development: A New Opportunity for Nonprofits. Commercial Banks, and Developing States". 
Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 31(1). Winter 1990, p.253. 
20 von Molt1ce & DeLong. op.cit.. p.5 . 
21 von Molt1ce & DeLong. i!;llih. 
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skewed22. Therefore, groups must decide whether the swap benefits outweigh the opportunity 
costs of using the funds23 . For some groups, deciding to participate in a swap may also 
depend on whether the resulting programs would be sufficient to adequately address the causes 
of resource misuse. Secondly, the implementation phase poses some deterrents. The 
sponsoring group must act as a guarantor to its domestic constituency, and in certain 
circumstances, to the tax authorities for the continued responsible use of funds. This 
responsibility remains even after it has relinquished effective control over those funds in order 
to avoid defensiveness about sovereignty matters hindering the swap. Thus the risk of 
unenforceability, should the debtor country not uphold its obligations, can dissuade a potential 
sponsor. In addition, the possible impacts of inflation (see chapter 3) in reducing the 
environmental programs' effectiveness also pose a risk for which the sponsorship of a nature 
swap may not be deemed worthwhile. 
Local environmental groups 
The local environmental groups vary in type and size from country to country. Costa 
Rica has an environmental movement with a long tradition, and local representatives for the 
swaps were easily found24. Ecuador has a fairly young environmental organization with 
strong connections to the government. A coalition of groups was fonned specially for the debt 
swap negotiations in Bolivia, as that country's environmental movement was less developed. 
According to some authors, the local environmental groups play the crucial role in debt-for-
nature swaps25. They often identify the conservation projects needing funding and then enlist a 
sponsoring IENGO. Many have been in contact with the sponsoring organizations through 
other conservation initiatives. The importance of these organizations arises from many factors 
22 Nina M. Dillon, 'The Feasibility of Debt-for-Nature Swap ", North Carolina JourrwJ of inJernalionai Law and Commercial 
RegulaJion, University of North Carolina, School of Law, Vol. 16(1), Winter 1991, p.137; Jeffrey P. Prestemon, and Scon 
E. Lampman. 'Third World Debt: Are there opportunities for forestry?", Journal of Forestry, February 1990, 
p.15. To assess this, the opportunity costs of alternative investments have to be considered, along with the risks of exchange 
rate fluctuations and inflation impact in both developing and industrialized countries . The co ts of negotiation & transaction 
can be minimized if the sponsoring NGOs group together, if the swap follows preceding ones. and to 8 certaffi extent, if the 
banks provide their services, or better still, their debt at no charge. 
23 von Moltke & DeLong, ~ p.5 . 
24 The information on the Costa Rican, Bolivian and Ecuadoran groups are taken from Kristin Dawkins. "Debt-for-Nature 
Swaps", in L.E. Susskind, and E. Siskind, (Eds.), International Environmental Negotiation, Salzburg Conference 
Proceedings, MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program, JuJy 1990. p.8 . 
25 Their cenlJ'ility is stated for instance in Jeff Wise, 'The Role of Debt-for-Nature Swaps in Preserving Habitat", Vol. 7(12), 
1990, p .3; and Betsy Cody, "Debt-for-Nature-Swaps in Developing Countries - an overview of recent conservation efforts", 
Congress Research Service: Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division., Report No . 88-647 ENR, Washington. 
D.C., September 26,1988, p. II . See primarily Hamlin and Gibson & Curtis & Curtis for further details . 
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- their role in public education about the swaps, their knowledge of the country, and familiarity 
with local needs and conditions, and their ability to respond rapidly to changing 
circumstances26. Their role in the implementation of the swaps over the long tenn, by drawing 
on the support and participation of concerned and affected communities, is also considered 
vital. However, they are a very diverse group, and while it is possible to sketch their interests 
at a general level, disaggregated analysis is not possible here. 
The main interest of the many local environmental groups is to maximize their funding, 
as a means to the end of achieving their environmental goals. Groups will negotiate for high 
exchange and redemption rates to boost the amounts they will acquire. They equally have an 
interest in the promotion of future swaps, and in their own organizational development, which 
means that they have a large stake in the successful arrangement and implementation of the 
swaps. 
On the whole, the entire debt-for-nature swap process is for them a very beneficial 
arrangement. They become strengthened through the acquisition of new funds, and the 
experience developed by the swap-funded programs. They also gain recognition from and 
influence upon the government by being involved in the policy-making of these programs. The 
nature swaps allow them to implement programs previously unfeasible through the technical 
and administrative support provided. Moreover, the funds provide not only new resources, 
but stability and longevity of the financial base through the endowments and regular income of 
the bonds. This stability is critical, as the growth of effective private con ervation 
organisations is more recent that in the United States and Europe. Con equently, these 
organizations can improve their current and future conservation efforts by freeing up some of 
their resources from fundraising imperative . The literature mentions no di incentives for the 
local groups to participate in nature swaps, and potential problem ari ing from waps, though 
acknowledged, seem primarily to be considered factors pertaining to the sponsoring 
environmental organisations. 
26 Gibson & Curtis & Curtis, Ql!£.ib p.342. 
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All types of banks are involved in selling LDC debt, but the primary sellers in the 
secondary market are the U.S. regional and European and Japanese banks. The former group 
has less exposure than the larger money-center and giant U.S. banks, and can therefore better 
absorb their losses and clear their portfolios. The European and Japanese banks do not face the 
same accounting regulations that create some uncertainties for the U.S. banks. They are more 
I 
willing and able to reduce their exposure through the market But most banks have reasons for ! 
wanting to sell their debt on the secondary market. Firstly , events in 1987 resulted in the 
practice of holding high loan loss reserves for LDC debt. Citicorp set a new high reserve in 
May, which forced other banks to follow suit. The New York Stock Exchange collapse added 
to pressures to establish greater loan loss reserves. The expense of this safety net "created an 
additional incentive for banks to donate or sell that debt for swaps"27. Secondly, from their 
perspective, the complexities of future participation in renegotiation and rescheduling process 
outweigh the benefits of holding much of the LDC debt. This is especially true for the 
regionals and non-U.S. banks mentioned above, as the process is often dominated by the 
larger banks and directed to their interests at the expense of the former group28. Thirdly, they 
face the possibility of losing the entire loan from certain countries through default or later 
government-mandated forgiveness. Selling LDC debt on the secondary market, therefore, 
became an increasingly attractive option. 
The banks' main interest lies in containing the costs of their non-performing portfolios. 
Swaps allow them to clear unwanted and unproductive foreign debt at low cost. When the 
banks sell portions of their debt, they receive immediate cash income, which allows them to 
reduce their required cash reserves 29, and possibly obtain tax deductions for losses incurred 
by the sale. Insofar as sponsoring environmental groups become cu tomer in the secondary 
market, they are welcomed by banks like any other purchasers30. 
27 Katy Moran. "Debt-for-Narure Swaps: U.S. Policy Issues and Options". Renewable Resources Journal, Spring 1991, 
~ .21. 
8 Cohen, ~ p.116-9. 
29 Prestemon & Lampman,~, p.14 . 
30 von Moltke & DeLong, QR£i1., p.6. 
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Benefits do accrue to the banks selling their debt to nature swap sponsoring groups. ! 
These benefits count all the more so if the debt bas been donated instead of sold. They often 
have an interest in supporting non-profit organizations, both for tax deductions and for public 
relations purposes. They can obtain public relations value both in the debtor countries and in 
the United States, in the latter with "communities usually not disposed to be sympathetic to 
banking concerns"31. There is also increasing recognition of the long-term economic value of 
natural resource protection. Debt-for-nature swaps can be seen as helping the debtor to invest 
in their future economic well-being and to repay other debts. In assisting debtor countries with 
their solvency problems through swaps, banks gain by promoting future good relations with 
the countries in question32. Finally, in light of the expected future increase in environmentally 
related investments, these banks garner a timely edge on their competitors, according to Dogse 
and Droste33. Through nature swaps, they will have links to the conservation community, 
ministries of environment, national environmental protection agencies, and possibly also 
industries working with environmental technology. These could become important future 
business partners. 
However, disincentives exist for the banks also, especially for donation of the debt, 
which has only occurred in three cases to date34. Should the debtor country renew payments 
on its other debt, the banks lose future revenue by having sold the debt35. The sales obligate 
the banks to justify their decisions to the stockholders, although they can argue that it 
contributes to the long-term stability of the country, and increases their own ca h re erves. 
Another disadvantage ari es from the 'free-rider' dilemma. Should debt-for-nature swaps, like 
other debt reduction programmes, increase the possibility that the debtor country can fulfil its 
other debt servicing obligations, those banks that do not sell their debt at a di count may reap 
31 Dawkins, op.cit., p. 7. A green image is increasingly a valuable asset in times of a public more concerned about the 
environment. 
32 Peter D. Dogse, and Bernd von Droste, Debt-for-Nanrre Exchanges and Biosphere Reserves: Eweriences and Potential 
MAB Digesl, UNESCO,1990, p.27. 
33 Dogse & Droste, ibid ., p.23-27. 
34 As the majority of nature swaps involve sales of debt, I will discu s the problems with donation of debt, along with more 
details on problems with debt sales in part 3. 
35 Prestemon & Lampman, oo.cit. p.l4 . This disincentive is of lesser importance, given current assessments of such 
scenarios . The future oUllook of the debt situation will be di cussed in chapler 3. 
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the benefits that the selling bank creates by taking a loss36. Banks involved in debt-for-nature 
swaps may perceive themselves to be losing comparative advantage. 
Other deterrents occur from the interpretation of the sale. Firstly, selling LDC debt may 
tacitly imply that the debt cannot be paid, which could be read as substantiation for the view 
that large-scale forgiveness is necessary. Banks generally dislike being seen to make 
statements on issues of general policy, and such a signal is undesirable. Secondly, banks do 
not want to create so-called 'moral hazard' by encouraging the debtor countries to relax their 
adherence to debt-servicing discipline. Banks fear raising the expectations of debtor countries 
of being able to service their debt along the less demanding lines of nature swaps rather than as 
originally agreed. Finally, the fear of debt 'contamination' remains an significant disincentive 
I 
I 
i 
I 
for banks to participate37. This is where the sale of a portion of a particular LDC debt may I 
prompt auditors to request the bank to write down on their lx>oks the remaining portion of that 
country's debt at the discounted price. Prior to 1986, the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Procedures (GAAP) required that all other loans to the same debtor country be readjusted to 
market value following the swap or sale of a portion of that country's debt. Although the 
accounting procedures changed, (through action by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board) and other debt could stay on the books at 
different levels, banks have stayed secretive about their sales. They are concerned for their 
bargaining position with other debtors over sales and renegotiations. The uncertainties of 
these valuation questions, and other related regulation and accounting standards for sold debt 
actively discourage banks from the secondary market. It is generally recognized that the 
market only deals with a very small proportion of LDC debt, a 1988 estimate naming the figure 
of around 1 %38. Nevertheless, the fact that the market has grown dramatically ince 1984 
testifies to banks' willingness to selJ39. The benefit accompanying participation in debt-for-
nature swaps have attracted banks to this social coalition on at least nineteen occasion . 
36 Dogse & Droste, op.cil.. p.23, 28. 
37 The details from lhis paragraph were gathered from Stephen Van R. Winthrop, "Debt-for-NalUre Swaps: Debt Relief and 
Biosphere Pre ervation1", SAIS Review, Vol. 9(2). Summer-Fall 1989, p.130, 141 ; and Gib on & Curtis, op.cil., p.337. 
38 Cody, op.cit., p.5. Most of the market deals in commercial debt-equity swaps. 
39 The market is reputed to have grown from around $1 billion in 1984 to $6 billion in 1986; Richard S. Weinert, "Swapping 
Third World Debt", Foreign Po/icy, Vol. 65, Winter 1986-87, p.86 and Richard Evans, "Secondary Market : Anomalous but 
Profitable", Eurorrwney, special supplement on Global Debt, January 1988, p.25. 
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Debtor countries' governments 
Twelve swaps have taken place in Latin American debtor countries. Four of these 
countries conducting over half of the swaps, belong to the World Bank's category of the 
seventeen highly indebted countries40. Most of the countries engaged in the swaps have been 
involved in numerous reschedulings and austerity programs, as well are experiencing severe 
difficulties in meeting their interest payments. Many also face critical environmental situations, 
with their natural resources and unique species rapidly disappearing. While these twin crises 
may not replicate itself exactly in every country, the general dilemma is common to all of them. 
The central interest of the debtor countries is to reduce the debt burden as much as 
possible. Thus they wish to obtain as large a part of the discount from the secondary market 
as possible by giving less than 100% redemption rate for the local currency exchange. 
Whatever the rate fmally agreed, the swap helps reduce the demand on foreign exchange 
reserves. It makes 'debt service' easier, because local currency is more readily available. 
Even though the amount swapped is small relative to the total debt burden, the debtor country 
benefits from the proper management of undeveloped resources, the protection of ecosystems 
and the development of 'conservation infrastructure', in which they also have an interest. As 
Bramble points out, "every dollar spent on debt service is a dollar withdrawn from 
development investment"41. Redirecting a portion of foreign debt payment to local projects 
greatly increases the financial resources available for these projects, if any. Some conflict of 
interest may arise within the government between the monetary representative and the natural 
resources representative of the government, the former wishing to pay as little as po ible for 
the debt, whereas the latter desires the opposite in order to increase the funding for natural 
resources management and protection. These differences are resolved prior to the negotiations 
with the sponsoring NG()42. 
40 Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico. The Philippines is the COlmlry outside the Latin American group that also 
features in the highly indebted category. 
41 Barbara J. Bramble, "The Debt Crisis: The Opportunities", The Ecologist, Vol. 17 (4/5), 1987, p.192. 
42 Gib on & Curtis & Curtis, ~, p.349. 
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Of the two of the benefits mentioned above, easier debt service and conservation funds, 
the results of the latter - better managed resources and preserved ecosystems - is hard to 
quantify. Dogse and Droste remark that when linked to other economic incentives, like 
reduced demand on foreign exchange, the environmental gains will become more explicit and 
become at least approximately monetarized through the experience of sponsoring groups 
paying for them43 . If one considers the long-term costs of environmental destruction, it 
becomes clear that it is equally of interest to the developing countries to deal with their 
'environmental debt'. One author emphasizes this when he states: 
If the selling off of natural resources only pays the debt, yet does not 
boost new domestic investment in ecological enhancement or capital 
formation by an amount at least equal to the resource "depletion factor" 
this constitutes the mere liquidation of assets characteristic of a 
bankruptcy. 44 
Other financial benefits from the swap can be reaped. The usual form of redemption, 
bonds, tend to have a later maturity date than the original debt note. Therefore, insofar as these 
original debt notes were being serviced, the bonds effectively reschedule the obligation. 
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Nature swaps are also attractive to developing countries, because unlike the equity swaps that I 
may need hard currency inputs into the investment, most conservation activities require only 
local currency45. Additional benefits with financial implications include recognition of effort 
and commitment from Northern countries. On the whole, the publicity is very positive, 
especially with the first swaps46. This improved image can potentially improve the country's 
creditworthiness and investment attractiveness47 . One author notes that "conservation 
43 Dogse & Droste, Qlllih, p.24. 
44 Joseph R. Potvin, "Debt·Por-Conservation: A New Assessment Framework and Some Practical Options", Latin America 
& the Caribbean Region, Environment Division, The World Bank, Discussion Draft O2!IV!90, March 1990, p.l2. 
(Unpublished document) 
45 von Moltke & Delong, op.ciL p.5 . 
46 Prestemon & Lampman, QR£i.L, p.14. 
47 Dogse & Droste, ~, p.23. 
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expenditures in LDCs represent an expression of faith in the future of these countries"48. The 
symbolic importance of the nature swap lies in countering the vicious circle of lack of faith in I 
the debtor country's economy, which compounds the capital flight49. Finally, the swaps 
increase awareness domestically and internationally of the need both to reduce Third World 
debt and to promote conservation and development plans. The awareness amongst politicians 
and bankers may help to decrease financing for investment in non-environmentally sustainable 
projects50. 
As with all the other parties, potential disadvantages can deter the debtor countries. 
They remain concerned about their long-term creditworthiness. Having generally accepted the 
role of capital in national economic development, they wish to retain access to it51 , and it 
remains a matter of speculation as to how banks in the future will assess nature swaps with 
regard to the moral hazard problem outlined above. From another angle, debtor countries may 
also face negative domestic reaction to any sort of debt negotiations, and accusations that they 
are overpaying the redemption of the debt52. A debtor country could perceive the swaps as 
barring the use of potentially valuable resources for very small reductions in the foreign debt53. 
Other disincentives include problems with the economic impact of nature swaps - the 
potential increase of in inflation, and the sovereignty issue - the foreign interference with 
domestic priorities. These issues will be dealt with at greater length in chapter 3, but need to be 
mentioned here. If countries have serious concerns about them, they will be unwilling to 
I 
engage in nature swaps. The most obvious case is Brazil, whose government has repeatedly I 
rejected proposals for various arrangements, and issued strong statements about safeguarding : 
its sovereignty. A final disadvantage may be the inadequacy of swaps in addre sing the cau e 
of resource misuse54. In terms of its interests, the debtor country government mu t be clear as 
48 von MolLke & Delong. !!ll£ib p.8. 
49 von Mollke & DeLong. ibid .. 
I 
50 Dogse & Droste, oo.cit.. p.24. 
51 Bramble. oo.cit.. p.I92. 
52 This relates to the criticism of the illegitimate nature of the debt, which will be examined in Chapter 3. Dogse & Droste, 
QI!£ih. pp. 23. 25. 
53 Dillon. op.cit p.136. 
54 Dogse & Droste. ~. p.23. 
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to what it wishes the swaps to achieve, and what value it attaches to the disincentives. The 
balance of favor will naturally vary between countries. 
Creditor countries' governments 
The creditor country governments do not have any vital interest in participating in the 
swaps. However, they do have some relative interests in the arrangement and successful 
implementation, and may have more so in the future. They play an important role in relation to 
taxation matters of donated debt, and possibly their involvement through legislation and other 
means will become more central55. In the meantime, they garner several benefits from those 
swaps arranged with their assistance. Firstly, they receive political kudos for supporting 
sound environmental management. The current degree of popular support in the United States 
and Europe for conservation and other environmental protection measures assures a positive 
response to government actions assisting such swaps56. Secondly, any program that 
contributes to the stabilization of the LDCs economic situation without necessitating their 
specific financial intervention is in their interest57. Thirdly, creditor country governments have 
a stake in any mechanism that combats mass deforestation58. The link of deforestation with 
global climate change and the loss of biodiversity ensures that insofar as nature waps 
contribute to more ecologicaUy-balanced management of forests, the swaps deserve creditor 
country support. 
The Confluence of Interests 
These then are the many interests, benefits and disincentives for the parties participating 
in debt-for-nature swaps. As mentioned above, it is the confluence of particular interests that 
allows this social coalition to form. Von Moltke illustrates the intersection of interests that 
55 The two early occasions where debt was donated for narure swaps impinged on the new ground of tax valuation of donated 
debt Here the U.S. Dept of Treasury's action of issuing a Revenue Ruling in November 1987 was considered an important 
first step. This matter and related implications of donaled debt, legislative support, and governmental participation will be 
etrlorcd in chaplers 3 and 4 . 
5 Bramble, oD.ciL, p.192. 
57 von Moltke & Delong, Ql!£ib p .8; They state this without specifying financial intervention. but arguably in terms of 
policy and management of the debt crisis, government inlervention in the LDC economic situation already talc place. The 
evolution of creditor government participation. both with regard to the debt scene and the nature wap will be considered in 
chapter 3 . 
58 von Moltke & Delong, op.cit p.8. 
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enables swaps to be arranged with the following example59 . The debtor countries want to 
obtain a greater net benefit than they would otherwise have. This can mean either substituting , 
external funding for necessary expenditures, or retiring more foreign debt than would be 
possible by other means. Sponsoring organizations, on the other hand, don't wish to pay for 
that which the developing countries would do anyway. They want to have new and additional 
measures put in place for their money. The retirement of foreign debt can satisfy both parties, 
but require the active support of the banks. Furthermore, just as nature swaps are possible 
through an intersection of interests, and requires intricate designing to satisfy all participants, 
anyone of those parties can prevent the swap from occuring should they not be satisfied6o. 
This indicates a certain fragility in the coalition, given the present context of the debt crisis, the 
secondary market, and the other conditions described in chapter one. Having reviewed the 
objectives and possible problems that the parties which to achieve or avoid, it is now necessary 
to consider to what extent and in what ways the swaps have realized the interests and produced 
or avoided the difficulties identified above. 
2.2 Pro2ress of Swaps 
The progress that the swaps have made and are making towards the realization of the 
goals for which they were designed will be the focus of this section. This evaluation exerci e 
is strewn with difficulties, however. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that Little time has 
passed. Just under half of the swaps have been agreed upon within the past two years, and in 
some cases, the debt for these has still not been purchased. Another major difficulty , ari ing 
directly out of the first, lies in the lack of progress reports in the secondary literature. Most of 
the information available concerns the first three swaps, which, being the olde t, have had the 
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most scrutiny. But most updates are usually confined to the swap transaction and I 
implementation details according to the agreement, not according to how they have actually 
59 von Moltke & DeLong. i!lli!... p.7. 
60 von Moltke & DeLong . .i.!lli6 p.lO 
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fared to date6l . A third and perhaps the most serious difficulty lies in the fact that the very 
parameters for assessment themselves are under dispute. Determining the appropriate 
expectations of what swaps can achieve will influence the evaluation significantly. 
Much of the discussion on the accomplishments of nature swaps has centered on the 
two main categories of debt relief and environmental conservation. But if the agreements 
generally were designed to serve various ends, as Hamlin maintains, then the assessment of the 
swaps will depend on to what extent these ends are reached62. He identifies multiple financial 
interests, the promotion of local environmentalists, future nature swaps, the management of 
undeveloped resources, and the resolution of conflicts of interest as goals. Another way of 
assessing the swaps would be within the context of the environmental needs of developing 
countries, as Patterson does63. Criteria would then include, at the national level, the increase 
of environmental awareness throughout society, the development of environmental strategies, 
the furtherance of sustainable development, and effective biodiversity protection. At the 
governmental level, it includes significant policy reform and the strengthening of governmental 
agencies. The other three needs consist of strengthening independent NGOs, encouraging the 
profit sector in conservation and sustainable development, and tapping significant financial 
resources. While it has become obvious that debt-for-nature swaps will not accomplish some 
of the larger aspirations invested in them at their inception, looking at how swaps do fulfil the 
interests of the participants in terms of debt relief, environmental protection, and other goals 
mentioned above will demonstrate the progress that nature swaps have made. It will also 
reflect the relative importance of swaps as a private mechanism in addressing the environment-
development nexus. 
Debt Relief and Debt Stabilization 
61 This is presumably because the evalualion phase would entail COSLS for which no money is available. and because those 
swap arrangemenLS which mandale expenditure reports would be in the local languages, the translation and analysis of which 
are not yel available in the secondary hterature. 
62 Hamlin, op.cit., p. l 070. 
63 Alan Patlerson. "Debt -for-Narure Swaps and the Need for Alternatives", EnvironmenJ. Vol. 32,1990,. p.12. 
I 
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It is generally acknowledged that debt-for-nature swaps concern insignificant amounts 
compared to the total debt burden. Words such as "negligible" and "minuscule" are used to 
describe the amount of debt retired. The proportions involved usually tend below the 1 % 
figure. For instance, Bolivia's swap involved $650, 000 compared with a debt burden of $8.3 
billion - approximately 0.13% 64; the Philippines has a $2 million swap agreement compared 
to a debt burden of $28.4 billion. The exception is Costa Rica, whose first two years of 
swapping amounted to $68.5 million. This is approximately 5% of its private foreign debt. 
Another potential exception is the Dominican Republic, whose program has a conversion 
ceiling of $80 million. If this amount is exchanged, it could retire around 10% of its foreign 
debt. These examples notwithstanding, with the present scale and number of nature swap 
transactions, relief from a staggering debt burden is not a realistic outcome for most debtor 
countries. 
Despite this, those who support nature swaps dispute the total debt burden being used 
as a point of reference. Hamlin points out that given the limited resources of the sponsoring 
environmental organizations, no expectation existed that swaps would make an important dent 
in the aggregate burden of the countries concemed65. He stresses that the swaps should not be 
dismissed because of their size but rather judged a financial success due to the mutual benefits 
that result both for debtors and sponsoring organizations66. 
Other authors emphasize the reduced demand on foreign exchange that the debtor 
countries experience as a result67. But Patterson points out that the saving are actually less, 
simply because many countries are currently unable to service their debts68 . Bolivia and 
Ecuador have had moratoria on both debt and interest repayments over the last several years, 
and Costa Rica has limited its repayment to a fixed percentage of the government principal . No 
figures are available in the secondary literature to show how much reduction is achieved. A 
more indicative measure, however, would be the amount of "debt stabilization" that the swaps 
64 Burton. Qll£i!... p.241 ; Hamlin. Qllii!.. p.I07l. 
65 Hamlin. iJ:lli!.. 
66 Hamlin. ibid .. 
67 Winthrop. Qllii!.. p.129. 
68 Pauerson. ~. p.l O. 
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produce; that is to say, the percentage that the swap represents in the annual interest payments 
met or missing. In most cases, the amount of interest unpaid is capitalized and adds to the total 
burden. As virtually no new loans are available, the absence of an increase in total 
indebtedness could be attributed to the swaps and would more accurately reflect the financial 
'relief produced. Two authors report that the swaps, in this manner, make a "noticeable 
contribution towards a more viable [DC] debt situation"69. The limited budgets of the 
sponsoring organizations, though, restrict this potential for debt stabilization, as Sadler 
correctly underlines. To date, these organizations have only purchased debt heavily discounted 
in the secondary market, or debt from those countries qualifying as heavily indebted by the 
World Bank70. 
However, a broader consideration of the financial benefit afforded by nature swaps 
comes from Potvin. He criticizes the financial analyses of nature swaps limited to conventional 
market considerations, such as those found in World Bank Working Paper by Occhiolini and 
Hansen 71. Occhiolini proposes that if the spending on the domestic environment bond is 
greater than the debt service payments on the external debt exchanged for the swap, then the 
swap is worse for the debtor country than an outright donation of the money used to purchase 
the debt72. Hansen asserts that the benefits to debtors from nature swaps depends on the 
expected evolution of the secondary market discounts for debt73. Potvin rejects these 
approaches which assess nature swaps only in relation to their short-term financial merits. He 
formulates an ecologically sustainable development economics framework, and suggests that 
the aforementioned authors miss several benefits by not considering the debtor countrie ' 
69 Sadler. op.cit.. p.336. citing von Moltke & Delong. op.ci!. p.7. 
70 Sadler. Ql2£iL. p.336. TIlls may no longer be valid. as four other COlUltries have transacted 6 more nature swaps and may 
not fall into these categories. Those heavily indebted countries who have engaged in swaps are Bolivia. Costa Rica. Ecuador. 
Mexico. and Philippines. Those countries with heavily discounted debt in the secondary market are. according to Sadler's 
footnote Ill. (Dec '87) Costa Rica and Zambia. Appendix IV in this paper only has prices for one other country that has had a 
debt for nature swap - Poland (April '88 -42%). No secondary prices are available for Madagascar. Paraguay or the 
Dominican RepUblic. and none of these feature in the 17 highly indebted category. However. generally. the low secondary 
market price and/or the amena.bility of government to a nature swap will be related to the amount of indebtedness of a 
developing COlUltry. 
71 Hansen. Stein. "Debt for Nature Swaps - Overview and Discussion of Key Issues". Ecological 
Economics, Vol 1 (1). February 1989. pp.77-93; Occhiolini. Michael. "Debt-for-Nature Sw ps". 
Working Paper 393. Debt and International Finance Division. International Economics Department, 
Policy. Research and External Affairs. The World Bank. March 1990. 
72 Occhiolini. Ql2£iL. p.I7. 
73 Potvin. ~ p.3; Hansen. ~ p.85. 
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ecological maintenance expenditure obligations, which swaps can help reduce. The point that 
Potvin makes is that the debt-for-nature swaps can have positive spin-offs for domestic 
expenditures for environmental services like clean water. These expenditures appear in 
financial terms, either by not being paid and showing up in other financial losses, or by being 
paid in order to maintain the services. Insofar as neglect of these obligations make it more 
difficult for countries to service their debt over the long-term, for instance, in the case of non-
sustainable harvesting of natural resources to earn foreign exchange, debt-for-nature swaps 
provide greater relief and stabilization than the above-mentioned generic comparisons and 
proportions reveal. In his own words: 
Ecological debt obligations are considered here to be at least as imperative 
as those related to foreign fmancial debt For just as surely as the global 
fmanciaI system will founder if a large proportion of the outstanding 
debts among developing countries are simply defaulted, the functional 
integrity of the ecosystem will fail under stress if adequate financial 
commitments are not forthcoming for initiatives to control and reverse the 
cumulative degradation. The argument that debt-for-nature swaps barely 
make a dent in the overall debt burden applies equally to both problems - in 
particular because neither one is the result of a mere cash-flow squeeze. 
Compared with the fundamental structural improvements needed, the 
amount that any financing mechanism can be expected to achieve without 
much of an increase in new funding commitments is obviously limited74. 
Potvin maintains that so long as the mechanism brings i) returns on investment to conserve 
resource rent values, and ii) reductions in essential ecological maintenance expenditures, it 
provides debt relief75. This perspective transcends the previous evaluations by con idering the 
'services' provided by the environment. In the same way that it is cheaper to con erve energy 
than to produce new sources, conservation and maintenance of ecological functions is better 
than expenditures for rehabilitation after damage has been wrought76. Therefore, debt-for-
74 Potvin. oD.cit. p.39. Italics from the original. 
75 Potvin. oD.cit.. p.39. 
76 Potvin discusses this in relation to the inflation question. oD.cit.. p.35 -36. He notes that returns to conservation inveslment 
can be calculated from exhaustible resource rents conserved as well as most cost-effective protection, repair and enhancement 
expenditures on improvements to functional ecological integrity. He concludes that the debtor countty would benefit more 
from max.irnizing its obligations through saving resources and reducing necessary expenditures rather than making 
environmental expenditures. 
I 
I 
, 
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nature swaps produce a measure of both direct and indirect debt relief through stabilization and 
contributions to the maintenance of ecological integrity. Nevertheless, the relief afforded 
remains small compared with the overall need. 
Environmental Protection 
As with debt relief, the evaluation of environmental protection achieved depends on the 
delineation of the area for scrutiny. Protection can be considered specifically - how each 
program instituted by the swap is faring - and generally - how the changes in governmental 
priorities will ensure future conservation efforts, how the swaps address the causes of 
degradation, and even globally, what swaps contribute to combating the wider problems of 
deforestation, greenhouse gas release, and genetic diversity loss. 
Specific Swaps 
Referring to specific achievements, von Moltke comments that "the resulting 
conservation programs have had a major impact"77. In some cases, the sponsoring 
organization's resources available for conservation have been doubled, and frequently amount 
to the total resources that the sponsoring organization has transferred to the debtor country 
over the past two decades. To date, over $100 million in local currency has been generated for 
conservation, and until last year, all fund disbursements have been complete and on time with 
only one exception 78. In Bolivia, funds are now going to an important protected area where 
none were previously available79. In Ecuador, swaps provided funds of a size twice that of the 
annual government park budget80. According to Brand, a high proportion of this additional 
money pays the direct costs of preservation and sustainable management81 . Mo t swaps have 
designated their expenditures for existing parks and preserves, though some new area have 
been placed under protection. 
77 Von Mo1tke & DeLong. 2R&ih. p.IO. 
78 Brand. oo.cit.. p.38. Her report is dated August '90 - more recent indications concerning payment promptnes is available; 
the exception is Bolivia - see section 2.3. 
79 Patter on • .2V.&i.h. p.6. 
80 Patterson. illliL. 
81 Brand.2P£ih, p.39. 
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Generally the priorities of the swaps have reflected those of the sponsoring 
organizations: the procurement, preservation and management of natural resources. 
Conservation International concentrates on 'sustainable development' programs, especially for 
the timber industry, while protecting biological diversity and regeneration of resources82. It 
also provides scientific research scholarships, environmental education programs, and formal 
training in biology. The Nature Conservancy aims for the improvement of documentation of 
the scientific significance of the protected areas. Each swap country is requested to fund 
Conservation Data Centers83. The World Wide Fund for Nature focuses on more traditional 
conservation measures. It seeks to combat the problem of parks without effective protection by 
having ecologically important lands set aside and by training conservation professionals84. It 
also designates part of its funds for institutional development and individual training. Hamlin 
states that while the sustainable development and traditional conservation approaches differ 
fundamentally, "it is not clear that either is necessarily superior"85. The WWF approach has the 
swapping country decide which lands to preserve, but its agreements usually prohibit any 
activities other than research in those areas, whereas CI responds to the developmental needs of 
the swapping countries with sustainable development programs. 
With regard to the success of the implementation, again, it is too early to make 
definitive proclamations for most swaps. Perhaps a good indication will be when the first 
swap agreements come up for renewal in 1992. Should either the TENGOs, local NGOs or 
debtor governments decline to participate further, problems in implementation will be revealed. 
Some indications of progress are available for Bolivia, Ecuador and Costa Rica86. In Bolivia, 
the conservation of the Beni Region is progressing now that the adrnini trative structure is in 
place. Task forces have been appointed to deal with issues of forestry, watershed, flora and 
82 In conjWlction with this. it also works to protect indigenous territories from logging and subsequent colonization. 
according to Maria Teresa Ortiz, 'The Road to el Porvenir". Orion Nature Quarterly, The Myrin lnstirute and Conservation 
International. Vol. 8 (3). Summer 1989. cited in Dawkins. oo.cit. p.ll. 
83 Dawkins. oo.cit., p.ll : The data centers are locally-controlled. employ 5 to 8 scientists and establish a local data-base for 
~ies ranked according to endangerment and degree of lUliquen s. 
4 Hamlin. oo.cit. p.1077-8. 
85 Hamlin.~ p.I079 
86 The following information is taken from Gibson & Curtis. oo.cit pp. 358-9; 3634; 371 -2. 
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fauna conservation, public awareness, environmental education, and the socio-economic 
ramifications of the conservation programs. In Ecuador, for both swaps a new budget and 
rules for project review have improved the decision-making among the parties involved by 
formalizing the procedures. As for Costa Rica, the amount of swaps transacted speak for the 
positive experiences the country has had with nature swaps. A new debt conversion program 
was launched in February 1989 to promote sustainable development - supporting projects 
involving education, small industry and natural resource conservation. Gibson and Curtis 
observe that this 'institutionalisation' of the swaps through the conversion program illustrates 
the country's commitment to the success of the swaps. 
Another perspective with which to consider the environmental protection of nature 
swaps involves looking at the wider picture, again using Potvin's ecological economics 
framework. Debt-for-conservation can be valuable in a type of national resource accounting 
exercise. If the nature swap programs are an effective use of funds for environmental 
protection which must eventually be paid, and furthermore, if ecology rent conservation is 
more efficient than the creation of new rents, then the overall contribution of swaps goes 
beyond the value of the land protected. Potvin discusses this in relation to a broader 
application of debt-for-conservation than current nature swap practice. But the point remains 
valid. Insofar as swaps result in shifting resources from environmentally degrading activities 
to more sustainable ones (whether in park protection or in 'sustainable use' projects), they 
accrue further direct and indirect financial benefits. Swap projects can decrease future 
expenditures to maintain or restore functional ecological integrity or to extend annual resource 
rents87. Seen in this manner, the environmental protection nature swaps produce cannot be 
considered minimal. 
Wider Impact 
The wider impact of swaps must also be closely considered in evaluating the success of 
environmental protection of the swaps. Such aspects as raising environmental awareness, 
87 Brand, Q1l&i6 p.42. 
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influencing governmental priorities, addressing the causes of degradation and the wider 
problems of global warming and species loss contributes to the realization of the swaps' 
objectives. In terms of awareness, swaps are considered quite good at fostering consciousness 
of environmental issues. Both in the participating countries, and throughout Latin America, 
Gibson reports an increased awareness of conservation issues as a result of the swaps88. 
In terms of governmental involvement and future commitment to environmental 
protection activities, the swaps have been relatively constructive. The various government 
ministries, often inclucting the Central Bank, have an ongoing role in the administrative bodies 
established to oversee the swap programs. This involves them on a long-term basis in the 
process of their country's environmental protection and conservation. In Ecuador, for 
example, several government agency representatives serve as members on the swaps' project 
commissions, which determine projects, budgets and plans along with the international 
NGOs89. An additional signal of the government's interest and support came when the 
Monetary Board's representative officially acknowledged the swap - a gesture of political and 
policy significance. The fIrst Philippines swap likewise specifies joint approval of projects and 
programs by the environment department and the local and international NGOs. Similar 
arrangements exist for the other swaps. On the whole, the swaps have been generally well 
supported by the participating governments, the institutionalisation of a debt conversion 
program in Costa Rica being the foremost example. Yet the fact is that the swaps usually fall 
within the policy areas already approved by the governments. They probably effect very little 
change, Patterson notes, though change is more likely when the funds or rewards are greater, 
or when the swaps fall in line with directions desired by the government90. An upcoming test 
of this would be Brazil, whose president is reputedly in favor of swaps but faces opposition 
from other areas of the government. Brazil is also currently considering nature swap 
transactions (see Appendix ill, under the end section of Other Potential Swaps). 
88 Gibson & Curti . oo.cit, p.356. 
89 Gibson & Curtis, p.363-4. 
90 Patterson, op.ciL, p.l2. 
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Whether the swaps' programs address the causes of environmental degradation is a 
somewhat controversial question. The negative contention forms the basis of much criticism of 
the nature swaps. Winthrop, though supporting the swaps, and pointing out the many 
thousands of acres under protection (admittedly of varying degrees of effectiveness), highlights 
the difficulty of attributing lasting impact to the swaps. He likens it to attempting to move a 
mountain with a teaspoon91 . The sustainable development programs promoted by the local 
NO Os and CI take initial steps, but the larger circle of poverty and debt-linked natural 
resources exploitation clearly need more fundamental reforms. Patterson states that relative to 
the needs of country-wide environmental plans and sustainable development strategies outside 
of protected areas, debt-for-nature swaps fall short92. 
The related questions of swaps' contribution to problems of global warming and 
genetic diversity loss also necessarily feature in an assessment of the nature swaps' wider 
impact. According to Sadler, tropical rainforests are the primary beneficiaries93 • To the extent 
that this halts deforestation over the long term, the swaps playa role in combating these two 
problems. They achieve this by simultaneously reducing the release of greenhouse gases and 
conserving the immense genetic diversity of the forests. The future consequences of global 
warming and genetic diversity loss mean that this dimension of environmental protection 
benefits all countries. Brand correctly stresses that the current problems in environmental 
valuation should not allow a marginalisation of the global benefits of the conservation 
programs94. 
Another contribution of nature swaps is the accumulation of scientific knowledge about 
tropical ecosystems that they enable95 . Research needs have been better defined, and now 
includes studies on the social and economic impacts of the conservation projects on the local 
and indigenous communities, as in the Bolivian and Paraguan swaps. The Conservation Data 
Centers in particular are considered very valuable. The outcome of the e re earch projects will 
91 Winthrop. oo.cit. p.l47 . 
92 Pallerson, oo.cit.. p.12. 
93 Sadler, QI!£ib p.338 . 
94 Brand,!W£ib p.41-42. 
95 Dawkins, ~ p.12. 
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be an improved understanding of environmental and social needs and the ability to undertake 
environmental protection. 
Other Goals 
Other goals of those parties participating in nature swaps include the strengthening of 
local conservation groups, attracting significant financial support, and the developmental 
interests in the management of natural resources. (The promotion of further agreements will 
be discussed in chapter 4.) These issues pertain to the evaluation of debt-for-nature swaps in 
illustrating to what extent they can be realized and what this implies for the overall 'success' of 
the swaps. 
The sponsoring groups desire a strengthening of local conservation groups in order to 
see more effective and self-detennined conservation efforts which reflect local needs and 
priorities. In effect, this has occurred, at least to a greater extent than existed prior to the 
swaps. The groups gain influence by being officially included in the agreements for the 
implementation of the swap programs and by being designated recipients of the swap funds. 
The Bolivian NOO LIDEMA is the 'executing entity' for CI, representing the sponsor and 
contracting out for the program implementation. Furthennore, its role has been enhanced since 
the execution of the agreement. It is now a member of the Finance Committee which has the 
power to veto use of funds from the Beni Biosphere Reserve endowment96. In the first Costa 
Rican, Ecuadoran and Philippino swaps, the local NOOs are signatories to the agreement, and 
hold substantial authority as such97. They also hold the bonds and receive all the interest, or in 
the Philippino case, obtain the currency directly. The long-tenn stable financing is equally 
instrumental for their development. Hamlin notes that while they do not neces arily have 
management autonomy as a direct result of fiscal control, they remain important for the 
implementation of the agreement. The NOOs thereby gain influence in government circles and 
in turn promote the development of environmental interests in these countries. As Hamlin 
96 Hamlin, ~, p.lon following info on local groups taken from this page. 
97 Hamlin, illliL. 
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points out, "this formal linkage between local environmentalists and their respective 
governments may be the most significant accomplishment of the debt-for-nature agreements."98 
This solidifies at least one part of the social coalition. It also helps not only the chances of 
continued adherence to the agreement, but furthers the integration of other environmental 
protection objectives into the main political agenda and promotes cooperation between the 
NGOs and the government in achieving these goals. 
The participating countries also have developmental interests at stake in conducting 
debt-for-nature swaps. These fall into what Hamlin calls the management of undeveloped 
resources. Those countries participating are interested in the benefits of traditional conservation 
for non-developmental reasons, but especially in those swaps that promote 'sustainable 
development' projects. One example is the second Costa Rican swap, which placed 25% of 
its funds in sustainable development practices through local social interest groups (see 
Appendix ill). Another example is the fIrst swap with Bolivia99. The Beni Biosphere region 
is divided into core and buffer areas: the core remains undeveloped (for scientific observation 
only), the buffers will be used by the Chimane Indians and carefully monitored agricultural and 
forestry development. However, to date, sustainable development-oriented swaps are in the 
minority. By contrast, the majority of WWF-sponsored swaps (which outnumber the CI-
sponsored swaps 2 to 1) promote traditional conservation that does not allow any economic 
development on its designated sites - as in the first Ecuadoran and Philippines swapslOO. 
Nevertheless, those governments concluding agreements with WWF are clearly interested in 
the benefits that the stricter conservation approach provides. 
Sustainable development strategies are now being investigated as ways to enable a 
"permanent, healthy and survivable interaction between humans and the environment." 101 In 
light of the growing interest in such practices, especially with those natural resources pre ently 
exported for foreign currency earnings, the debtor countries have a great deal to gain by 
9 Hamlin. iQiQ.. 
99 See Hamlin. Ql2£i.L p.1078 for more details on agreement structure. 
100 Hamlin.~. p.1079. 
101 Dawkins. QlI£iL. p. 12. 
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assuring themselves the benefits of more viable and longer-term natural resource 
management 102. Insofar as the nature swaps provide a better understanding of how to 
promote a balanced and non-destructive co-habitation between humans and the environment, 
they promote the long-term development interests of the swapping countries. 
The debtor countries also need substantial financial resources to deal with their 
environmental needs. For various reasons, nature swaps so far do not necessarily provide 
significant amounts of funding. While this may change, presently the swaps are not successful 
in attracting the private for-profit sector in conservation and sustainable development efforts. 
The enormous needs of the debtor countries means that the absence of this sector greatly limits 
the capacity of debt-for-nature swaps to address environmental protection and country-wide 
involvement in less destructive strategies103• 
Thus we see that nature swaps aim for a variety of goals with differing levels of 
success. Broad interpretations of debt relief, and environmental protection permit a favorable 
conclusion. Nevertheless, this somewhat positive picture of the progress that nature swaps 
have made must be contrasted with the problems, constraints and critique that have arisen, and 
which the following chapter examines. 
102 The potential of non-timber forest products as an environmentally sustainable source of income is gaining a lot of 
attention, but at present is still at the e perimental stage. 
103 Pauerson, op.cit.. p.12. 
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Problems and Critique of Debt-for-Nature Swaps 
Debt-for-nature swaps are subject to a number of problems and constraints, as well as 
criticisms. The problems can act as disincentives to participants from engaging in the swaps 
and offset the progress already discussed. The criticisms of the swaps take both the problems 
engendered by the swap process and the underlying rationale of the swaps to task. The fIrst 
section will examine these problems and to what extent they pose a barrier to the progress 
discussed previously. The main problems fall into two categories - in transaction arrangement 
and in implementation. The second section will consider the criticisms, their basis and what 
the implications for the outlook of the nature swaps are. The main types of criticisms concern 
the mechanism's shortcomings, its moral difficulties, and its imperialist aspects. 
3.1.1 Problems in Transaction Arran2ement 
The majority of the problems in the arrangement of the nature swap transaction fall into 
the category of identifying and acquiring the debt, although certainly difficulties in negotiations 
on the agreement exist The latter are very seldom discussed in the secondary literature, except 
in the context of the disincentives and conflicts of interest mentioned in section 2.1. 
Consequently in this section, a nature swap agreement is taken as a given. 
Buying Debt 
Once an agreement on the debt package has been made, a sponsoring environmental 
organization may experience difficulties in identifying and purchasing the right kind of debt on 
the secondary market 1. Previous to changes in U.S. tax and accounting regulations in 1986-
87, debt on sale for swaps was scarce. Since then, the situation has improved2 , and the 
secondary market has continued to grow, but locating the desired parcel can still prove 
difficult. Because of their limited resources, spon oring organizations are generally looking 
for small amounts of debt, typically $100,000 to $500,000. Third World debt tend to be held 
in much larger quantities and these mall amounts are thinly traded. It may be difficult to 
1 Thi passage relies mainly on information from Winthrop, op.cit. p.l41 -2, and Gibson & Curtis, op.cil.. p.338-9. 
2 See discussion in Chapter 2.1 regarding banks' disincentives to participate. 
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identify which banks have the appropriate types, as they are typically the lesser known regional 
banks. Often, these amounts have been fully written down by the banks, which removes the 
tax benefits to the banks of selling at a discount and recording a loss. Also, the larger 
investment banks dealing in the secondary market earn substantial fees from trading debt 
(sometimes up to 4% of the deal), so the smaller parcels may not be considered worthwhile in 
tenns of the transaction costs involved. 
Following the location of the appropriate debt package, the acquisition may present 
problems. Third World debts are often held by bank consortia, and require complicated 
transactions to obtain the multiple approvals. The leaders of a consortium, usually large 
money-center banks, fear debt contamination, and sometimes block the conversion until the 
debtor country has renegotiated its debt terms3. According to Gibson and Curtis, most nature 
swaps to date have been transacted with the developing country debt that has already been 
written down by the banks, or for which the banks have already established loan loss 
reserves4 . While it was noted above that such treatment of the debt removes the tax incentives 
to banks to sell, the NGOs hope that banks will become more receptive to selling or donating, 
presumably because the treatment resolves accounting problems5. 
Acquiring Bank-Donated Debt 
Bank donations of debt have been very rare, with only four instance occurring to 
date6. However, because of the limited resources the sponsoring NGO have, donation of debt 
is considered one possible way to increase the scale of nature swap activity. Analysi of the 
tax situation facing U.S. banks considering debt donation shows that both uncertainties and the 
lack of incentives hinder banks from donating. Three main factors influence this situation - the 
3 Gibson & Curtis, op.cit. p.339 
4 Gibson & Curtis,~, p.338. 
5In June '89 the top 15 U.S. banks had approximately $20 bill in reserves against $70 bill in loans , but the reserves were not 
earmarked for LOC exposure formally; General Accounting Office figures show that regulators required $4.3 bill, but 
estimated that a minimum of $49 bLllion is nee sary - Gibson & Curtis, ~, p. 338. 
6 They are I) Fleet National Bank(Norstar Financial Group) of Rhode Island. February 1988, 254,000 to TNC for Costa 
Rica swap no. 1; 2) Chase Manhattan affiliate, December 198 ,$400,000 Bolivian debt to CI; 3) Deutsche Bank, ometime in 
1989, of an unknown to Madagascar for environmental conservation; 4) Bank of America, June 1991, 6,000,000 to WWF, 
CI, Smithsonian Institute, for future swaps in Mexico, Ecuador, other south American countries. 
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Department of Treasury Ruling 87-124, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 170, and the 
tax regulations concerning 'source of 10ss'7. 
In November 1987, the U.S. Treasury Department issued Revenue Ruling 87-124, 
which includes debt for charity swaps (including debt-for-nature swaps)8. This ruling allows 
banks to claim firstly the difference between the loan's face value and the loan's market value at 
the time of donation as a loss, and secondly the 'fair market value' of the proceeds generated as 
a charitable donation9. The problem with this Ruling is the valuation of the second part, which 
it indicates will rely on the local currencies. However, debt-for-nature swaps are not always 
conducted with the free market exchange rates, due to local currency restrictions. 
Furthermore, the alternative of valuation at the secondary market price would also be 
difficult lo, as similar debt may be hard to find. The Internal Revenue Service will determine 
the value on a case-by-case basis, according to the information it receives. But this does not 
provide a clear enough situation prior to donation to encourage the banks to donate. 
The IRC section 170 deals with requirements for charitable deductions that the Revenue 
Ruling 87-124 neglects. The relevant issues concern whether the debt donated could be only 
that of a foreign central bank, whether the valuation could take place with bonds instead of 
currencies, and whether the recipient charity could be that of a foreign country. The Treasury 
wrote a letter on these issues ll , giving the unofficial position of the Treasury and the IRSl2. It 
indicated firstly that private sector or other government agency debt was eligible, secondly that 
valuation of bonds was consistent with the principle of the Ruling, and thirdly, the charity 
status of a foreign NGO depended on the amount of control the sponsoring NGO exercised 
over the donated debt. This issue is a complicated one, but a positive court precedent exist 
7 The information on bank donations and tax issues reljes heavily on Gibson. oo.cit. pp. 372-385 and Winthrop. oo.ci!. 
~. \30. 141-2. 
Revenue Rulings are opinions of the Treasury Department. They carry less authority than Revenue Regulations, but have 
~een persuasive precedents for many courts when cited. They are to serve the uniform application of tax law by providing 
mterpretative guidance to tax payers. Dillon. ~ p. 131. 
9 Dillon. 2lL..£il.., p.132. 
10 Somc critics of Ruling 87 -12A argue that valuation should be based on secondary market price. Gibson & Curtis, Ql1...cil... 
f·375 . 
I The response was by C. Eugene Steuerle, Deputy Assistant Secrctary for Tax Analy is. to Senator John H. Chafee who 
enquired specifically about these issues. The ICller is dated March 29. 1988. For more extensive details on this maUer. see Jud 
Harwood, "Narure Swaps - Commentary", Taxes InJernaJionai, No. 93, 1988, pp. 3-12, 87-89; and R.J. Halperin. "Revenue 
Ruling 87-124: Treasury's Flawed Interpretation of Debt-for-Nature Swaps", University o/Miami Law Review, Vol. 43, 
1989. 
12 Gib on & Curtis. QQ£i.L p.378. The leiter is considered a liberal intcrpretation of the RR 87-124. 
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where specific designation of the proceeds can substitute for actual or physical possession of 
the donation 13 . The donating banks must then be able to show that the specific donation 
request of the NGO in order to receive the largest possible tax deduction. Overall, this seems a 
positive context for banks considering debt donations. 
However, one other important domain impinges on the donation treatment - the source 
of loss rules. Banks wish to attribute their losses on LDC debt to their domestic (U.S.) income 
instead of to their foreign source income for tax reasons 14. The Treasury Department issued 
rules in May 1989 to the effect that the loan losses were to be considered from foreign 
sources l5. This source of loss rule deters direct bank donation, because they obtain bener tax 
benefits by selling in the secondary market. Banks can only deduct up to 10% of their taxable 
income for charitable and other deductions and debt donations could rapidly use up this 
allowance16. 
Other factors also deter banks from engaging in the complications of donating debt. 
Gibson remarks that banks fear negative shareholder reaction, and possible law suits resulting 
from bank asset donations17. Also the bank regulatory authorities take a conflicting position to 
the tax authorities on treatment of LDC debt. The indications given by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, in the Banking Circular No. 200 and the GAAP "hinder banks from taking 
positive steps to reduce their LDC loan portfolios"18. The GAAP and Circular statements 
imply that banks may have to write down other loans to a particular borrower after having 
registered a loss from a debt conversion to that borrower. Federal laws and regulations may 
also compel debt write-downs, depending on the 'rating' that the impaired loans receive 
according to the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983. The Act may require a bank to 
13 Gibson & Curtis. ~, p.379-80. 
14 This is because the huge LDC debt loss would substantially lower their uu obligations. If it is attributed to their foreign 
source income, they would then pay less foreign uues. which lowers the credit limit they have under U.S. UU regulations for 
foreign taxes. 
IS Notice 89-58. Gibson & Curtis,~. p. 381 -2. 
16 Gibson & Curtis. p .382: Banks benefit because adjusled gross income subtracting below the line' deductions. including 
charitable deductions. are subject to percentage limitations whereas deductions to gross income subtractions 'above the line' are 
not. 
17 Gibson & Curtis. QQ£ih. p.384 . 
18 Gibson & Curtis, oo.cit. p. 337: Admin. National Banks. Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Circular No . 200, 
Accounting for Loan swaps (1985). 
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establish an Allocated Transfer Risk Reserve (A TRR) or allow the bank the option of writing 
down that part of the loan requiring an ATRR19. As mentioned above, it is unclear whether 
writing down encourages or deters the banks to sell or donate. Nevertheless, the general 
uncertainties of the overall tax and accounting regulations collectively discourage donations 
from the banks. 
Those donations that have occured seem to have been made without regard to the 
charitable deduction option. Gibson terms them "nuisance" debt disposal20. The flrst instance 
occured when the Fleet National Bank of Rhode Island donated $254,000 of Costa Rica's debt 
to The Nature Conservancy. Although it was initially thought to have been in response to the 
87 -124 ruling, it was later established that the charitable deduction was not a factor in the final 
decision to donate. The second donation came from an affiliate of Chase Manhattan Bank in 
December 1988. Conservation International received $400,000 of Bolivian debt. The potential 
tax benefits were 'apparently not a factor' in this donation either21 . Other donations from 
European banks have been made, but as mentioned previously, not being subject to the same 
tax and accounting regulations, they do not face the same disincentives22. More recently, the 
Bank of America (BA) has donated $6 million in Latin American loans towards rainforest 
conservation activities in Mexico, Central and South America. The recipients, WWF, CI, and 
the Smithsonian Institute, will receive the money over a three-year period and use towards 
debt-for-nature swaps. The bank's Chief Executive Officer, Richard M. Rosenberg described 
the bank's donation as in keeping with their commitment to speciflc con ervation and 
environmental principles". However, BA is one of the more troubled U.S. banks, particularly 
on the domestic front23 . Its domestic vulnerability increases its difficulty and costs in 
19 Gibson & Curtis. 2lMtil.. p.337 -8. 
20 Gibson & Curtis. 2lMtil., p. 383. 
21 Gibson and Curtis.~. p.384. 
22 The (West)Gennan bank Deutsche Bank. has made a debt donation. see footnote 6 above. Other debt for development 
swaps have received donations from banks in the United States. United Kingdom. Switzerland, and (West)Gennany. (American Express $5 mill Peruvian debt in June 1989; Deutsche Bank (FRG). Midland Bank (U .K.) and Hambros Bank (Switzerland) $5.5 mill Sudanese debt in December 1988) Gibson & Curtis. p.384. It is not clear whether the incentives to 
donate for development swaps. such as education and water reclamation projects vary significantly from nature swap in thllt 
they are also considered charitable donations. The $6 million involved in the afore mentioned debt -for-development swaps can 
be taken to indicate the potential for greater donations to environmental projects. though ubjectto constraints di cussed in 
chapter 3. 
23 Feinberg and Hanson. Q1!....£iL. p.48. 
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establishing enough loan loss reserves to cover LDC debts, due to new capital standard 
requirements (discussed in Chapter 4). It would therefore have ample reason to try to reduce 
its exposure to troubled LDC debts, despite the vagaries of donation. Furthermore, BA 
presumably has incentives of a public relations nature. As Gibson and Curtis point out, the 
increase in public concern over tropical deforestation could attract the banks to make donations 
other than to their usual domestic recipients, where they previously felt they could garner the 
most public relations benefits 2A • 
Generally, then, the fear of debt contamination, the tax treatment of loss on the loan and 
of charitable contributions deters the banks from donation. These problems imply that narure 
swaps are for the most part dependent on the resources of the larger sponsoring organizations, 
and therefore limited in number and in scale. The tax and accounting regulations will continue 
to act as a constraint on the future number and size of nature swaps until changes encourage 
donation. 
Converting the Debt 
Another set of problems may arise with debt conversion. The terms of any debt 
restructuring agreement to which the debtor country is a party may also provide hindrances, as 
could the creditor country or debtor country's regulations25 • The amount of LDC public debt 
eligible for conversion under the country's debt exchange program may be limited. If the 
restructuring agreement has no specific provisions about conversion, the swap must be 
designed to abide by the loan agreement, especially in relation to local currency26. Otherwise 
non-restructured debt must be used. Another complication could arise if the debtor country is 
implementing an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, and mu t comply with 
24 Gibson and Curtis. op. cit. p.384. 
25 Post mainlains that most non-commercial swaps (debt.foT-nature. and would also presumably include debt-for-
development) have been negotialed without including the formal requiremenlS and restrictions of the commercial debt-for-
equity programs. op. cit. p. 1087. but given the development of imposing ceilings on nature swap (albeil for very large 
amounlS). this may not remain the case for longer. 
26 Gibson & Curtis.~. p. 349. 
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performance criteria like a target for domestic liquidity27. If and when these problems are 
surmounted, the next hurdles lie in the implementation of the debt-for-nature swap agreement. 
3,1 2 Problems in Transaction Implementation 
Problems also arise in the implementation of the agreed debt-for-nature swaps. The 
largest difficulties concern the financial erosion of the swap proceeds, the negative fmancial 
impacts of the swap in the debtor country, the enforcement of the agreement, and the local and 
indigenous reception of the swap programs. They all raise serious concern about the viability 
of debt-for-nature swaps as a mechanism to finance conservation. 
Financial Erosion 
Financial erosion results from a number of factors , inflation, currency devaluation, and 
to a lesser extent, fees. There are inherent risks to placing money in countries with the unstable 
economic conditions common to debtor countries. It is the extent to which the problem of 
financial erosion works against the interests of the swapping country, the local recipients and 
the sponsoring organization that detennines how much these problems endanger the benefits of 
the swap mechanism. 
If the economy of the debtor country is highly inflationary, the interest payment of the 
bonds will decrease over time even if they are indexed to the inflation rate28. For instance, 
Ecuador has had a 50-85% inflation rate over several years and the purchasing power of the 
swaps has consequently declined. The latest swaps in Costa Rica have been designed to 
overcome this difficulty in giving the option of dollar-denominated swaps with lower interest 
rates than the colones bonds. This would mean that the value of the bonds would hold better 
over time, and compensate for the lower interest payments of the bond . The advantage of a 
reduced demand on foreign exchange would presumably still hold true, as the dollar 
denominated bonds would be paid at maturity in the then equivalent amount of colones. It 
27 Gibson & Curtis, ibid .. 
28 Conservation International, The Debt-for-Nature Exchange: A Tool for International Conservation Washington. D.C., 
1989. p.29. (Hereafter CT Report) . 
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allows a choice between the value of the bond at maturity and the interest generated until 
maturity. While this option may be offered more in the future, for swaps currently being 
implemented from currency holdings, the danger of inflation eroding the proceed value still 
exists. 
Currency overvaluation also features as an erosionary variable in the literature29. The 
overvalued currency matters firstly at the time of the conversion, ma1cing the exchange more 
costly to the sponsoring organization than it would be under conditions of free market 
exchange. It reduces the leverage which initially attracts the sponsoring organization. 
Secondly, the depreciation of the local currency, resulting from constantly high local inflation 
and adjusting exchange rates, is purported to decrease the value of the swap proceeds relative 
to the original dollars. But because the funds will not be reconverted as with a debt-equity 
swap, only the local purchasing power of the currency matters. Winthrop declares that 
except for the danger of an overvalued local currency at the 
time of the swap, neither inflation nor rigged exchange rates 
are important factors when a local currency endowment fund 
is established30. 
Alternative swap arrangements to combat inflation have been considered by TNC, but 
have not appealed to swapping governments3l . For those alternative plans spreading the 
exchanges over a period of time, inflation and overvalued currency become important and may 
work either to the advantage or disadvantage of certain participants depending on the plan. So 
far, none seem to provide the mutual gains of the current design. Meanwhile, measures that 
can be taken to protect the value of the proceeds vary, depending on the risk po ed and the 
sophistication of the country's financial markets32. 
29 This paragraph borrows heavily from the discussion in Winthrop on this matter. 
30 Winthrop, op.cil p.I44. 
31 See Winthrop, op. cil., p.I44-5 for details . 
32 CI Report, p.29. 
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Another source of financial erosion, one not often mentioned, are the fees and cuts 
levied on the financial process. First of all, the investment banker may charge a fee for 
services rendered in acquiring the debt, although these services have been occasionally 
provided free33 . Secondly, the debtor government takes a share of the secondary market 
discount, which reduces the leverage of the sponsoring organization's funds . Thirdly, there 
are fees for the management of the bond or trust fund. For example, in Costa Rica the 
government officials did not allow competitive bidding for the management of the $5 .4 million 
Natural Resources Conservation Fund, and insisted that the Costa Rican Cooperative Bank 
(Bancoop) administer the project. Bancoop receives 2% of the fund 's principal annually as a 
fee34. Yet an additional risk is that of extortion, corruption or misallocation of funds, or the 
use of funds for unanticipated expenses. There is evidence that the first Philippino swap may 
be being partially undermined by illegal logging activities. The local NGO has ben forced to 
equip their staff with airguns and radio communications networks in order to protect the 
lands35 . Although this is the only mention in the secondary literature of such a problem, it 
implies that the proceeds of the swaps may be siphoned off into protection of boundaries, and 
commensurably decreasing the effective conservation resulting from the swap. This becomes 
especially pertinent when the funds become very large. All these factors will affect the 
'leverage' that the sponsoring organizations obtain for their funds , and their interest in 
swapping debt as a means of financing conservation activities. 
Impact on Local Economy 
Another problem comes from the impact of the swaps themselves on the local 
economy. The swaps have been criticised for their inflationary potential . When the debtor 
government exchanges the debt, it can provide the local currency in several ways, of which 
printing is one. The printing could cause inflation, depending on the ratio of the economy's 
size and the amount being printed36 . In such cases, the governments would be unwilling to 
covert the debt directly into cash 37. When this concern was raised, Roques Sevilla altered the 
33 Unfortunately. the lilerature does not specify for all swaps when this did or did not occur. 
34 Winthrop. QlL£iL. pp.139-40. 
35 Dillon. Q1L.£i.L, p.138. 
36 Prcslemon & Lampman. Qlh..£iL. pp.14- 15. 
37 Winthrop. Ql1.,....£iL pp.134-5. 
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swap's design to incorporate the proceeds generated into local-currency bonds instead. As an 
additional counter-measure, ceilings can be imposed on the total amount of debt to be swapped, 
as is the case with numerous swaps. For instance, in the ftrst Costa Rican and Philippino 
swaps, the governments respectively agreed for swaps of up to $5.4 and $2 million. With later 
swaps, the ceilings have increased. Nature swaps can also include non-fmancial components, 
such as the institution of a higher legal protection status for parks, as in the first Bolivian swap, 
or the enactment of other environmental reforms to avoid any inflationary impact. 
Supporters of the swaps voice doubts about the inflationary potential. To date, the 
transactions have been very small, and the limited demand for local currency in the swapping 
countries has not made it a problem to date38. A study commissioned by TNC, and carried out 
by Costa Rican economists estimated that a debt conversion of up to $50 million in local 
currency within a 12-month period would have raised the Costa Rican inflation rate by 
0.17%39. Given the hyperinflation experienced by many Latin American and other debtor 
countries, this amount is insignificant. The increase in the money supply is could easily be 
balanced out by counter measures. Even a staunch critic of nature swaps, Carol Burton, has 
admitted that inflation is receding as an issue, given its small scale and minimal impact40. 
Nevertheless, concern about the inflation potential issue remains. According to Rudiger 
Dornbusch, the bonds merely postpone the inflationary impact41. Should the level of nature 
swap activity rise dramatically, the inflationary potential will become a salient issue. 
Yet one author has expanded the counter arguments to the inflation problem to make 
claims of deflationary potential for the nature swaps42. Potvin argue that the swap 
mechanisms do not cause inflation themselves, but rather the previous lack of environmental 
protection which necessitated the expenditures is respon ible. If the investment is pu hed up to 
the level of essential environmental expenditures, that is, if it is es ential to finance 
38 Burand, Qlh£iL, p.12. 
39 J. Moreno Perez and C. Lopez Bravo, Conversion de deuda POr conservacion de la naruraleza: los effectos en CosU! Ric!!, 
The Nature Conservancy, Arlington, Virginia, 1989. 
40 Carol Burton, "Debt-for-Narure Swaps: Swaps are Counterproductive", DeveloprnenJ Forum, July-August, 1989, p.13. 
41 Clemens P. Work, and Geri Smith "Using red ink to keep tropical forests green", U.s. News and World Report, March 6, 
1989, p.49. 
42 Potvin makes his argument on pages 33-34 of the previously referenced te L 
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conservation, it is not additional and therefore not "inflationary". He states "the only way 
conservation investment can be considered additional is when the chosen activity, project or 
program is not the most cost-effective means of conserving ecological functions and 
integrity"43. If the swap activity enables the country to meet the upcoming additional financial 
commitments to structurally adjust to ecological conservation imperatives, the nature swap 
could actually be counter-inflationary, because the inability to finance this will have a negative 
financial impact when the loss of critical ecological functions decreases the sustainable yield of 
the biomass on which the population depends. While this argument has merit, it rests on the 
assumption of much wider and comprehensive environmental activity than is presently the case 
with nature swaps. It does, though, provide a strong point for expanding such activity, if debt 
forgiveness is not forthcoming. 
Enforcement/morn toring 
A third topic that attracts much discussion when considering the viability of nature 
swaps is the monitoring and enforcement of the agreement. This topic is highly sensitive 
because of its implications for the swapping country's sovereignty. Local and indigenous 
people may take offence at the prospect of a foreign organization managing their natural 
resources, which is often considered a matter of 'national patrimony'44. Given the historical 
tensions between the United States (the home base of the international sponsoring 
organizations) and the swapping countries, controversy abounds. A common analogy used to 
illustrate the local feeling about nature swaps was one of the Japanese corporation buying the 
Grand Canyon - the United States' most prized National Park. The inaccuracy of this analogy, 
given that foreign ownership of the national park or reserves is not involved, ha been noted 
in some articles, but the point about the delicacy of the issue remains valid. Debtor countries 
do not wish to have outsiders imposing their environmental and monetary policy priorities45, 
and nature swaps have been heavily criticized as eco-imperialistic venture. 
43 Potvin. ~ p.33. 
44 Gib on & Curlis.QIL.£i.L. p.343. 
45 Prestrnan and Lampman. 00' cit.. p.14-5; Cody. 00' cit. Cohen. 00' cit.. 
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The swap agreements establish monitoring arrangements only in general terms, and 
make more specific provisions in ancillary agreements following the swap agreements46. The 
local and sponsoring NGOs, the government officials, the central banks and various oversight 
committees share monitoring responsibilities. Cooperation and shared administrative authority 
have been the main features of the swap agreements. To date, none of the agreements include 
arbitration, choice of law or choice of forum clauses to deal with disputes arising from 
breaches of the agreements. This weakness in the enforcement area is considered a significant 
potential problem, especially if nature swaps are to become more numerous. 
Non-implementation could arise for a number of reasons - natural or economic 
disasters, national or international financial problems, changes in the political power or from 
local opposition to the programs47. The Bolivian swap provides an example: the government 
delayed making its $100,000 contribution to the local currency account for 21 months. This 
occurred as a result of austerity measures taken to combat the country's economic collapse in 
the 1980s. The delay also retarded the USAid component, and resulted in an effective loss of 
$60,00 in interest for the Reserve48 . Under similar circumstances, should a swapping 
country contravene the restrictions and exploit the natural resources of the protected land, it 
would be exercising its international legal right of 'eminent domain'. Dillon point out that the 
United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States designates natural resources 
as assets over which the state can exercise full sovereignty49. 
The two options for ameliorating the risk of breach, insurance and legal redress, are not 
very attractive. Insurance for political risk can be purchased from the U.S. Overseas Private 
46 The following infonnation on monitoring responsibilities is taken from Dawkins,~, p.12-13 . 
47 Tamara 1. Hrynik , "Debt-for-Narure-Swaps: Effective But Not Enforceable", Case Western Reserve Journal of 
InJernational Law, Vol. 22(1), Winter 1990, p.156, discusses enforcement only in relation to the first swap agreement between 
Bolivia and CL 
48 Gibson & Curtis, p.359. Another problem with the Bolivian swap is the maximum legal protection for the Beni Biosphere 
Reserve, one of the conditions of the debt exchange. Gibson & Curti report that the government drafted a major 
environmental law instead of enacting the legislation to promote the Beni Biosphere Reserve. As of the Lime of Gibson's 
article, this law had not passed, and according to Potier, whose article is dated 9/90, the law had still not been introduced. It is 
not clear from Potier's article whether he is referring to the 'maximum legal protection bill' or the major environmental law. 
49 DiIJon,~, p,J38. 
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Investment Corporation, and the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 50. 
However, it is prohibitively expensive, and it has been taken out on any nature swap agreement 
to date. Hrynik, in an examination of the legal alternatives, finds the outlook bleak for suits in 
the United States, the swapping country (in this case Bolivia) and in the International Court of 
JusticeS!. The absence in the agreements of waivers of sovereign immunity , the U.S.'s 
government 's lack of political interest in prosecuting another country, the deference to national 
interests in the courts of the swapping country, and the inability to obtain representation in the 
International Court would all prevent the sponsoring NGO from obtaining any kind of 
authoritative pronouncement on enforcement. 
Why the dispute resolution clauses and strict enforcement measures do not feature in 
the agreements sheds light on how how the interests of the participants are met in an 
unenforceable agreement. Hrynik identifies three main reasons for the Bolivian swap which 
apply equally to the other swaps52. First of all , given the speculative nature of the program, it 
was possible that Bolivia may not have accepted an agreement with stricter enforcement 
clauses. The risk of not being able to uphold the agreement due to circumstances beyond the 
government's control would be the basis of other government's rejection of stricter 
enforcement clauses, as well as Bolivia's. Secondly, Conservation International was willing to 
forsake explicit enforcement terms in order to achieve conservation of rainforests . It's 
suggestions were likely to be followed as the government and local people would confer it 
expert status and commensurate deference, a situation of which it was certainly aware. Again, 
this applies to other agreements, the sponsoring organizations viewing the long-term benefits 
of cooperative relationships with the developing countries as producing more gains than strictly 
enforceable agreements53. Finally, Hrynik note that Conservation International may have 
hoped to negotiate stricter terms at the time of the agreement's renewa1. However, the 
precedence of ab ence of resolution/enforcement c1au es has become one which affects the 
other nature swap agreements, and tho e swapping countrie involved have no incentive to 
50 Dillon. i!lli!.. 
51 Hrynik. ~ pp.158-161. 
52 Hrynik. Q.JL£iL. pp.156-158. 
53 Hamlin. ~ p.l080. 
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commit themselves to stronger tenns once they have already transacted swaps which do not 
itemize such enforcement requirements. 
How then has do the agreements resolve 'the tension between enforceability and 
national autonomy', as Hamlin puts it, and serve the different interests of the participants?54 
As mentioned above, cooperation and shared administrative authority have been the mainstays 
of the agreement structure. According to Hamlin, the large roles played by the government in 
the administrative decision-making process as established by the agreements and the ultimate 
unenforceability are the very characteristics of the agreements that preserve the states' 
autonomy. Yet the terms of the agreements provide subtle enforcement in a preventative 
manner, by establishing extensive involvement of the sponsoring organizations in the design 
and implementation of the project, and by ensuring continual dialogue during the project's 
evolution. The latter permits the resolution of differences and potential problems as they arise 
and before they become too large. The sponsoring organizations work against a paternalistic 
approach by entering the deals in partnership with the local groups and the government leaders. 
CI prides itself on having nationals of the countries in which it works on its board, staff and 
membership, and TNC also emphasizes the cooperative aspect of its work with local groups55. 
Examples of various swaps illustrate the authority that the governments retain while the 
sponsoring and local environmental organizations realize their wider goals in implementing 
their programs. For instance, the agreement between Bolivia and CI has the government 
participated in program selection, which enables it to dismiss criticism of foreign domination. 
CI retains a dominant role in planing and managing the protected areas, and together with 
LIDEMA determines fund and planning matters. Hamlin states that the explicit mandate to 
cooperate "serves the goals of both CI and the Bolivian government"56. CI de ire influence 
over environmental matters beyond the agreement, and hope to attain it through a cooperative 
relationship with highly placed officials. The Bolivian government intere t 'lie in e tablishing 
54 The following infonnation on the CI and WWF agreements is derived largely from Hamlin, Hamlin.!llL£i.l. p.1 0 0-5. 
55 Personal interview. Nancy Pritchard. Conservation International. Sept 26. 1991. 
56 HamJin. QlL9L. p.1083. 
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a framework for collaboration with environmental experts to study and implement sustainable 
development of environmentally sensitive areas. 
The WWF agreements with Ecuador, Costa Rica and the Philippines differ somewhat 
in their structure, but still preserve government supervisory authority while allowing 
independence to itself and the local organizations in daily management of the projects. The 
governments have a general veto power over projects which must be compatible with national 
priorities. WWF can oppose the government's decisions by refusing to spend money, but this 
measure does not confront national sovereignty. Hamlin also argues that factors such as the 
vague management systems, relying on undefined standards57 , allows wide interpretation of 
the obligations, and thus gives the governments the freedom to pursue the management of the 
areas according to its best judgement. The lack of enforcement mechanisms and ambiguous 
termination clauses also contributes to the ultimate unenforceability which underlies the 
compatibility of the agreements with the interests for respect of national sovereignty and 
effective conservation opportunities. 
The unenforceability, therefore, while representing a ri k, pennits part of the 
confluence of interests that enable a swap transaction to take place. The sponsoring 
organizations submit to the risk for longer-term ends, and the developing countries do not 
become subject to agreements that would pose them serious problems if they were unable to 
fulfil them. Thus the lack of enforcement creates a paradox of sorts, where its absence seems 
in practice to provide what its presence would be put in place to assure. The concept of 
enforcement belies the vested interests that the swapping country, both at local and at national 
level, has in the implementation of the agreement, which is, after all, mutually negotiated and 
caters to the developing country's interest as much as those of the sponsoring organization58. 
The viability of the nature swap agreement in their present 'unenforceable' tate will depend 
57 This is the case with the Bolivia-CI agreement, where 'sustained use' can be broadly interpreted. 
58 Sadler, op. cit., p.335; Deborah Burand , "Debt-far-Nature Swaps: An Effective Can ervaLion Tool", D eve/opmenJ Forum, 
July-August. 1989, p.12. 
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on the depth of those interests - because "enforcement will ultimately depend on each country's 
commitment to conservation"59. 
LocallIndigenous Reception/Support 
The type of reception and the degree of support shown by the local people is important 
to the success of the debt-for-nature swap. Yet the picture on local involvement and support is 
not very clear, especially with regard to indigenous populations affected by the areas 
designated for protection. "While environmental, government and fiscal interests appear to 
have been well-represented in the debt-swap negotiations completed to date, affected groups 
that lack political power are not represented at the table"60. 
Bolivia has been the most problem-ridden swap on these issues, fir tly with nationalist 
indignation at erroneous reports of land 'purchase', secondly with indigenous objection at lack 
of consultation and the swap's intersection an area under dispute. In the first instance, press 
reports announcing the swap in Latin America apparently misrepresented the transaction as a 
purchase61 . The negative responses were finally countered with public education about the 
facts and benefits of the swap by the local NGO LIDEMA62. As an interesting counter-point 
to the initially unfavorable reaction, the local residents later showed their support of 
conservation activities by voting to give seven percent of their tax revenues from forestry 
activities to support the Reserve63. 
The more serious of the problems involve a dispute between the Indians who live in 
the Beni Region and logging companies. Prior to the swap, the latter obtained seven timber 
concessions from the government conditional on reforestation. The Indians object to the 
loggers' non-compliance, and the roads the loggers have built, which they fear will enable 
large numbers of landless peasants to come and convert the fore t into farm and pa ture land. 
59 Dawkins. op. cil.. p.12. 
60 Dawkins. op. cil.. p.9. 
61 Gibson & Curtis. op. cit.. p. 356 
62 Gibson & Curtis notes that the Bolivian government did not hasten to adequately explain the agreement, op. cit. p.356. 
which indicates a seemingly unaccountable lack of interest on their part. 
63 This took place at a Congress of Civic Associations. in Hrynik. ~. p.153. 
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The swap involves part of the land under dispute and the controversy has been intensified by 
the seeming 'legitimacy' that it places on the logging operations (under the sustainable use 
rubric). The Indians object to the fact that they were not consulted as to the ramifications, nor 
their opinions considered when negotiating the swap. They have marched in protest, claiming 
that the swap prevents them from acquiring title to the land and is leading to the destruction of 
their home64. The difficulty with indigenous claims' to land is that their historical ties often 
have not been granted legal recognition. According to one repon, the land that came under the 
enlarged buffer zone of the Bolivian swap was previously a communal reserve for the Guarayo 
Indians. Following the swap, the government retained the mineral and timber rights not only 
in the park, but also in the areas granted to the Guarayo tribe65 . Barbara Bramble (National 
Wildlife Federation) acknowledges that the Guarayo tribe have had only bad experiences with 
debt-for-nature swaps, and that without the subsurface and timber rights, they do not have real 
rights to their land66. Another repon talks Moxos Indians, also traditional residents in the 
Reserve area67 . They are seeking collective ownership of 202,000 hectares which would be 
preserved from logging. 
Conservation International has admitted that due to lack of experience and its eagerness 
to complete the first nature swap, it neglected to meet with the Indians before implementing the 
agreement68. It has issued a position statement supporting the Indians' concerns, agreeing in 
principle with the establishment of areas for sustainable use by indigenous groups69. Also, the 
local coordinating committee set up to oversee the nature swap program has been changed to 
include representatives of Moxos, Chi manes, Yacuma and Ballivian Indian group who Ii e in 
the area . Since then, CI has been involved in integrating indigenous concerns with their 
conservation objectives, and has panicipated in and funded various activities to promote 
indigenous interests. This includes co-producing a series of radio programs on indigenous 
communities in the Chimane Forest, contributing funds to the indigenous protest "March for 
64 Brand, 00' cil., p.30 (refers to a newspaper article Financial Times, August 2, 1990) and Gibson & Cunis, 00' cil., p.358. 
65 Elizabeth Darby Jtmkin, 'The Monte: Why the Inctigenous Peoples of the Amazon Basin Want to be Pan of Saving the 
World's Largest Rainforest", BuzlWorm, lhe EnvironmenJai Journal, Vol. 11(4), July/Aug. 1990, p.32. 
66 JUnkin, iJ:llih. 
67 Dawkins, 2lL.£i.h, p.9. 
68 Brand, 00 cit., p.30-3J. 
69 Dawkins, QJ2....£ih. p.9; the following information is also derived from her work. 
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Dignity and Territory" to the capital and becoming involved with the Indigenous Institute of 
Bolivia in drafting Indigenous Law70. 
This lack of representation and consultation with indigenous peoples is not uncommon 
in nature swaps activities, though it does not always receive much mention in the literature. 
The question of land rights is extremely sensitive in the Amazon Basin region , and many 
governments have considered the region uninhabited. It would be difficult to set up any 
conservation activities in these areas without encountering problems with indigenous land 
rights issues, and the delicacy of conducting negotiations with governments who conduct 
policies of neglect if not downright abuse towards the indigenous groups additionally 
complicates matters. An anonymous banker was reported as saying that half a dozen nature 
waps have significant problems, characterized by a lack of consultation with grass-roots 
people, especially indigenous groups7!. But the only other mention in the secondary literature 
of a specific incidence of this kind is with the second Ecuadoran swap. An article in the 
environmental magazine Buzzworm states that the indigenous people found that land they had 
lived on before was placed under protection and prohibited to themn. The general complaint 
of the native peoples is that the local environmental groups represent the power structures of 
their countries, and don't recognize the requests made for consideration before park and 
reserve boundaries are drawn 73. Political and financial favoritism is also alleged by local 
organizations, with a disproportionate amount of money and resources going to the larger 
environmental groups74. Fundacion Natura in Ecuador, the sole recipient of the endowment 
from the matured bonds produced in the first swap, is the object of such a complaint. Other 
Ecuadoran NGOs have criticised this provision, as they are only eligible to get funding for their 
projects only from the interest the bonds produce. This pre ent a problem which must be 
reversed if the swap programs are to endure and achieve their ends. Hrynik pointed out that 
70 Conservation International Bolivia Program, Chronology of Event ; Fa obtained (Tom Nancy Pritchard, October 20, 1991 ; 
~fPD8Y. "Indians. EnvironmentalislS Meet", Christian Science Monitor, May 21.1990, p. 6 cited in Dillon, QlL£i1. p.137. 
72 JUnkin, QR...£iL. p.32. 
73 Junkin, iliiQ.. 
74 Brand. op. cit., p.49. 
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local opposition is a potential reason for the failure of a swap's implementation. Local 
cooperation and local benefits from the swaps are vital. 
Environmentalists are now coming to agree that greater participation of indigenous 
groups will improve their conservation capacities, and that it is in their interests to have tribal 
members participating in the swap programs. (Presumably, this opens the way for mutual 
gains, as the tribes would be able to co-determine the projects and the areas concerned in a 
manner compatible with their traditional lifestyles, and conservationists would have far more 
rangers enforcing the conservation standards than they could otherwise afford to employ.) As 
Dillon remarks, "future swaps ideally should incorporate the interests of indigenous land 
groups into the agreement"75. However, a difficulty presents itself in arranging proper 
representation of indigenous interests, and finding the legitimate representatives. As Dawkins 
points out, the difference between the groups' level of organization and experience of 
interacting with white societies ranges from substantial, to fair to no history and contact. This 
complicates the identification of legitimate representatives, constituencies and balanced power 
for the negotiations. 
One of the steps taken towards resolving this problem has been meetings between the 
sponsoring organizations and groups representing indigenous interests. In September 1989, 
COICA (The Coordinating Body for Indigenous Peoples' Organizations of the Amazon 
Basin 76) requested recognition as the rightful negotiating partner for environmental groups 
dealing with rainfore t politics and policies in the Amazon Basin. In May 1990, it held a 
summit with U.S. environmental group, which ended with a declaration of understanding and 
the establishment of an "Indigenous and Environmentalists Alliance for an Amazon for 
Humanity". COICA has al 0 called for a Tripartite Commi ion, which would include the 
bilateral and multilateral funders of amazon development, the government and COICA. The 
Commi sion would be respon ible for informing the population affected, and for de ign and 
75 Dillon. op. cit. p.137. 
76 Founded in Lima in 1984. claims to represent 1.2 million people and 219 different nation · from Junkin. op. cit .. p.32; the 
following information fTOm pp.32. 37. 
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implementation of appropriate development projects77. Continued collaboration with COICA 
will go a long way to ensuring the proper representation of affected indigenous groups. Even 
critics of nature swaps concede that programs are emerging from the swaps that try to promote 
conservation through the involvement of local, indigenous and other groups78. The experience 
of the above problems underline the necessity of acquiring support from all sectors of the 
country and area involved in the swap, not just that of the debtor country's NGOs and the local 
administrations. 
In conclusion, the problems facing the nature swaps have not yet proved 
insurmountable. Financial erosion has necessitated the refinement of the financial mechanjsm, 
and this will likely continue as other difficulties arise. The inflationary impact remains 
unproven, though it could present problems in the future. The enforcement issue is latent, and 
the structure of program administration neatly balances the interests of the parties with 
collaboration and conflict resolution in a subtle manner. Lastly, the matter of indigenous 
representation is beginning to receive proper attention. All of the current inrucations show the 
swaps to be relatively successful, despite some mistakes needing rectification along the way. 
Nevertheless, some strong criticisms of the nature swap exist, and must be considered in 
evaluating the swaps. 
3.2 Critique of Debt-for-Nature Swaps 
The swaps face critici m by groups who question the intent and the re uIt of the 
exercise. This section will briefly review the criticisms made, and the rejoinders made by the 
supporters of the swaps. Generally, the criticisms can be split into three main categories, those 
that consider the swaps misdirected and insufficient in term of addre sing the debt, 
development and environmental cri es, those that underline the moral problems of uch 
77 Dawkins. Ql1....£i.1. p.9. 
78 Carol Burton, ~. p.13. 
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measures, and those that identify an imperialist venture in the swaps. The critics range from 
religious and secular organizations who have ethical or political reservations to the international 
financial community who have doubts about their effectiveness79. 
In the first category feature the following criticisms are voiced: that the nature swaps do 
not effectively address the underlying causes of resource misuse and environmental 
degradation 80, do not contribute to debt reduction or proper conservation infrastructures81 , 
merely create protection on paper and not in practice82, and by benefiting those countries with 
deteriorated economies and environments, perhaps provide a negative incentive resulting in 
further deterioration. The responses have been that solving the debt crises was not the 
objective of this mechanism. The swaps are simply to extend the effectiveness of the funds of 
the sponsoring organizations, and that the international NOOs are looking at broader 
approaches to the debt problem. The supporters point out that the swaps may be quite 
important at the national level, and that with the growth of the mechanism, it could become 
more so for more countries. The paper parks dilemma has already been di cussed in section 
2.2 under environmental protection. The sponsoring organizations have emphasized the 
protection of already established parks, though no aggregate figure are available as to the 
amount of land added to protected areas compared with additional protection for already 
established areas. As for the negative incentive argument, it has not been directly countered in 
the literature. But supporters of the swaps would certainly reiterate the conservation 
accomplishments of the swaps in contributing more to the solution of environmental and 
economic problems than to their aggravation. 
The criticisms of the second category revolves around how the swaps legitimize 
'illegitimate' debts and thereby postpone a proper solution to the debt crisi . This argument 
says that the NOOs by involving themselves, legitimize an inequitable economic order and debt 
79 Cody, op. cit., p.19. 
80 F. Pearce, "Exchanging Changes", The Guardian (London), 13 April 1990, cited in Dogse & Droste. p.25. 
81 Conservation International's Spencer Beebe acknowledged that in Latin America, the 5 million yearly expenses only cover 
1-2% of what is needed to establish a reasonable land conservation infrastructure. Winthrop,~, p.138. 
82 Winthrop, citing Javier Lopez. a Bolivian environmental activi t.~, p.138. 
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often acquired by elites whose populace never received the benefits83 . This criticism 
emphasizes the national and international structures, in which nature swaps feature as a 
superficial reform. Another part of the criticism has been that with the inability to enforce 
these swaps, the long-term effect may be a bailing out of the banks without any conservation 
gains being made. If the swaps do make a substantial contribution to debt stabilization, it could 
be construed as helping to postpone a comprehensive solution by making those countries' debt 
burden seem more tenable. The response to the illegitimacy issue has been on the pragmatic 
basis that the developing countries have accepted the need for access to international funds, 
both for the sake of development and the achievement of greater political autonomy. In 
retaining this access, some degree of cooperation in repayment, instead of defaults is 
acknowledged by the debtor countries. Burton notes that if repayment occurs and swaps are 
considered of use in this process, clearly non-profit swaps have an important role by engaging 
the social and economic aspects of a solution84. Basically, the supporters have refused to 
engage in a debate on the legitimacy of either private or official debt, and noted the absence of 
debtor countries demanding total forgiveness. 
The third category comprises criticisms of the imperialist underpinnings of the nature 
swaps - the excessive influence held by international NGOs in national policies, the distortion 
of local priorities, the skewing of resources away from other social projects and development 
decisions, and the exploitation of the debtor countries' financial weaknesses, all of which 
combine to a contravention of national sovereignty. Barton also includes a criticism of the 
treatment of indigenous peoples, the international NGOs' treatment of whom she likens to that 
of birds, needing preservation, but not supporting their struggle for legal land tenure 5. The 
responses have emphasized the mutuality of the negotiations, and the participation of local and 
national parties in instigating, designing and implementing the swap . The supporter 
emphasize that the swap funds cover the activitie already approved by debtor country 
governments but for which insufficient or no domestic fund could be found 86. This, 
83 Carol Bunon, ~. p.13 . 
84 Eve BurLOn. 2lh£ih. p.240. 
85 Carol BUTLOn. 00' cit.. p.13. 
86 von Moltke.~. p.7-8. 
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however, does miss the point that the representation of local needs, and the active participation 
of local people does not necessarily occur when negotiations and decisions are taken at the 
national level. There is no direct substantiation that nature swaps skew the budget away from 
other social needs, but this distortion argument has notably been propounded in World Bank 
working papers. This organization's lack of effective integration of environmental interests in 
their development policies has been widely criticised in several articles87 as has their programs' 
deficiencies in dealing with poverty. Moreover, the zero-sum implication of mutual 
incompatibility between environmental protection and poverty alleviation imperatives in these 
papers is seriously flawed88. 
Finally, another serious concern has been raised about the potential harm of this 
mechanism. People involved in development and environmental circles are concerned that 
through lack of information and consultation, or through deliberate abuse, these debt swaps 
can have serious consequences. A case of deliberate abuse has already been alleged, of a debt-
for-toxic waste having been conducted in Ghana89. Unfortunately, there is no substantiating 
evidence either for or against this score in any literature reviewed. Naturally, swap supporters, 
although condemning such abuse, do not believe that such problems justify dismissing the 
mechanism that when properly conducted, provides multiple benefits. 
In general, these criticisms often come from those groups who are interested in finding 
alternative solutions to the debt, development and environmental crises than those currently 
available in the established fora of the present international political economy. The a sumption 
underpinning much of the critique is that these wap detract from other more effective 
approaches to combat the cri es, and moreover work directly against them. Yet preci ely this 
fundamental defect is difficult to substantiate, in almo t any terms. The critici m are indeed 
serious. Oi tortion of priorities, postponement of a comprehensive debt olution, a well as 
glaring insufficiency in making any contribution to halting the proce e of environmental 
87 Potvin, op. cit., Bru e Rich. 'The Emperor's New Clothes: The World Bank and Environmental Reform ", World Policy 
Journal. Vol. VII(2), Spring 1990; and Hrynik, QlL£iL. 
88 See the excellent critique of Hansen in Potvin's paper. 
89 Molly Olson. Memorandum to Au ITalian Council for Overseas Aid E e utive Regarding Report 
for European Conference on Debt and Con ervation, Nov .2-3, 19 9, Switzerland, ovember 19 9. 
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destruction are grave accusations. But given the present limited range of nature swap, much of 
the critique depends upon how many more swaps take place, and how the whole debt crisis, 
including protracted austerity programs, evolves. If this mechanism becomes the sole and 
preferred policy option for dealing with the debt and environmental crises, instead of proving 
to be a stepping stone, a phenomenon in the transition to substantial environmental restoration 
and 'structural adjustment' to an environmentally balanced international political economy, the 
critics' arguments will hold much greater weight. Thus the future outlook of debt-for-nature 
swaps in the international political economy is important in considering the value of nature 
swaps, and its significance as a private phenomenon for a public goods problem of global 
proportions. 
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Debt-for-Nature Swaps in the International Political Economy 
Since nature swaps began, the variables underlying the transaction have been changing. 
The window of opportunity in which the nature swaps are conducted depends a great deal on 
the confluence of interests, which in turn are subject to changes through the evolution of the 
debt, development and environmental crises. The dynamics of the constellation of interests 
makes predicting the time frame for debt-for-nature swaps difficult. Some observers feel that 
the specific situation which enabled swaps may not continue for very much longer. A 
different creditor approach to the debt crisis, a surge in secondary market prices, or a write 
down of most LDC commercial debt to a level worthless for nature swaps could halt the 
arrangement of further nature swaps. In order to assess their future, it is necessary to consider 
the changes in the international political economy and how they might affect the social coalition 
which conducts swaps. This chapter will consider the changes in the LCD debt crisis and 
international finance, in the institutional approaches to development and environment, and the 
outlook of swaps with regard to official aid, access to public debt, both bi- and multilateral , 
and legislative promotion in the United States. Finally, the extrapolations from the 'debt-for-
nature' swap will be considered with regard to the future of such mechanisms. 
4.1 Debt and International Finance 
Changes in the state of the LDC debt crisis and in international finance directly affect 
nature swaps prospects. In this section, banking regulations, the secondary market, and 
creditor policies of both governmental and financial circles wHl be con idered to see if the 
opportunity for nature swaps is being altered. 
Banking and Tax Regulation 
The threat to the international financial sy tern posed by the Third World debt cri is wa 
in large pan due to the massive overextension of the banks' capital. In order to prevent a 
reoccurrence of the threat, the Bank of International Settlements is ued internationally-
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sponsored capital guidelines in June 19881• These minimum standards for risk-based assets 
were subsequently adopted by the U.S . Federal Reserve, and made the U.S. banks' loan loss 
provisioning strategy more costly2. Given that most non-U.S. banks have already reduced 
their exposure to LDC debt, most of the debt sales are from U.S. banks. Therefore the 
implications of the BIS rules and other financial regulations for the U.S. banks are the most 
pertinent to the future of nature swaps. 
U.S. banks have most of their LDC loans on their books at face value, because write-
downs necessitate registering a capital loss, which banks avoid for firstly fear of debt 
contamination and secondly adverse effects on their share values from the perception of 
decreased profitability. The loan loss reserves back up these troubled loans3. Previous capital 
guidelines counted loan loss reserves as part of primary capital which allowed banks to conceal 
their capital deficiencies through creative accounting. However, since the new guidelines were 
introduced, loan loss reserves are considered supplement capital, and must stay below 1.25% 
of the total risk-based assets. Anything above this figure does not qualify as supplement 
capital, becomes 'idle resources' and therefore costly. The new emphasis on capital adequacy 
motivated banks to correct their balance sheets, and "has led banks to increase sales of troubled 
loans"4. This by itself is a positive development for nature swaps, in that more debt becomes 
for sale on the secondary market. 
This pressure to reduce loan loss reserves means that bank may wish to write more of 
their debt down instead. This would be to avoid needing to comply with federal regulations 
that necessitate large amounts of impaired debt to have corresponding A TRRs (see Chapter 3). 
However, in May 1989 the regulators increased the hurdles for banks to take deduction for 
debt losses (the 'source of loss' ruling mentioned in relation to debt donation in Chapter 3), 
whether for sales or donations. This ruling may counteract the pressure to write down debt, 
1 The infonnation in this paragraph is derived from Feinberg & Hanson. oo.cit.. p.47. 
2 LDC provisions for the U.S. banks reached approximately S18 billion. or 63% of tOIa! loan loss reserves. Feinberg and 
Hanson. oo .cit.. p.4S. 
3 The Tax Refonn Act of 1986 does nol allow tax deductions for general loan loss re erves. 0 banks can only deducllo ses 
when specific loans arc charged off. which the fear of debt contamination prevents them from doing. So the banks have 
provisioned for the majority of their troubled LDC loans in general reserves and keep them in the books al face value. 
Feinberg and Hanson. oo.cit.. p.4S . 
4Feinberg and Hanson. ®&iL, p. 47. 
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as the losses from the write-downs no longer hold the same tax advantages. Altogether, then, 
the regulatory and accounting picture is unclear. Both pressures against write-downs and loan 
loss reserves could negatively affect nature swaps, though, because to date, all debt sold for 
these transactions has either been already written-down or provisioned against. If this 
continues to be the case, debt available for purchase on the secondary market for nature swaps 
may become scarce, if only because the amounts until now have been hard to locate as it is. In 
addition, even should the banks favor selling debt, the loss they register from this type of 
conversion (GAAP and Banking Circular 200 previously discussed) could impel other write-
downs that the banks do not desire. A great deal of the debt availability, therefore, will depend 
on the balance between the conflicting pressures. If the imperative of the new capital adequacy 
requirements outweigh the reasons for which banks withhold debt from the secondary market, 
sufficient and appropriate debt sales will continue, as will the banks' interest in participating in 
nature swaps. 
As for donation , although calls have been made for a review of the regulatory 
accounting and tax policies which would improve donation incentives, this has not occurred5. 
So generally, unless public bilateral and multilateral debt is made available - discussed below, 
the sales of debt are the most likely source for future nature swaps. Therefore, a general 
assessment of the outlook in the secondary market may be helpful. 
Secondary Market 
The secondary market is very important to the future of debt-for-nature swap in their 
current form. Even if bilateral or multilateral debt become available for such trades, it i till 
possible that the NGOs will need to purchase the debt via the secondary market ( ee eli cu sion 
of the institutionalisation of nature swaps in 4.4) . The market has grown substantially since 
the early 1980s. Its continued growth is likely, though subject to some limitations. As the 
market represents a small part of the total LDC debt, it could still grow a great deal, although 
5 NGOs advocate using the market value of the donated debt for tax credit for banks but the Treasury does not wi h to sct su h 
a precedent that would have ramifications far beyond debt-for-nature swaps. Gibson and Curtis, QQ&ih, p3 2. 
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the aforementioned fears and uncertainties concerning debt contamination, taxes and 
regulations do keep many banks away. Banks have begun to treat their loan portfolios 
similarly to their investment portfolios, and are now earning fees through swapping and selling 
activities. The trading in the market has become more sophisticated, and involves export 
financing, trade credits and asset swaps6. This positively affects nature swap opportunities, in 
that the nature swaps can also be broadened to encompass different financial instruments. For 
instance, the debt used in the second Madagascar swap includes trade credits7. 
Some observers believe that the best opportunities for nature swaps have a limited 
time-frame, asserting that the market is beginning to find a balance between supply and demand 
of debt8. This would narrow the leverage margin that makes it worthwhile for the NGOs to 
conduct the swaps9. But the overall downward trend of the prices since the early 1980s, in a 
predominantly seller's market, seems to contradict this. The prices usually reflect the banks' 
sense of the progress made towards solving the debt crisis. Between 1982 and 1989 they 
generally declined, as the approaches were not seen to be workinglO. Between 1987 and 1988 
the prices of the loans decreased by 21.4%11. A slight rise occurred with the announcement of 
the Brady Plan, but given its lack of success to date, and the continuing difficulties of the 
LDCs with their debt, it is likely that the gains have been nullified l2. Meanwhile, the 
increased competition in the banking world, discussed below, will ensure movement in the 
financial world, and could provide additional impetus to the overexposed banks to sell debt in 
the secondary market for some time to come. Therefore, there are no negative indication for 
the near future concerning the role of the secondary market in nature swap transactions. 
Changes in the Debt Crisis 
6 Evans, op.cil.. 
7 See Appendix III on Swap Details. 
8 Prestemon and Lampman, oo.cit., p.16. 
9 Yon Moltke states that as a rule of thumb, "when the total benetitLO the purchaser generated by a debt-for·nature program is 
less than double the benefit that can be derived from more traditional frnancial trategies, the transaction i probably not worth 
the risks of high inflation, a poor exchange rate, loss of control, or transaction difticulti ", op.cit.. p. 6. 
10 Krugman, op.cit., p.147. 
11 CI Report, p.l8 . However, prices vary considerably between countries, and much depends on the individual country's 
economic standing. Nevertheless, prices have in general tended downwards since 19 4. 
12 Unfortunately, it is very difficult LO obtain current data on market pric ,and therefore this remains an unsubstantiated 
assertion, 
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One of the major influences on the future of nature swaps is the management of the debt 
crisis. Significant changes in the conditions of the crisis would alter the interests on which the 
nature swaps rely. However, the approaches and the problems which characterized the debt 
crisis when nature swap transactions started have not altered greatly, which seems to imply a 
continuation of nature swap opportunities. The nature swaps began during a phase of 
management that relied on market-based workouts, about whose failure a consensus grew 
towards the end of 1988. Many of the debt-equity swap programs did not fare well , and were 
closed down 13 . The Bush administration then announced the Brady Plan in March 1989, 
which marked the fourth phase in the creditor strategy. This plan proposed to cut debts 20% 
for all debtors over a period of three years, in exchange for commitment to economic reform 
policies 14 . Banks were to be offered new securities with either a reduced face value or 
reduced interest rates with compensating collateral or backing of funds from the Treasury, or 
possibly the IMF and the World Bank. New financing from Japan was also tendered. Again 
the emphasis on structural and sectoral adjustment entails liberalization along IMF monetary 
and fiscal stabilization policies, including privatizing state properties, reopening debt-equity 
swaps and repatriating flight capital. 
The Brady Plan, however, did not and does not offer either a substantial change or 
improvement in dealing with the debt crisis, despite its focus on relief. It merely formalizes the 
expansion of the market menu approach. Cohen correctly points out that it is a mere refinement 
and not a fundamental refonn, because it still relies essentially on voluntary bank measures 15. 
Debt reduction on the basis of voluntary measures illustrates one defect of the free market 
approach - the fear of a potential free-rider situation keeps most banks from making progre s 
on reducing the debt burden. The failure of the voluntary aspect can be een with the Me ican 
case, the only major debt reduction attempt under the Brady Plan to date. An agreement 
tentatively reached between Mexico and the bank committee in July 1989 gave banks the 
choice of reduction in principal or in interest, or the granting of new loan , backed by the IMF, 
13 Only Mexico has recently reopened its conversion program. and for public debt only. 
14 In money tenns. the Plan expected $20 billion in new lending from the commercial banks to 15 highly indebted countries 
between 1985-88. 
15 Cohen. Ql2£iL. p .ll O. 
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the World Bank and Japan. The majority of the banks chose not to put in any new money, 
leaving Mexico with a shortfall of $6-7 billion per year despite a reduction in its debt, and Latin 
America overall with merely 0.5% less outstanding debt16. 
Within six months, the Plan came under open criticism from the commercial banks for 
being underfunded by the multilateral institutions, and for encouraging debtors to default17. 
The Institute of International Finance (representing 184 banks and financial institutions 
globally) also criticised the IMF for acquiescing in late interest payments to the banks. Thus 
Cohen noted that "pressures have visibly grown to loosen the close, albeit tacit bank-
government alliances that have dominated decision making on LDC debt."18 Some of the 
biggest U.S. and British banks declared profit losses and again made large increases in their 
loan loss provisions19. While the World Bank's 1989-90 annual debt report dismissed the 
pessimism surrounding the new debt strategy, it admitted that the debt relief in 1989 had 
decreased by one-third from 198820. Commercial lending was much less than anticipated. A 
subsequent World Bank report acknowledged that the Brady Plan had not brought as many 
agreements as had been hoped, with only the Philippines, Morocco, Costa Rica and Venezuela 
agreeing on Brady-sponsored debt reductions by September 1990. At that time, 
the IMF announced that the debt service ration of the LDCs had fallen to its lowest level since 
1981. The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean has called for 
improvements to the Plan, including the elimination of regulatory and tax obstacles to debt 
write-offs, and noted the insufficient amount of funding for significant relief to Latin America, 
the most indebted region21 . The net outflow of funds from the debtor countries to the North 
demonstrates the weaknes of the Brady Plan and the alternative debt relief proposals by other 
groups which have not brought substantial relief22. 
16 Wesson. Q.Q£.i.h. p.422. 
17 This occured at the annual joint IMF-WB meeting, in Sept 1989. 
18 Cohen, oo.cit. p.120. 
19 Keesing's Record of World Events, "World Debt". Volume 36(11), November 1990. p. 37 92 : In September 19 9. IP 
Morgan, Chase Manhattan and Manufacturers Hanover added 2.000 million. 1,150 million and 950 million to bolster their 
reserves to 100%.46% and 36% of their Third World loans respectively. Uoyds and ationa! W tminster have now 
~rovided for 85% of medium and long-term debt, and 72% of its total debt respectively. 
o Keesing' ,.illliI.... 
21 Felix.~, p.745; Keesing's,~; the Commission noted that even with a doubling of the agreement made between 
Mexico and the banks, the current Plan funding would only allow a 13% reduction of Latin America' foreign debt, and a 14% 
reduction in annual debt ervice. 
22 For instance the United Kingdom proposed a new debt relief scheme for 19 of the poorest countrie . II enhan ed the terms 
of debt relief agreed at the 1988 G-7 economic summit, and comprised a two-thirds write.(!own by the 'Paris Club', a total-
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The immediate outlook for a resolution of the debt crisis is poor for three main reasons. 
Firstly, the creditor strategy is not working in terms of meeting the objectives of the banks the 
creditor governments and the international financial institutions. Even if it were, it is not 
certain that this would reverse the decline of the debtor countries. The market liberalization 
focus advocated by the creditor group is to achieve restructuring without the backup of 
'concerted lending', and without sufficient lending from the international financial institutions 
(IFJs)23. The debt reduction from market workouts, i.e. equity swaps, is not overtaking debt 
increases, and no capital is being attracted to the debtor regions. Despite the sporadic de facto 
defaults and continuing arrears in debt service, the overhang remains, although its damage 
potential for the international financial system has been reduced. Moreover, Felix makes a 
strong argument that the free market restructuring will only perpetuate asymmetries that impede 
economic development in late-industrializing societies. If he is correct, then reversing the 
decline of the debtor countries will depend upon a substantial change in the current creditor 
management strategy. 
The second reason relates closely to the fir t. The banks' interests no longer 
complement the governmental approach. Consequently, they are pursuing different directions, 
and are much less interested in LDC loans. They now face a different situation both at the 
national and international levels. The banks' previous leverage in negotiations seems to be 
subsiding, partly from the continuation of sporadic defaults. Also, concern about the 
erosionary effect of partial debt forgiveness on the creditors' bargaining power exi t in the US 
administration and the IFls. Meanwhile, the banking group's unity i waning as the smaller 
banks extract themselves from Third World lending and the larger bank' interest diversify. 
Many of the latter, in trying to compensate for overexpo ure to troubled LDC debtors, 
conducted aggressive real-estate and leveraged buyout lending in the United States. These 
debt instead of a one-year marurity approach, a capi18ljzation of intcrest for fITSt5 years rescheduled, repayments linked to 
expoTlS, and repaymcnt over 25 years. The Paris Club also agreed on a more favor blc approach to lower-middle-income 
counlTies, allowing 15 instead of 10 year rescheduling periods, and permilling debt-equjty waps by creditor govemm nts up 
to 10% of debts. 
23 Felix identitie this as the fiflh phase in the creditor trategy, which he calls a 'warchou ing' approach, QJ2&i.L p. 761. 
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loans are turning 'bad', and are not protected with loss reserves. The regional and smaller 
banks free from these problems are challenging the hierarchy of the financial industry and 
increasing the competition on the domestic front. Even though some of the bigger banks 
cannot exit as hastily as they would like, they are generally looking to continue devolving their 
financial links over the medium to long tenn. In addition, opportunities in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union have opened up. The lack of new lending for the Southern debtor countries 
contrasts with a rise in commercial lending by Western banks to eastern Europe. Already early 
in 1989, loans to that region had increased by 6%24. The Southern governments, therefore, 
are likely to remain desperate for new finance. John Ravenhill notes that "in the 1990s it is 
highly unlikely that commercial banks, even under pressure from Western governments and the 
international financial institutions, will provide significant injections of new capital into the 
heavily indebted countries. "25 
The final reason for the protraction of the debt crisis is the bleak conditions which the 
debtor countries face. The debtor countries must attempt economic refonns not only without 
much relief through debt reduction programs, and market workouts, but al 0 without any good 
prospects of improvement in the conditions that contribute to the crisis, such as lower interest 
rates, higher commodity prices, and increased access to Northern markets. Protectionism has 
not decreased, and many analyses of international trade fore hadow regional blocs which will 
disadvantage the LDCs, especially seeing as their own initiatives, intra-South trade and self-
reliance have not moved beyond the declaratory stage of the New International Economic 
Order. Commodity prices do not seem poised for an upswing and while international 
agreements might be beneficial for both LDC and industrialized countries, no great enthusia m 
in the North for their revival is apparent. The continuing high deficit of the United State 
means that a policy of high interest rates for the dollar will be necessary to attract financing, 
however deleterious it may be for the debtor countries. As for over eas development 
assistance, the OECD does not anticipate any significant increase in the real terms during the 
24 While this is not a very large increase. and banks are still likely to avoid lending to Eastern European countries on a scale 
similar to the late 1970s. it nevenhelcss means money that is not available for lending to the LOCs. 
25 John Ravenhill. 'The North-South Balance of Power". InJernalional Affairs. Vol. 66(4), October 1990, p. 738. 
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1990S26. In general, North-South relations have not fared well, as the LDCs have been too 
involved with managing the debt crisis to concern themselves with wider agendas. 
For the reasons outlined above, then, the outlook for a near resolution to the debt crisis 
is unlikely. A substantial change in the creditor strategy would be the variable most amenable 
to change, but Cohen notes that no fundamental refonn can be expected unless new alliances 
strongly challenge the resistance to debt relief held by the big banks, finance ministries and 
central banks of the western countries27 . While the loosening of the groups of creditors, 
mentioned above, is taking place, the divisions are not yet deep enough to affect major change. 
Even if there were a refonn of the ongoing management approach by the governmental 
creditors, the amenability of banking interests and the corresponding improvement in trade and 
financial conditions may not follow. 
The Implications for Debt-for-Nature Swaps 
The implications of the changes in banking regulations, the secondary market and the 
debt crisis for future nature swaps are varied and somewhat contradictory. The developments 
in the banking world overall mean pressures to reduce any remaining overexposure to debtor 
countries; on this count sales of debt would continue. Generally, the conditions in the 
secondary market are also positive for nature swaps, unless a balancing-out of the market does 
occurs. The present lack-lustre perfonnance of the Brady Plan and low chances of a new 
strategy for debt relief in the near future, ironically, auger well for nature swaps a a private 
phenomenon. If the Brady Plan were going well, or were to improve the amount of reductions 
in the near future, debtor countries would perhaps be less willing to engage in nature swap, 
because they would obtain debt relief without tho e particular sorts of local expen es. But 
Southern governments are de perately searching for new capital, and direct foreign inve tment 
is increasingly seen as a possible ource of ignificant amounts of capitaI28. If nature swaps 
26 The 1989 annual DECD Development Assistance Committee Report projected a 2% growth in real tenn . predicated on a 
continued large growth in aid from Japan - whose increase in aid merely covers the shortfall real flows from other DECO 
donors - cited in Ravenhill, 1990, 9.l2£iL., p.735 
27 Cohen, 2n£ib, p.120. 
28 Ravenhill. 1990. op.cit., p. 739. 
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are perceived to increase credit-worthiness more than is presently the case, debtor countries 
will have a heightened interest in conducting them. Meanwhile, the debt stabilization and local 
benefits even with the local expenditures they incur, will continue to appeal to the debtors. 
The environmental benefits will also count for those debtor countries concerned about the 
ecological problems and pressures for redress that they face. 
Paradoxically, the structural adjustment programs of the Brady Plan, and of other IF! 
loans, are criticised for creating some of the environmental problems which nature swaps seek 
to combat. The austerity measures under the reduction programs can contribute to 
environmental problems, by starving the government resource and environmental agencies of 
funds, by the policies of exporting at any cost, and by the environmental impacts of the social 
problems caused by austerity. International and national groups have criticised the Brady Plan 
for that reason, and are lobbying to have strong environmental conservation provisions and 
sustainable development policy reforms integrated into it29 . To date, however, this has not 
occurred30. 
In the area of debt and international finance, then, no substantial changes have occurred 
in four years since the initiation of nature swaps that negatively affect nature swap transaction 
opportunities. This conclusion, however, must be considered along with the ramifications of 
changes in the areas of development and environment. 
4.2 LDC Development & Enyironment 
The evolution of the crises in LDC development and environment since 19 7 when the 
nature swaps began has been very gradual. But the direction of the changes can be identified, 
as can the prospects for progress in these areas. By altering the context in which the social 
coalition that transacts nature swaps operates, the condition of LDC development and 
environment problems can substantially influence the future of nature wap . 
29 Gibson & Curtis. oo.cit , p. 395: According to Gibson and Curtis. nature swaps could be easily fit into Brady Plan-based 
debt reductions. by using fmanciaJ and non-financial components; sector and macroeconomic policy reform with envirorunenlal 
ramifications and buybacks with environmental components. 
30 Gibson & Curtis. QQ£iL. p. 398. 
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Development Outlook 
Although it is hard to generalize across debtor countries, overall LDC 
development prospects have not greatly improved since nature swaps began. So long as the 
debt overhang remains, and those conditions contributing to its protraction continue, 
development will be stalled. There has been a decline in Africa to the per capita levels of the 
1960s, and no significant per capita growth in Latin America. 
The debt problem in the near tenn may seem under control, but the cumulative effect of the 
continuing austerity on the debtor countries cannot be ignored. Felix considers another lost 
decade likely, given that the present approach to the debt crisis is limited to free market 
restructuring. Ravenhill too, although less critical of the Brady Plan than Felix, acknowledges 
that the prospects for Latin America and Africa in the 1990s are bleak unless more relief from 
the debt burden is given31 . 
The implication of poor development prospects on debt-for-nature swaps is twofold. 
On the one hand, it would seem that those nature swaps that forward sustainable development 
programs based on community involvement and employment would appeal to debtor countries. 
On the other hand, with very tight budgetary conditions, the debtor countries will rapidly use 
up the proportions of local currency they perceive appropriate to dedicate to environmental 
protection and sustainable development. The immediacy of the development demands will 
make the long-term benefits of the nature swaps more difficult to justify in their view. This 
reading of the influence of development conditions on the opportunities for nature swaps is 
rather ambiguous. A consideration the changes in the approach to LDC development, by the 
governments themselves, and the institutions that assist them, may help to refine the 
assessment of the outlook. 
In the approaches to development, the essential points concern the governmental, 
international institutional and bilateral as istance focus on the private sector, on community 
orientation and on environmental conservation and sustainable development. At the national 
31 RavenhilJ, 1990,~, p.743. 
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level, the emphasis on the benefits of state-led development is being replaced, under the IMF 
and WB austerity programs, by an increasing role for the private sector. In the institutional 
realm, the emphasis on mega-projects for infrastructure development has given way to more 
appropriate maintenance and rehabilitation of already existing infrastructure. In the aid 
agencies, the direction now underlines local self-reliance and community-oriented programs. 
Both the international institutions and aid agencies are also beginning to integrate the concepts 
of environmental protection and sustainability into their developmental philosophies and 
programs. Overall, there has been an increasing recognition of the need to align the 
development initiatives with environmental care and maintenance. This augers well for debt-
for-nature swaps, especially those already existing. It reinforces and builds upon the 
collaboration between governmental and non-governmental groups from nature swaps. This is 
beneficial for already existing nature swaps and for other environmental and developmental 
projects because it allows wider participation in designing and decision-making on these 
matters. The NGOs can represent local and environmental interests at a higher level. It also 
creates greater chances of complementarity between the development and the environmental 
protection and sustainability projects. 
Environment Outlook 
The crisis in the environment, especially in LDC countries, who are less able to cope 
with the problems, has not abated at all. Any of the standard books on the tate of the world's 
environment will record deteriorations, mounting problems and an absence of progress in 
protection and maintenance of ecosystems. The implications of the declining LDC ocial and 
economic condition on environmental health are no less bleak for the environment than for the 
development to which those societies aspire. Unfortunately, even if economic indicators were 
positive, and showed an improvement for development prospects, it could still project an 
acceleration of environmental problems due to the link between the energy-intensive, growth-
orientation of the conventional development path and environmental deterioration . But again, 
as with the bleak prospects for development, some changes are evident in the under tanding 
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and approaches to environmental problems. Some of the events which influence the 
awareness of environmental problems were touched on in chapter one. Here, it suffices to 
point to the changes in the evaluation and treatment of environmental problems of local and 
international consequence, and which can influence the future of nature swaps. 
The international institutional approaches to environmental problems are undergoing 
rapid change. First of all, the context of national and international policies on issues of 
biodiversity and global warming may be about to change significantly. The upcoming United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) is forcing governments to 
think about their policies on domestic and international environmental problems. Many types 
of NGOs have become extremely active in lobbying their governments about UNCED agenda 
issues, and have, in general, gained more recognition for their role in the national preparation 
process for the conference. An international convention on biodiversity, and individual 
country commitments on steps dealing with global warming are expected to emerge from 
UNCED, and movement on these two issues will have a significant impact on the context of 
present and future nature swaps. Secondly, the multilateral development banks (MDBs) have 
begun to adopt formal environmental policies, and are attempting to integrate concepts of 
protection and sustainability into their development projects. The main developmental lender, 
the World Bank, is working on placing environmental criteria into its programs, as well as 
making loans specifically for environmental restoration projects. Although there are doubts 
about the actual implementation of the e policies at the project level, the international financial 
institutions responsible for assisting development are starting to understand the imperatives of 
sound environmental bases for development. At the same time, pressure is being exened on 
the governing elites to incorporate environmental aspect into their development activities32. 
The World Bank has, over the last few years, increa ingly re ponded to pressure to 
integrate environmental aspects into their project proposal process. In 1987, under a 
reorganization, they set up environmental unit in all four regional offices and a central 
32 See Hamlin, 00 cit., p.146 for referenoes on the 'paper policies' of the MOBs. 
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environment department under Policy, Planning and Research. However, the Bank is still the 
focus of criticism for the environmental and social problems resulting from their recent 
projects33. Nevertheless, they increasingly appreciate their role in this area. Their internal 
Working Papers propose various types of involvement in environmental projects, including 
nature swaps (see discussion below on Multilateral Development Bank involvement). The 
imponance of the World Bank's role cannot be understated, given that many of the poorest 
debtor counnies rely overwhelmingly on it, instead of commercial banks for loans. These 
counnies must abide by the multilateral loan conditions in order to secure future credit, so 
policies of the World Bank concerning the environmental measures will carry much weight. 
The consequences of these changes on both the development and environment fronts 
must be, amongst all the negative signs, considered in a positive manner. Hopeful signs exist 
for some constructive social coalitions between environmental and development interests 
instead of the confrontational aspects usually emphasized. The upcoming United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, and the collection of funds for LDCs to fulfil 
their Montreal Protocol obligations, and the establishment of a Global Environment Fund all 
point to a potentially mutually beneficial linkage between environment and development. The 
South will obviously need compensation and additional assistance to avoid the environmentally 
destructive path of development which the North has pursued. Moreover, the North cannot fail 
to recognize that the progress it wants to see on global environmental problems can only be 
reached by providing additional financial and technological support. 
Nevertheless, the outlook for coalitions between the development and environmental 
communities, especially at the grassroots level, is not all rosy. In discussing the NGO , Yap 
remarks that the environmental groups have begun to attract notice not only for their po itive, 
but also for their negative impact on the development process and on the human communities 
affected by the areas they work to protect. The expected expansion of their efforts "may bring 
them into apparent or real conflict with the other NGO communities, particularly the 
33 See Hamlin. who discusses the Bank's role. organization and shortcomings oo.cit.. p.146 -151 ; Bruce Rich.~. 
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development groups and the indigenous peoples' groups. "34 This potential for confrontations 
of opposing interests also exists in a wider sense between Northern and Southern countries. 
Amidst the fusion of environment and development needs stands the justified 
scepticism of Southern countries of the North's new found concern about environmental 
problems, especially as they impinge on development activities. Many LDCs consider the 
environmental conditions as one more barrier placed by the North in front of their attempts to 
develop. Environmental balance and protection in general, and debt-for-nature swaps in 
panicular may be perceived as just another way for the Nonh to pursue their own interests at 
the South's expense. Unless the environmental conditions clearly improve their development 
prospects over the shon term, which because of the nature of environmental problems and the 
defects in the measurement of economic indicators they rarely do, the more immediate demands 
of economic progress will take precedence. It is a undeniable moral dilemma that the 
accusation that the Nonhern countries ultimately stand to benefit more from such changes than 
the LDCs themselves can always be made and rarely completely dismissed. However, the 
current understanding of ecological processes highlights the fact that environmental protection 
and a balanced use of ecosystems is an imperative for every country, indeed for every 
'bioregion'. Waiting for changes in the structure of the international political economy that 
discriminate against Southern countries, and that promote environmental destruction will only 
create a vicious circle of inaction. Addressing the problems of environmental degradation and 
instigating the changes to the system must occur simultaneously, and be hared by both 
Nonhern and Southern countries. It is necessary for all countries to 'structurally adjust' to 
ecological maintenance and rehabilitation whatever their level of development. 
The Implications for Debt-for-Nature Swaps 
There are several implications for debt-for-nature wap that ari e out of the movement 
towards joining environmental and development need , the trend to privatisation and out of the 
wider international in titutional involvement in environmental matter. First of all, as 
34 Nonita Yap. Ql1£i.b p.85. 
-
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mentioned above, the integration of development and environmental imperatives can have 
positive ramifications for nature swaps in several ways, by providing complementarity of 
purpose in environmental and developmental projects, and by solidifying the cooperation 
between groups representing local and indigenous needs and interests, who can participate in 
deciding on national policies. This should mean that any future nature swaps have better local 
reception and more appropriately cater to the people whose lives they affect. 
Secondly, the consequence of privatisation may work against debt-for-nature swaps per 
se, but could improve the opportunities of meeting LOC environmental and developmental 
needs. As Patterson points out, the current fonn of nature swaps does not attract the for-profit 
sector, because of the strong orientation to parks , wildlands, and protection programs. 
However, developing countries also need sustainable development projects of wider reach. 
With the private sector growing in importance in their development activities, it is imperative 
that that environmental regulations, impact and sustainability criteria be designed, and the 
majority of debt-for-nature swaps do not promote these things. Patterson also goes on to point 
out that despite the benefits of the emphasis on non-governmental organizations, the swaps 
have a distinct bias against participation of major governmental agencies. They are being 
deprived of the opportunity to gain skills and experience by implementing the projects. Again , 
as with the private sector, the responsibility and capacities for dealing with broader country-
wide environmental needs rests with governmental agencies. Basically, this highlights the 
inherent constraints of nature swaps in their present focus and fonn, and implies that the 
application for nature swaps is limited, not only in tenns of the opportunities, but al 0 in tenns 
of the their ability to meet the developing countries' need. If, however, their activitie can be 
expanded, and they can incorporate better collaboration with governmental agencies and the 
private sector, the constraints can be lessened. 
Lastly, the wider institutional involvement could inaugurate more systematic and 
organized assistance for afforestation and rainfore t protection, in their work on combating 
biodiversity loss and global wanning. The UNCEO, the greening of over ea development 
agencies and the attention of MOBs is providing a greater role for NGO , and for orne of their 
I. 
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approaches to dealing with developmental and environmental issues. As a private mechanism, 
the debt-for-nature swap has limits, but its adoption by official bodies would expand the 
opportunities for further nature swap transactions. In the same way, extrapolations of its 
structure would also multiply the possibilities, and allow different groups, including those 
presently in the social coalition transacting nature swaps, to realize their interests in similar 
ways. 
4.4 The OUtlook for Debt-for-Nature Swaps 
The Continuation of a Confluence of Interests 
The above discussion shows that the conditions of the international political economy 
will most likely encourage future nature swaps. The participants who form the social coalition 
conducting swaps do not face any substantial changes to the context in which they fmd the 
advantages of swaps greater than the disincentives. In the immediate future, the confluence of 
interests seems set to continue, though subject to constraints produced by a growth in the 
number of swaps. The overall positive experience of nature swaps has encouraged other 
countries to participate, where possible. Conservation International reported an increase in the 
debtor countries' receptivity (based on both formal and informal evidence) as they look upon 
nature swaps as having equal or greater benefits than profit investments35. The list of new 
countries said to be considering nature swaps, a ide from those countries intere ted in multiple 
swaps, is quite long36 . The list features a couple of African countries. Although debt 
exchange programs are less developed in this region, apparently some prospects exist for 
indigenous organizations to acquire additional local currency through swaps or blocked fund 
transactions37. The opportunities in Eastern Europe are also opening up, and European banks 
are contacting WWF regarding the use of outstanding loans for con ervation purpo es38. 
35 CI Repon. oo.cit. p.18. 
36 Those countries that haven't already swapped who are listed are: Argentina. Brazil, Uruaguay, Guatemala. Peru, Panama. 
Venezuela. Colombia. Jamaica. Haiti, Taro..a.nia. Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
37 Kathy Fuller, "Debt for Nature Swaps: A New Conservation Tool", Economic Impact, Vol. 65(4),19 ,p.43 . However, 
this would stil1 only represent a mall percent of the private debt. 
38 Fuller, illli!u 
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However, the more frequent swaps become, the less likely a decline in the debtor 
countries' interest in providing a good conversion rate for the debt (in terms of percentage of 
face value given by the Central Bank in exchange). This is because of their budget limitations 
and their increasing preoccupation with inflation, which could be a problem with large amounts 
being exchanged for nature and equity swaps under their conversion programs. Another 
reason may arise from developments in the secondary market. For instance, for the third 
swap, Costa Rica initially agreed to convert the debt at 75% of face value. Subsequently prices 
on the secondary market fell, and the purchasing NGO received a much larger discount, of 
which the government wanted to have a larger part39 . The negotiations following the 
government's change of position finally resulted in the 30% figure which they wanted being 
used. NGOs could consider using securities, according to Brand, if the debtor governments 
are giving less on bonds4o. With a great deal of the debt relief approach predicated on market 
workouts, the budgetary allowance and political viability of nature swaps in the debtor 
countries will decrease over time. Nevertheless, nature swap proponents are confident that the 
swap mechanism can evolve and be designed to meet changing interests. Fuller notes that the 
experience so far demonstrates that the swaps can be structured to successfully meet each 
party's concerns, even though many different interests need to be met41. 
Towards the Institutionalisation of the Nature Swap 
Generally two different indications as to the future prospects of nature swap emerge in 
literature. Consideration of the institutionalisation pos ibilities, especially via bilateral and 
multilateral channels, make it seem that the mechanism will evolve but essentially continue to 
exist for the purposes of debt reduction and environmental activitie. Other indications are of a 
closing window of opportunity for the private tool, given eventual write-down of large 
39 Cody, Q2£i!., p. IO. 
40 Brand, oo.cit. p .40. 
41 Fuller, QP£.ib p.42. 
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portions of Third World' debt, secondary market stabilization, and gradual debt forgiveness. 
The discussion from the above and below sections support the former proposition. 
The nature swap mechanism has evolved since its inception to meet the interests of the 
parties, such as when the design was changed to include bonds to ameliorate the inflationary 
potential. Current moves to incorporate the nature swap mechanism into the public arena also 
point to its flexibility. This evolution can be interpreted as a gradual process of 
institutionalisation into the mainstream of international relations. The opportunities for 
expansion in the public arena are enormous, if access to the restructured or donated debt of 
industrialized countries, aid agencies and multilateral development banks directly or indirectly 
(through grants to NGOs to purchase commercial debt) is obtained. For instance, the U.S. 
government agencies alone have $65.8 million in foreign debt42. In fact, nature swaps in the 
public sector, known as 'second generation swaps', are already underway. 
Through AID 
The U.S. Agency for International Development, AID, has a debt-for-development 
swap initiative which includes nature swaps43. AID will provide funding to NGOs to buy 
debt for AID-approved conversions. Its funding of development and nature swaps has been 
limited so far, contributing to two nature swaps. However, this signals at least an initial 
endorsement from the U.S. government for the nature swap transactions44. The swaps have 
also received endor ement from the OECI)45. Two countries from the OECD have participated 
as sponsors instead of NGOs in nature swaps. The Netherlands and Sweden transacted the 
second and fourth swaps with Costa Rica respectively. Sweden used part of it first bilateral 
aid donation to Costa Rica to fund the swap. There is also an unconfirmed report of a swap 
conducted by the Federal Republic of Germany with Kenya in February 1989 of a OM 850 
42 Figure from Jeff Wi~e, 'The Role of Debt-ror-Nature Swaps in Preserving Habitat", Vol. 7(12), 1990, p. 4. 
43 Memo, Agency for International Development "A.I.D. Announces Debt-for-Development Initiative", Washington, D.C., tirilll ,1990. 
Gib on & CUIti ,2l2£iL, p.390; AID COnlribUled $150.000 for lhe conservalion program inilialed by lhe first naJure swap 
in Bolivia; it also gave WWF $1 million. part o/which was used 10 purchase debt/or the first Madagascar swap . 
45 The July 1989 OECD Summit final declaration emphasised the potential value of such mechanisms for developing countries 
in contributing to environmental protection. Michel Potier, "Swapping Debt for Nature", The OEeD Observer, No. 165, 
August/September 1990, p.17. 
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million loan for unspecified exchange amount to be used in improving lands in the north and 
western regions46. The A.LD. involvement is expected to grow, and NOOs hope for greater 
OECD involvement as well. 
TIrrough Restructured Bilateral Debt: the EAI 
The most significant step toward institutionalisation has come from the inclusion of 
debt-for-nature swaps into the U.S.'s Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI)47 . This 
Initiative comprises policies on debt, trade and investment such as technical assistance grants, 
investment funds, commercial trade credits made available for conversion on the econdary 
market, and possibly free trade agreements. The provision of bilateral trade credits from the 
Export-Import bank and the Commodity Credit Corporation is the closest the U.S. has come to 
making official bilateral debt available for purchase on the secondary market. In November 
1990, the Congress passed Public Law 10 1-624 authorizing the debt-for-nature component of 
the EAr. The President can reduce the debts incurred under PL 480 (Food for Peace) in Latin 
American countries and their governments can make local currency interest payments 
corresponding to the reduced debt to an environment fund. The local NOOs are accorded a 
large role in in managing their countries' environmental fund. The U.S. Treasury stresses the 
benefit of both the environmental programs and the stabilization of debt to the debtor countries. 
Criticisms have been voiced about the constraints and problems associated with the 
EAI, however. Only those countries meeting the IMF/WB macroeconomic requirements, 
investment reforms and having commercial debt reduction or financing agreements are eligible. 
Many countries may decide not to participate in the EAI, because of the limited amounts of 
relief (calculated in a complicated formula that reduce the total amount owed but not the 
amount paid each year by individual countries). Countries may find the negative economic and 
social impacts from the macroeconomic programs outweigh the benefit of relief48. The 
46 It is not clear whether the debt was actually owed to the government - cr Report. oo.cit. , p.2A . The improvements 
atr,arently take the form of rcafforestation and irrigation programs. 
4 Information on the EAl was obtained from Moran. Qll£ih, and Gibson & Curtis, oo.cit. and Gib on, Memos: Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Memo re: EAl, Washington. D.C., January 18, 1990; Natural Resources Defense Council, Memo 
"Expanding the EAl : A Prescription for Progres ", Washington, D.C., April 2, 1990. 
· ,. 
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negative environmental impact of structural adjustment must also be added to this, as was 
discussed in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, quite a few Latin American countries may already be 
eligible for EAI relief, having already pursued macroeconomic reform in order to obtain 
commercial loan restructuring or multilateral finance. 
Those countries that participate in the EAI will therefore have a nature-swap option. 
U.S. Legislative Developments 
There are also several developments in the U.S. legislation that auger well for a 
possible expansion of debt-for-nature swaps. The first comes from a law of the lOOth 
Congress (Public Law No. 100-461) on debt relief for the sub-saharan African countries. It 
permits discussions to be initiated with the African Development Bank (AFDB) on financing 
debt through local currencies and conversion to social program funds49 . The rest of the 
changes originate from the International Development and Finance Act of 1989 (H.R. 2494), 
which has parts addressing nature and development swap issues. It encourages MOBs to 
promote, coordinate and facilitate natures swaps through an amendment to the International 
Financial Institutions Act. It also addresses accounting of donated debt for development and 
nature swaps through harmonization of accounting and tax treatment of these donations. 
Finally, it amends the Foreign Assistance Act to provide for nature swaps. A number of 
consequences arise from the amendment that facilitate swaps, and support the mutual interests 
in the transactions. The following items are the most important for future swaps. Firstly, the 
NGOs can now keep the interest eamed on local currencies through AID-financed conversions 
instead of returning it to the Treasury, as previously required. Thi allow AID-financed 
conversions to use bonds, which is the preferred option for inflation rea ons. Secondly, more 
activities become eligible for nature swap transactions, widening the scope of swaps. Thirdly, 
the amendment specifies that the grants for swaps should be additional to exi ting foreign 
assistance, which will sustain the debtor countries' interest in conducting swap. Fourthly, the 
coordination of multilateral foreign assistance is called for, and the Secretary of State i made 
responsible for initiating OECD negotiations. This would give impetus to the promotion of 
48 Critics of the EAI acknowledge that the President does have the right to waive the IMF/WB conditions, but e press doubt as 
to the likelihood of George Bush using such a clause. 
49 More details in Gibson & Curtis, Ql2£iL, pp. 403-4, about the technical qualifications of the law. 
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swaps by MDBs, whose position on nature swaps is discussed below. In total, these 
legislative developments are quite positive. While they do not provide for the direct reduction 
or forgiveness of public debt held by the U.S., they take initial steps in institutionalizing the 
collaboration between NGOs, debtor and creditors on nature swaps. 
Through Multilateral Development Banks 
The debts owed to the multilateral development banks provide another potential area for 
expansion, due to the large number of countries needing MDB credit50. The MDBs could, 
hypothetically, allow their debts to be serviced in local currency to both local development and 
conservation programs. Of all the MDBs, the regionals have been the most receptive to debt-
for-nature and debt-for-development mechanisms. The Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB), and UNICEF are establishing a Social Investment Trust Fund for development swaps, 
and the AFDB is studying the opportunities. The World Bank has denied the possibility, 
citing the prohibition in its charter for rescheduling or selling LDC debt. This prohibition also 
applies to the other MDBs. However, the World Bank does not wish to endanger its triple A 
credit rating, which allows it to borrow money on the capital markets on good terms. 
Nevertheless, even without direct participation, the MDBs, and the World Bank in 
particular, can still have an important role in future nature swaps with public funds. The 
World Bank would be in a position to facilitate or coordinate donations of bilateral or 
commercial debt for nature swaps. Proposals for World Bank involvement include the 
functions of infonnation-gathering, development of analytical and policy frameworks for the 
swaps, assistance in resource-mobilization, the association of nature swaps with other bank 
operations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of both, legal and accounting assistance, 
and lending the Bank's weight to enforcement of nature swap obligations51 . Potvin 
50 Most information in this section on MOBs comes from Gibson. ~,pp385-387 . 
51 Potvin, p.5. Citing Katz's proposals - Katz having wrinen one of the World Bank Working Papers. See other World Bank \ 
Papers by Hansen & Occhiolini: Stein Hansen, "Debt for Nature Swaps - Overview and Di cussion of Key Issues", Ecological 
Vol I (I). February 1989, pp.77-93; Michael Occhiolini, "Debt-for-Nature Swaps", Working Paper 393, Debt and Intemationa 
Finance Division, International Economics Department, Policy, Research and E tema] Affairs, The World Bank. March 1990. 
Occhiolini suggests including similar components in its conventional environmental loans; Gibson. Ql1£i!.. p.386. Moran. 
op.cit.. The U.S. Treasury has studied nature swap initiatives. and submitted reports to the Congress (see the bibliography). 
Subsequently. legislation has been passed with recommendations for World Bank action in assisting nature waps. The World 
Bank has indicated that it would review the recommendations, but according to Gibson, no progress had taken place at the time 
of his writing of the article (mid 1990). 
, 
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specifically suggests that the World Bank, together with other donors, governments and 
NGOs, could set up an accreditations system for international and local participative institutions 
who could be involved in nature swaps assisted by the World Bank52. He also advises the 
World Bank to assist in arranging adequate financial and ecological perfonnance monitoring 
and evaluation of program effectiveness, using its accumulated experience in this area53. The 
latter could be particularly useful, as evaluation exercises are currently lacking due to financial 
constraints. The nature swaps could also be expanded beyond the individual , bilateral 
arrangements to syndicated transactions, for instance, through the Global Environment Fund54. 
The Fund could transact debt-for-conservation deals that would sunnount the constraint of 
bilateral arrangements, in the same sort of way that the group of smaller NGOs in the first 
Costa Rican swap collaborated to achieve together what they could not accomplish individually 
(see Appendix IV). The Nature Conservancy has also proposed a debt-for-nature Trust Fund 
for renegotiated official bilateral debt of heavily indebted countries. 
The opportunities for future nature swaps, therefore, seem quite good , as the 
institutionalisation of the mechanism would free it from some of the constraints imposed by the 
private aspect. 
Extrapolations of Nature Swap Mechanisms 
Aside from the establishment of the nature swap in the public sector, another way of 
looking at the future of debt-for-nature swaps is to con ider the extrapolations of this 
mechanism into other fonns. While not all of these would be debt-for-nature swap per e, 
they would be attempting to deal with the is ues of finance for debt relief, development needs 
and environmental protection. The examples mentioned below often have similar coalition-
building aspects as the nature swaps proper. Bramble propo e u ing other method of 
52 Potvin. Ql1.&iL. p.37. 
53 Potvin. QQ&iL. p.38. 
54 Potvin. QI2&.iL. p.42. 
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financial exchange including cooperation with multinational corporations holding blocked 
funds in debtor countries, and tax incentives for corporate investors supporting sound 
environmental management in their equity swaps55. One actual example is that of a recent loan 
by the Asian Development Bank to the Philippino forestry sector. The Philippi no government 
was permitted to direct a small part of the loan proceeds (in hard currency) to local NGOs, in 
order that they could buy and swap commercial debt on the secondary market for local 
environmental expenditures56. Another example is that of Green or Conservation Exit 
Bonds57. Conservation exit bonds would be provided to commercial banks by a multilateral 
development bank. The MDB would give the commercial bank credit in the form of a guaranty 
or collateral that improves the value of the bank's other debt in proportion to the amount that 
the commercial bank agrees to swap for conservation purposes. Green bonds are similar, and 
involve credit enhancements to banks who agree to new loans in the form of bond to finance 
conservation. 
There is also potential for initiatives that set an exchange of protection to offset 
environmental costs. These could be either associated with nature swaps or instigate 
independent nature conservation programs through an exchange mechanism of sorts. A bill in 
the state of Massachusetts House (H. 3463) is currently being considered that would require 
companies to address the buildup of carbon dioxide. It is possible that company support for 
afforestation in LDCs may help meet that requirement58. This type of idea where, for example, 
a U.S . power company donates debt to an LDC NGO to fund tree planting to offset their 
greenhouse emi sions, has already been acted upon. The company building a coal-fired power 
plant in Hawaii, AES, has agreed to donate up to $2 million to TNC for the Paraguayan nature 
swap which will protect rainforests. The plant manager stated "Whatever our plant will 
generate will be offset by what we will be preventing from being generated in Paraguay"59. 
Another company, Virginia Power and Light, has tated that it will pay for tree-planting in 
55 See Bramble, ~. 
56 Potvin,~, p.4l. 
57 Dawkins, ~, p.6. 
58 Prestman & Lampman, 2R&iL, p.16. 
59 Honolulu Advertiser, 29 May 1991, "AES funds rain forest to off ct Isle facility's emissions", Thomas Kaser quoting Dan 
Rothaupl, plant manager of AES Barbers Pointlnc. 
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Guatemala to absorb the same amount of carbon dioxide emitted from their new power 
station6o. However, the scientific soundness of such exchanges has yet to be established. 
Given the potential exploitation of such activities by Northern companies seeking to avoid the 
more costly Northern modifications for the environmental impact of their activities, it is 
important that such proposals be properly researched and regulated by the governments in 
question. Such exchange activities could actually produce more 'debt-for-nature' swaps, but 
here the critique mentioned in Chapter 3 may become more justified. 
A different proposal has been forwarded by Karl Zeigler, an American banker during 
the 1970s excessive loan distribution period61 . He suggests a massive reduction of Brazil 's 
external debt (50%) in exchange for a verifiable program for preserving the Amazon62. He 
maintains that this would save a valuable renewable resource while costing marginally more in 
the short-term (as opposed to the present costs to the banks in terms resources put towards 
constant rescheduling and 'making up' the shortfall of the incomplete payments in other ways), 
but argues that this would be very cost-efficient compared to the long-term expense of 
reversing future environmental damage. This proposal was made in 1989, and was under 
consideration of the Brazilian, U.S. and British governments at that time. No action has been 
taken on this proposal, but the institutionalisation of nature swaps into the EAI program may 
see the return of a similar proposal with bener chances of successful and effective realization. 
On the whole, then, the outlook for future nature swaps is quite positive. At the very 
least, the recent donation of debt by Bank of America , and the Bolivian debt held by 
Conservation International will stiU provide for a few more swaps in the near future. Although 
the regulatory picture is unclear, and it is hard to predict the movement of the secondary 
market, the availability of commercial debt does not seem likely to constrict significantly in the 
near future. The lack of substantial debt relief means that the confluence of interests basically 
remains the same, and the transaction of yet more nature waps through the public sector seem 
60 The Economist, "The Future of Forests", June 22, 1991 , p.23 . 
61 "Gringo greenmrul puts nature on the balance sheet", The Sunday Times. 14 May 1989, London. 
62 He proposes that a consortium of lending governments buy $50 billion Brazilian debt on the econdary market ($17 billion), 
leave the debt on the books to ensure Brazi l implements the program, and have the consortium meet the ervicing cos ts of . 5 
billion/year. 
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fairly likely. The institutionalisation of this mechanism into the public sector, and the 
solidification of the coalition which conducts the swaps indicates that the swap as a private 
solution to a public goods problem is now turning in to one of the mechanisms that 
governments, and international institutions will use in dealing with the debt, development and 
environmental crises. 
CONCLUSION 
Conclusion 
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Debt-for-nature swaps have come about as a result of a particular conjunction of 
circumstances, namely the greening of international relations, itself a product of growing 
knowledge about our global environmental problems, the debt and development crises, and the 
changes in the international political economy which created the opportunity for a private 
financial mechanism of this type to be used. 
In their present form, they are a very small-scale tool, and face a number of constraints. 
Because of the limitations of the financial capacities of the sponsoring NGOs and the interests 
of the debtor countries in balancing their additional environmental expenditures with their 
foreign debt retirement, they are not conducted in large amounts. Thus, they cannot provide 
much debt stabilization, nor make a large contribution to constructing a proper conservation 
infrastructure or natural resource sectors that are ecologically sustainable, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Their constraints also derive from their impact on the debtor economy if transacted 
in large amounts, the need to identify long-term financial needs for conservation activities, a 
vunerability to unpredictable variables, such as a change in political power or an economic 
crisis, and the kinds of activities IENGOs will and can fund with the financial instruments 
available. 
At present, debt-for-nature swaps are transacted by virtue of the following 
circumstances: i) where the debtor government is inclined to conservation priorities ii) where 
their debt has a good discount on the secondary market (for whatever rea on ) iii) where there 
is a history of cooperation between the sponsoring organizations and the local environmental 
groups, either grassroots or national, and where they have identified priority areas under 
danger and iv) where the IENGOs can obtain donated debt or have the financial capacity to 
fund a swap. As a private means to solve a public goods problem, it is predicated on some 
quite coincidental factors and thus is haphazard in character. Furthermore some of the 
countries that, in terms of the rapid and widespread destruction of unique and important 
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bioregions taking place, such as Brazil and Malaysia, need to participate the most in 
conservation and ecologically sustainable projects, are not. 
However, debt-for-nature swaps have various things to commend them. They are an 
immediate step in the face of ongoing crises. While there is much discussion of how to 
transform economies and societies, from whatever state of development, into ones that are 
ecologically viable over the long-term, there is little enough happening to enact the changes. 
Though the nature swaps themselves do not necessarily attempt to fundamentally reverse the 
current structures on which environmental destruction is predicated, nor convert LDC 
governments that are opposed to such programs, they do begin some action on the ground in 
some places where it will benefit some areas and some peoples. Even though it stilI is difficult 
to assess their effectiveness beyond a general level, given the small fraction of nature swaps for 
which there is sufficient up-to-date information, they are bener than no action at all, and they 
may be laying the bases for ongoing, cumulative achievements beyond the immediate projects. 
The renewal of some of the first agreements in 1992 will provide an indication as to how 
satisfactory they have been in achieving the multiple objectives of the many participants. They 
also keep the topic of LDC debt and its links with environmental destruction on the 
international agenda as well as in the international public eye. They strengthen the po ition of 
NOOs in the debtor countries, and help promote the NOO objectives throughout civil society. 
Although it is true that some of these NOOs already represent the power structures of the 
countries in question, and not the peoples affected by the nature swaps, especially in terms of 
indigenous groups, this shortcoming is being recognized, and is being responded to by the 
sponsoring organizations. This author thinks that the promotion of NOOs in the environmental 
and developmental issue-areas is highly desirable, and will ensure more equitable, 
representative and participatory political processes to deal with the international a pects of 
environment and development needs. Debt-for-nature swaps are a mall tep in the right 
direction, insofar as they put some immediate protection on the ground, achieves some debt 
relief, and initiates some programs that will have positive ongoing consequences for local 
NOOs, environmental protection schemes, scientific understanding of eco ystem needs, 
f 
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biodiversity protection, community participation, and slowly, indigenous participation in 
decision-making in projects affecting their homelands. 
The institutionalisation of the nature swap, in itself, may also be a step in the right 
direction. But it will encounter technical problems, and perhaps broader political ones. 
Negative economic and political problems could arise if nature swaps start taking place on a 
much larger scale, with sovereignty issues and accentuated inflation topping the list. 
Nevertheless, the continuation of nature swaps, even in their institutionalised form, for 
instance, under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, with World Bank collaboration, will 
still underscore the absence of a proper solution to the debt and development crises for the 
debtor countries, let alone serious attempts to address the root causes of the environmental 
crisis. The cumulative urgency for all three crises can only be ignored at greater cost for all 
countries in the future. If it is realistic that substantial debt reduction will only occur with 
strings attached, it is preferable for some of these strings to tum into plowshares and seedlings, 
as with debt-for-nature and debt-for-development swaps, where the 'payment' of the obligation 
is reinvested back into the country and heals the suffering of those people and areas that have 
borne the brunt of the debt crisis. Should no substantial debt reduction take place in the near 
future, then the absence of a non-profit opportunity in the current market-ba ed strategy would 
be of more harm than its presence. The outlook for debt reduction is not overly positive, a 
observed in Chapter 4. But the possibilities for expansion of debt-for-nature, as well as debt-
for-development mechanisms, seem auspicious in the public sector, though more at the national 
than international level. 
Debt-for-nature swaps, as a private initiative to combat a public goods problem, reveal 
the impact of the structural changes in the international political economy on the role of the 
environment in human affairs. The globali ation of finance and the rise of private economic 
power provided the opportunity for environmental NGOs to playa role in international 
environmental politics. The current proces of institutionali ation of this mechanism into the 
public sector attests to the rising importance of environmental issues on the world political 
agenda, and the irreversible linkage between economic and ocial development and ound 
~~----------------~-
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environmental practices. Debt-for-nature swaps can even be seen as positive developments for 
the pressing global environmental issues of biodiversity and global warming, and international 
political developments on these two topics may auger well for the same or similar mechanisms. 
Ironically, debt-for-nature swaps have been transacted by an international coalition with a 
confluence of interests that depends primarily on the existence, the extent, and the continuation 
of three crises. They also exist because of a growing realization that the current structures of 
our civilization are destroying the ecological base on which we depend. The social coalition 
that transacts them has taken advantage of an unusual confluence of interests. Many nature 
swap observers speak optimistically about future beneficial collaboration between banks, 
conservationists and debtor country governments for the financing of conservation and 
environmentally sustainable projects in the LDCs. However, the new social contracts that 
Robert Cox spoke of, as mentioned in Chapter 1, will obviously not be formed on the basis of 
such a small phenomenon. Nevertheless, the experience of collaboration, and the connections 
formed will most likely influence the shape of future global environmental politics, though it is 
difficult at this stage to predict how and to what extent. Undeniably, we need, as Winthrop 
points out, we need faster and larger scale solutions to the debt and environmental crises 1. If 
debt-for-nature swaps prove to be a phenomenon of transitional character, bridging the gap 
between small, inventive private initiatives to public goods problems and the insufficient public 
strategies, and eventually enabling movement beyond the conditional quality presently forming 
in the institutionalisation of the nature swap, they will ultimately be successful - on their own 
terms, and in terms of the meeting the immense and urgent needs of the environment and basic 
human development in the international political economy. 
1 Winthrop, Ql!&i1, p.147. 
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TABLE OF DEBT-FOR-NA TURE SWAPS 
fURLHMiN rAC£ vNJJ.£ 
(()~Of.JlVA r 'ON 
(o<Of Of (:it,JANC(. 
(00 NT~Y IV ("0 Cffil ()f l>fef ~(Nf.I(Al( 
BOLlUIA 8 / 8 7 CI $100,000 5650,000 5250,000 
EC UADOR 121 8 7 FNIWWF $354,000 $1,000 ,000 $1 ,000 ,000 
COSTA RI CA 21 88 FPN /WWF/Group 5918 ,000 $5 ,400 ,000 $4 ,050 ,000 
COSTA RIC A 6 / 88 NL $5,000,000 $33 ,000,000 59 ,900 ,000 
PHILIPPINES 6 / 88 WWF 5200,000 $350,000 5390 ,000 
COSTA RICA 1/89 The 5784 ,000 $5 ,600 ,000 $1 ,680 ,000 
COSTR RICA 4 / 89 SW 53,500,000 524 ,500,000 517 ,1 00 ,000 
ECUADOR 4 / 89 WWFITNC/MBG $1 ,068,750 59 ,000 ,000 $9 ,000,000 
MADAGASCAR 7 / 89 WWF $950,000 $2,11 ,1 2 52,111 ,11 2 
ZAMBIA 8 / 89 WWF $454,000 $2,270 ,000 52 ,270 ,000 
POLA D 1/ 90 WWF $11 ,500 550 ,000 550,000 
DOMI N ICAN 
REPUBLIC 3 / 90 PRCTITNC $116 ,400 5582 ,000 $582,000 
COSTA RICA 3 / 90 SWIWWFfTNC $1,953 ,470 $10 ,753,631 59,602,904 
MADAGASCAR 5 / 90 CI $5 ,000,000 
PHILIPPINES 8 / 90 WWF $438,750 5900 ,000 5900 ,000 
MADAGASCAR 8/ 90 WWF 5445 ,891 $919 ,363 $919,363 
COSTA RICR 1/ 91 RNMNLlTNC $360 ,000 $600 ,000 5540,000 
MEHI CO 21 91 CI ?Sl,800,OOO $4 ,000 ,000 52,600,00 
PARAGURV 5 / 91 TNC/FMB $2,000 ,000 $?5-7,OOO,OO 
TOTAL SWAPPED: 2NDARY PRICE TOTAL DEBT FACE VALUE: TOTAL LOCAL CURRENCY 
S 5 mill S147 mill (plus) S10C III 
C I- ConservaTIon Internat'l TNC- TheNature Conservancy WWF- World Wildlife Fund 
RA - Rainforest Alliance MBG- Missouri Botancial Garden AID- US Agency Inti Devlpmt 
PRCT- Puerto Rican Conservation Trust NPF-Nat'i Parks Foundation Costa Rica 
FRG - Federal Republic of Germany NL - Netherlands Gov't SW - Swedish Gov'l 
MCL - Mon teverde Conservation League CABEI-Central American BanI( lor Economic Integration 
FMB -Fundaclon Moises Bertoni para la Conservacion de la Natu ra leza 
Others (no additional confirmation found) 
Argentma 12/ 89 
Philippmes 1990 USA 10 $25,000,000 
Sudan ? 
Kenya ?/89 FRG ? OM850 mlfl 
$6,000,000 
5800,000 
$405 ,000,000 ? 
? 
? 
?-
~ 
Jt~li Conservation International: Mexico Debt-for-Nature Swap 
414', ' •• f ' II • ~V" '[j" "-'I!¥S7Jil'!jTl LI.'\'~"R\ \TILli\: 
'\. "TIR."\:AnONAL 
F,n.noal Estaci6n Chalul I I Proposal Montps Azulps 
B,osph~r~ R~sprv~ 
(5<Jenhfic Fi~ld SlAtlon 
for R~serv~ PrOI~ctlOn) 
Me.'(Jco Staff 
PRONATURA UNAM 
UNMt ~ C~ntpr for Ecology (EcOSyst~01 Inshruto de HlStona hnan"al Donahon Cons~rvahon Natural de Ch,.pas Approval 
of D.t. C~nter) Conservation Pesos 
Internahonal U.s Dollars 
PRO NATURA Washtngton, DC 
(Mrocill NCO 
... with Prognms 
in COO1JJ1U1Ucation 
I & Education) 
Maie .. n Debt In""stm~nt B.nk Cons~rvation 
rldnnong Conservation Purch~d .1 or Int~rn.tion.J rt sm~ Program Intern.tionl.! Discount CommerCl.1 B.nk Maico. A.C. (MroeAn Mexico, A.C. i.n Donor of DEBT Receiv~s Full hce Environmental 
U.S. Dollm on BphaJf of V.Ju~ in /'tsu, Agency) CI Mb.ico f" r "Discount Bonds" 
.--
ImtJruto de Histona 
NatunJ d~ Chiapas 11 (Regional Cons~rvation 
Sw~p Accord Summary I D.t. Center) 
·4 yur swap accord 1991 - \OQ4 Conservallon Nacional Finmcera H F~d.d6" ""'" • MuJllple s"'ap o~rations each Approval (Development Bank) \ 'UI AleaUn & FUNDA,\\AT 
• L'SD 4 nullion '" debt (dlS(ount (Awareness Building bonds) & Cons~rvatJon 
• Converted to about USD 40 Edueatio:! ) 
rrullion in ~ av~r 4 yeu 
~nod 
I I I ~ Conservation • ~~ purchased at market rate SecnlMi. d~ H.ciend. Based • i'ar ronds also el'Slble. at Consenatton Development dlheren! terms Proposal y Crtdito PUblico (S~cntary of Fin.nce) (Ecotounsm; ~ I Forest Producu) 
1015 18th Street, N w. , SUite IOCXJ, Wa~hjngton . DC 20036, (202) 429·5660. FAX (202) 887.5188 
~ 
-BOLIVIA 
Date (Agreement) 
July 13 '87 
APPENDIX ill 
Swap Details! 
Cost 
$100,000 
Face value 
$650,000 
Funds Generated 
$250,000peso-
fund 
(Debt exchanged) 
7/87 
Secondary Market Price Redemption (Face Value) 
15 cents/$ 39% 
Actors 
NGOs 
Conservation International; Frank Weeden Foundation 
Government Agencies: 
Ministry of Agriculture & Peasant Affairs (MAPA); Central Bank 
National Academy of Sciences of Bolivia (NAS); Inter-Institute Technology 
Commission (UTC) 
Banks 
Citicorp Investment Bank 
(services) 
unidentified Swiss bank (purchase) 
AgreementlProcess Details 
Contributors 
$100,(){)() Frank Weeden Fdn for purchase 
$150,(){)() USAID for fund; $100,(){)() Bol. gov't 
for fund 
The debt was purchased at 15% of its face value and cancelled in exchange for funds to 
manage Beni Biosphere Reserve, whose area & buffer zone was increased by 3.7 mill 
acres; and for maximum legal protection of the Reserve. NAS administers the 
programs, oversees a commission made up of local officials, scientists from Costa 
Rica's Ecology Institute and Beni Biosphere Reserve, and a representative from the 
local environmental NGO Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente (LIDEMA) (who is 
approved by MAPA). LIDEMA manages the area for conservation and sustainable 
development purposes. NAS & MAPA administer the fund. For five years CI 
provides scientific, technical, financial and administrative assistance for design and 
execution of programs promoting 'rational and sustained use of renewable natural 
resources'. MAPA and Ministry of Planning and Coordination (MPC) are to approve 
of CIs programs. CI is to submit work plans, annual activity reports to MAPA, MPC 
and Mini try of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 
Ecosystem Particulars (Beni Bio phere Reserve) 
Home of nomadic Chimane Indians, and also Yacuma, Ballivian, Guarayo and Moxo 
tribes. The Beni Region in northeast of Bolivia noted for its extraordinary biological 
1 This compilation of Swap details is by no means exhaustive; due to space constraints, 
details are selective. Please see the Debt-for-Nature Swaps Table for the acronyms of 
the purchasing international organizations. 
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richness. A seasonally flooded lowland Amazonian rainforest and savannah habitat 
that supports 13 species of Bolivia's 18 endangered animals, 500 bird species, and 
6000 vascular plant species; world's largest mahogany, jacaranda and tropical cedar 
forests. The region experiencing rapid forestry and agricultural development. 
(Mahogany is Bolivia's primary forest product export, cedars used locally for boat-
building & fIrewood.) 
ActivitieslPurpose 
The swap supports conservation management of Beni Biosphere Reserve; promotes 
environmentally sustainable development uses in buffer areas, including managed 
logging and farming; commissions a socio-economic study of the region by the IITe to 
help resolve territorial disputes between timber companies and indigenous tribes. 
ECUADOR 
The Ecuadoran Central Bank, at the request of Fundacion Natura, approved a $10 mill 
nature swap program, the agreement to which FN is a signatory. FN has 5 years from 
8th October 1987 to present notes for conversion. The following swaps have taken 
place under this program: 
Swap No: 1 
Date (Agreement) 
Dec 14, '87 
(Debt exchanged) 
12/87 
Actors 
NGOs 
Cost 
$354,000 
Secondary Market Price 
35.4 cents/$ 
Fundacion Natura; World Wildlife Fund 
Banks 
Citicorp; Bankers Trust 
Selected Agreement/Process Details 
Face value 
$1,000,000 
Funds Generated 
$1,000,000 
Redemption (Face Value) 
100% 
Gov't Agencies 
Central Bank 
WWF agreed with FN to provide financial support and purchase debt. One million 
dollars was redeemed at 100% face value and exchanged at the official rate (249 
sucres/$). The Bank issued 9-year sucres-denominated bond with a floating intere t 
rate and an average yield of 30-35% (3 I % the first year, thereafter tied to the interest 
rate paid by Ecuador's five largest banks), and tran ferred to FN. The principal will 
116 
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be retained as a permanent endowment for FN. The projects funded in the flrst year 
are specified in the agreement, and thereafter jointly decided by WWF and FN. They 
must complement existing government projects and be compatible with national 
policies of Ecuador and the principles of FN and WWF. 
Ecosystem Particulars 
The land is biologically very diverse and includes Amazon rainforests, Andean 
highlands, coastal savannah lands and mangrove forests. Ecuador is also the home of 
the Galapagos Islands, a world-renowned wildlife park. The country has many other 
national parks, but also a very high population density and growth rate which places 
huge stress on the environment. Problems include deforestation, soil erosion and 
poaching of protected wildlife. 
Activities/Purpose 
To protect and manage Ecuador's many threatened natural resources: maintenance and 
conservation of 8 national parks (2 mill hectares) including Yasuni Nat'l Park 
(hereafter NP), and Pasochoa Nature Reserve, designated an area of special 
importance. One 800 hectare park site is for a pilot program in environmental 
education and nature interpretation. Activities include infrastructure development, 
boundary delineation, equipment purchase, natural resource inventory, staff training, 
additional staff hiring, management plans, and research on biosphere reserve 
management techniques. 
ECUADOR 
Swap No: 2 
Date (Agreement) 
Mar 22 '89 
(Debt exchanged) 
4/89 
Actors 
NGOs 
Cost 
$1,068,750 
Secondary Market Price 
11. 9 cen ts/$ 
Face value 
$9,000,000 
Funds Generated 
$9,000,000 
Redemption (Face Value) 
100% 
Fundacion Natura; World Wildlife Fund-U.S. 
Gov't Agencies 
Central Bank: 
Banks 
American Expres , Morgan Guaranty Trust, 
Bankers Trust 
Contributors 
WWF $5.4 million; 
TNC/MBG $3.6 mill 
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Selected AgreementlProcess Details 
Bonds were issued at 100% face value and exchanged at the official rate (422.88 
sucres/dollar, free market rate is 520), have 8-year maturity with floating interest rate -
average yield of 30-35%, paid biannually. Most of funds go to support programs 
started with previous swap, this time with training and staffing of park professionals. 
Different provisions regarding the oversight of programs were made through 1) the 
establishment of project commissions which jointly determine projects, budgets and 
plans with WWF; and 2) the requirement of bond expenditure reports. The projects 
are implemented by various local NGOs. 
ActivitieslPuroose 
Acquisition and management of Maquipucuna Reserve; addition of Machialilla NP to 
the list of threatened areas. Establishment of Conservation Data Center to provide at 
the national level a comprehensive source of information about threatened species, 
habitats and help with provision of their protection and sustainable management. 
Efforts are being made for the organization and implementation of workshops and field 
activities to improve local capacity to manage the natural resources. 
Future Swaps 
The debt for nature program has been expanded into a debt-for-development program. 
In October 1989, the Government of Ecuador approved a $50 million debt exchange 
program. The debt can be exchanged at 50% face value for monetary stabilization 
bonds paying interest in local currency to support social, cultural , educational and 
environmental programs. Current information does not indicate any debt-for-nature 
transactions under this program to date. 
COSTA RICA 
The Costa Rican government set up a trust fund, the Natural Resources Conservation 
Fund (NRCF), for the conversion of foreign debt into local currency bond, after a 
request by Alvaro Umana, the head of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and 
Mines. The fund is to finance projects for national parks, conservation, environmental 
education, reforestation, and research on sustainable development. An agreement, 
signed October 24, 1987 by the Ministry, the Central Bank and the Fundacion de 
Parques Nationales assigns the responsibilities for the administration of nature swap. 
The Costa Rican Cooperative Bank (Bancoop) administers the fund, and finances 
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projects agreed to by donors and NRCF board (private citizens and public officials). 
The following swaps have taken place through this conversion program: 
Swap No: 1 
Date (Agreement) 
Mar4 '88 
(Debt exchanged) 
12/87-2/88 
Actors 
NGOs 
Cost 
$918,000 Face value $5,400,000 Funds Generated $4,050,000 
Secondary Market Price Redemption (Face Value) 
17.0 cents/$ 75% 
Fundacion de Parques Nationales (in consultation with WWF); The Nature Conservancy 
Gov't Agencies 
Central Bank; Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy & Mines (MNREM) 
Banks 
Swiss Bank Corporation; Fleet National Bank, Rhode Island, U.S.A.; Costa Rica 
Cooperative Bank R.L. (Bancoop). 
Contributors 
Fleet $254,000 to TNC for endowment of Braulio & Carillo Nat'l Parks 
Group of NGOs $2.4 mil12; World Wildlife Fund $3 mill 
AgreementlProcess Details 
The government agreed to exchange up to $5.4 mill debt for 6-yr colones bonds 
(average interest of 25%) at 75% of face value. Contributors donated directly to FPN 
which purchased the debt and receives interest from the bonds. The bonds are not for 
sale, but can be used as collateral for loans. WWF has an agreement with FPN and the 
MNREM; the group of smaller NGOs syndicated their exchange to enable them to 
finance a variety of different projects in which they individually had an interest. In 
May 1988, the Central Bank increased the conversion ceiling by $5.6 million. 
Ecosystem Particulars 
This country is one of the most ecologically diverse of its size in world , it has 10,000 
different plant species; more bird species than in all of U.S .A. and Canada in its rare 
dry tropical forest ecosystem and rainforests with endangered bird species and 
mammals. The very high population density results in much timber poaching and 
2 Association Ecological La Pacifica, Pew Charitable Trust, MacArthur Foundation, J.S. 
Noyes Foundation, Swedish Society for the Conservation of Nature, W. Alton Jones 
Foundation, Organization for Tropical Studies, and Conservation International. 
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Costa Rica has the highest rate of deforestation outside its parks in all of Latin 
America. 
ActivitieslPumose 
Expansion, protection and management of high priority parks and reserves. 
Corcovado NP is under special focus due to pressure of miners and developers on 
ecosystems there. Guanacaste Nat'l Park was expanded through land purchase, and 
enhanced through a new park management program (environmental training and 
education.) Other parks and private reservations receiving resources: Tortuguero, 
Braulio, Carillo and La Amistad; Monteverde and Centro Ecologica del Pacifico. Also 
funded by the swap is the Gandoca Land Management Project, which supports 
sustainable development practices (land titling, tree & crop nursery organization, 
agricultural extension work) and ecodevelopment projects (aquaculture & nature 
tourism). 
COSTA RICA 
Swap No: 2 
Date (Agreement) 
Jun 88 
(Debt exchanged) 
7/88 
Actors 
Cost 
$5,000,000 
Secondary Market Price 
15.1 cents/$ 
Gov't Agencies 
Netherlands Government 
Face value 
$33,000,000 
Funds Generated 
$9,900,000 
Redemption (Face Value) 
33% 
Central Bank; Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy & Mines; 
Ministry of Planning 
NGOs 
none 
Agreement/Process Details 
The bonds were provided at 30% of debt's face value; 4-yr maturation period, average 
15% interest in biannual payments. This swap was a direct government to government 
exchange, which set up a Costa Rican-Netherlands nature trust fund. The funds are 
administered by joint commission of Costa Rican ministries and Dutch Ambassador; 
and allocated to local NGOs for specific projects. 
ActivitiesIPumose 
Reforestation of 24,000 acres of land with 75% of swap-generated revenue. 
Sustainable development via social interest groups is also supported; monies go to 
cooperative and peasant organizations benefiting thousands of small farmers (planting 
of nearly 4,000 hectares in 1989.) 
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Swap No: 3 
Date (Agreement) 
Jul89 
Cost 
$784,000 
-
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Face value 
$5,600,000 Funds Generated $1,680,000 
(Debt exchanged) 
1/89 Secondary Market Price Redemption (Face Value) 14 cents/$ 30% 
Actors 
NGOs 
Fundacion de Parques Nationales; 
The Nature Conservancy 
Contributors 
n.a. 
Banks Government Agencies 
R.L. Costa Rica Cooperative Bank 
Central Bank:; (Bancoop); 
Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy & Mines 
free) American Express Bank: (services 
AgreementlProcess Details 
TNC and others purchased the debt, which was redeemed for 30% of face value, with 
a 5-yr maturity, earning an average interest of 25%. 
ActivitieslPur:pose 
This swap mostly finances a continuation of projects begun by the previous swap, 
including restoration & preservation of dry tropical forest in Guanacaste NP, rainforest 
in Braulio & Carillo NP, and cloud forest in Monteverde Reserve. New areas 
supported include Lomas Barbudal Biological Reserve (dry tropical rainforest); Barra 
Honda NP ( rare limestone caves with unique bat species). Also supported _ a marine 
turtle protection project (guard services for nesting beaches). Research funded 
includes 5-yr operating budget of Conservation Data Center & the biological and 
natural resource computer data-base. Organisations benefiting from the swap are the 
National Biodiversity Institute, FPN and the Neotropica foundation. 
COSTA RICA 
Swap No: 4 
Date (Agreement) 
Apr 89 
(Debt exchanged) 
4/89 
Actors 
NGOs 
NPF 
Cost 
$3,500,000 
Face value 
$24,500,000 Funds Generated $17,100,000 
Secondary Market Price Redemption (Face Value) 
14.3 cents/$ 70% 
Banks 
Salomon Brothers 
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Contributors 
Swedish Government, Swedish students & private conservation groups. 
Selected Agreement/Process Details 
Bonds provided at 70% of face value, 4-yr maturity, 15% average rate of interest. 
Sweden used part of its flrst bilateral aid contribution to Costa Rica to purchase the 
debt. 
Activities/Purpose 
Finance for the completion and endowment of Guanacaste NP project. Efforts focus 
on regeneration of 200, 000 acres of dry tropical forest. Also the endowment fmances 
research and environmental education, staff training, and park management, including 
cataloguing park's biodiversity and forest fire control during dry season. 
COSTA RICA 
Swap No: 5 
Date (Agreement) Cost 
Mar 90 $1,953,470 Face value $10,753,631 Funds Generated $9,602,904 
(Debt exchanged) 
4/90 Secondary Market Price Redemption (Face Value) 18.2 cents/$ 80% 
Actors 
NGOs 
World Wildlife Fund - Internat'l, 
The Nature Conservancy (loan) 
Banks 
Salomon Brothers, Lafisse 
Selected AgreementlProcess Details 
Contributors 
Swedish Government, 
Pew Charitable Trust, USAid, 
W. Alton Jones Foundation 
This three year program allows US$15 mill face value of debt to be exchanged each 
year for conservation, education and micro-enterprise projects. In April 1989 FPN 
exchanged US $10.75 mill for conservation bonds. The redemption was split 
between A) $5 mill in bonds at 100% face value, 20-yr maturity, 8% interest; for La 
Amistad Regional Conservation Unit (URC Amistad) and B) $5.754 mill at 80% face 
value; 20-yr maturity, 3% interest for Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad (INbio). 
With A), 44% of the bonds endow the URC A's 
management costs; the u<;e of funds determined together by URC A admini tration and 
FPN. The remainder goes to protection and research of propertie within URe A. 
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Ecosystem Particulars 
Amistad Reserve home of two indian groups; has a number of the region's 
watersheds. 
Acti vities/Purpose 
Endowment of URC Amistad; and research support. INbio will use part of income 
earned from interest to fund a parataxonomists course. The students, when trained, 
will staff Biodiversity Sections of eight Regional Conservation Units and establish 
additional biodiversity survey offices. Course includes topics on zoning, species and 
habitat management, specimen extraction for economic & scientific purposes. 
COSTA RICA 
Swap No: 6 
Date (Agreement) 
Jan 91 
Actors 
NGOs 
Cost 
$360,000 
Rainforest Alliance; TNC 
Integration 
Monteverde Conservation League; 
Gov't Agencies 
Central Bank 
PHILIPPINES 
Swap No: 1 
Date (Agreement) 
Jun 24 '88 
(Debt exchanged) 
1/89 
Actors 
NGOs 
Cost 
$200,000 
Secondary Market Price 
51.3 cents/$ 
Face value 
$600,000 
Banks 
Funds Generated 
$540,000 
Central American Bank for Economic 
Agreement & Purpose Details 
unavailable in literature surveyed. 
Face value 
$390,000 
Funds Generated 
$390,000 
Redemption (Face Value) 
100% 
Haribon Foundation; World Wildlife Fund-U.S. 
Co. 
Banks 
Bankers Trust 
Gov't Agencies 
Department of Finance; Dept of Environment & Natural Resources 
AgreementlProcess Details 
The government approved a nature swap program allowing WWF to purcha e up to $2 
mill of debt, to be converted into local currency cash account, managed by Haribon. 
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WWF agreed in 1988 to buy face value of $390K, and more at a later date. All 
programs to be mutually agreed upon by Dept ENR, WWF and Haribon. Participation 
of other NGOS IS encouraged. Funds cannot be used to pay non-Philippine 
consultants and must be devoted to national projects. 
Ecosystem Particulars 
Two National Reserves threatened by illegal logging AND soil erosion. St. Paul 
Subterranean River Nat. Park has 5 different types of habitat, and a number of 
endangered species. El Nido Nat'l Marine Park has very diverse habitat, from rugged 
mountains to coastal mangrove swamps. 
ActivitieslPurpose 
To protect natural resource areas using a traditional conservation approach, following 
the national conservation strategy. The protection and preservation of undeveloped 
national park lands obtains 60% of the funds, benefiting 2 parks on Palawan Island: St 
Paul Subterannean River NP and EI Nido NP. Projects funded will include 
environmental education and research activities, training for local community resource 
managers, fellowships for graduate students in conservation-related areas. The 
remainder supports government efforts to stop illegal trading and exploitation of 
wildlife resources, surveyance of critical areas, and planning for an integrated system 
of protected areas. 
PHILIPPINES 
Swap No: 2 
Date (Agreement) 
8/90 
Cost 
$438,750 
Agreement & Purpose Details 
unavailable in literature surveyed. 
MADAGASCAR 
Swap No: 1 
Date (Agreement) 
Jul89 
Cost 
$950,000 
Face value 
$900,000 
Face value 
$2,111,112 
Funds Generated 
$900,000 
Funds Generated 
$2,111,112 
(Debt exchanged) 
8/89 
Secondary Market Price 
45.2 cents/$ 
Redemption (Face Value) 
100% 
Actors 
NGOs 
World Wildlife Fund-U.S. 
Gov't Agencies 
Central Bank 
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Banks 
Bankers Trust; European syndicate of 7 commercial banks (National Westminster 
PLC, Dresdner Bank, Amro Bank, Banque de l'Union Europeenne, Credit 
Commercial de France, Societe General) 
Contributors 
USAID gave $1 million to WWF 
AgreementlProcess Details 
Details on agreement particulars hard to come by. 
Bankers Trust arranged the European syndicate. The debt was exchanged for local 
cash using the official exchange rate. USAid provides $300,000 for hard currency 
expenditures in relation to the swap agreement. Up to $3 mill in foreign debt can be 
swapped; WWF will seek to convert the remaining $900,000 over the next few years. 
Ecosystem Particulars 
Madagascar has many unique ecosystems, including tropical forests and rare animal 
species, with an unparalleled numbers of species. Protected areas are threatened by 
rapid deforestation (80% has already been destroyed by one estimate), illegal logging, 
poaching, drainage of wetlands, cattle & goat overgrazing. 
Acti vi ti es/Puroose 
Proceeds go to conservation projects in high priority areas over a 3 year period, 
including training, equipping and supporting 400 park rangers. The focus will be on 
education, sustainable development methods and traditional conservation. 
MADAGASCAR 
Swap No: 2 
Date (Agreement) 
May 7 '90 
Cost Face value 
$5,000,000 
Funds Generated 
(Debt exchanged) Secondary Market Price Redemption (Face Value) 
n.a. 100% 
Agreement Details 
The government agreed that Conservation International can exchange up to $5 million 
commercial bank debt and trade credits at 100% face value over the next five years. 
The swap proceeds can be deposited in private Malagasy banks as an endowment fund 
paying interest in local currency. The fund is to support activities such as establi hing 
inventories of endangered species, provide technical and financial upport to protected 
parks and reserves, scientific study, and education programs teaching agricultural 
techniques less harmful to the environment and more supportive of development. 
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(Trade paper is more heavily discounted than commercial bank debt in the secondary 
market). According to news reports, Conservation International is negotiating the 
purchase of trade debt from IBM, Honeywell and Coddam, the French electric 
cornpany3. 
MADAGASCAR 
Swap No: 3 
Date (Agreement) 
8/90 
Cost 
$445,891 
Face value 
$919,363 
Funds Generated 
$919,363 
(Debt exchanged) Secondary Market Price Redemption (Face Value) 
n.a. 100% 
Debt exchanged: n.a. 
Secondary market price cents!$: n.a. ?48 
Redemption price as % of face value: 100 
Agreement & Purpose Details 
unavailable in literature surveyed. This swap was with WWF. 
ZAMBIA 
Date (Agreement) 
Aug 15 '89 
(Debt exchanged) 
8/89 
Actors 
NGOs 
World Wildlife Fund 
Banks 
Cost 
$454,000 
Face value 
$2,270,000 
Funds Generated 
$2,270,000 
Secondary Market Price Redemption (Face Value) 
20.7 cents/$ 100% 
Gov't Agencies 
Central Bank 
NMB Bank: of Netherlands (services) Contributors Anonymous Swiss donor 
$200,(){)() + 
Agreement & Purpose Details 
Debts purchased at an 80% discount were exchanged for local currency (kwacha), to 
be used for conservation and management of wetlands (Kafue river flats), education 
programmes, support for local conservation in titutions, alleviation of oil erosion and 
protection of rhino and elephant populations. 
3 Nancy Dunne, "Madagascar to swap trade debt for nature", Financial Times (U.S.) 
Friday, August 31, 1990. 
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Cost Face value 
$10,000 $50,000 
(Debt exchanged) 
1/90 Secondary Market Price Redemption (Face Value) 23.0 cents/$ 100% 
Actors 
NGOs 
n.a. 
Banks 
NMB Bank 
Contributors 
n.a. 
Selected Agreement & Purpose Details 
Funds 
$50,000 
Set up to be an experimental exercise, this exchange is to initiate a large-scale Swedish-
Polish projects to clear up the river Vistula. This exchange will support the 
development of Biebrza National Park. 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Date (Agreement) 
Mar 90 
(Debt exchanged) 
3/90 
Actors 
NGOs 
Cost 
$116,400 
Secondary Market Price 
20.0 cents/$ 
Fondo Pro Naturaleza (Pronatura) 
Bank 
MG -First Boston 
Conservation 
Selected Agreement/Process Details 
Face value 
$582,000 Funds Generated $582,000 
Redemption (Face Value) 
100% 
Gov't Agencies 
Central Bank 
Contributors 
PuertoRican 
Trust 
The Central Bank and Pronatura (a coalition of 11 leading conservation & development 
groups) agreed to convert $80 million (9.4%) of commercial foreign debt, at 100% 
face value, into local currency for conservation efforts over the next four years. The 
first swap was put into a pesos account in the Central Bank, held by Pronatura and 
which functions as a national conservation trust fund. 
Ecosystem Particulars 
Isla Cabritos National Park has the world's largest popUlation of American crocodiles. 
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Activities/Puroose 
The four conservation projects were developed by Pronatura and The Nature 
Conservancy. Isla Cabritos NP receives 16% of funds ($94,000) for salaries of 8 new 
park guards, a boat, training and community outreach. Reforestation and management 
of Arroyo Parra Watershed is supported by $99,000. La Montana Diego de Ocampo 
receives $99,000 to train the community in renewable resource practices, to construct 
tree planting nurseries, and to create and manage a protected zone. Eban Verde 
Scientific Reserve established with remainder ($290,000), covering management and 
infrastructure building costs. 
PARAGUAY 
Date (Agreement) 
Generated 
5/91 
Actors 
Cost Face value Funds 
$ 2,000,000 ?$5-7,000,000 
NGOs Banks 
The Nature Conservancy; International Finance Corporation 
Fundacion Moises Bertoni para la conservacion de la naturaleza 
Gov't Agencies 
The Ministry of Agriculture (The Conservation Data Center of Paraguay), 
The Institute of Rural Welfare 
Contributors 
U.S.Aid ($500,000) 
AES Corporation, Arlington Virginia - funds as part of an effort to offset carbon 
dioxide emissions from a new coal-fIred power plant being built in Hawaii . 
AgreementlProcess Details 
The International Finance Corporation, a private subsidiary of the World Bank, 
acquired the land in a foreclosure in 1979. The land is being sold for $2 million, and 
is estimated to be worth about $5 to $7 million if it were to be sold for agricultural use 
or commercial logging development. The Fundacion MB will operate the reserve. The 
Government of Paraguay will approve the designation of the land as a permanent 
nature reserve and provide adequate legal protection. The Ache will have a permanent 
seat on the reserve's Management Committee. The bonds will be divided a follows: 
$4 mill in lOyr bonds at LIB OR interest rates; $1 mill in 25yr bonds at LlBOR interest 
rates. 
APPENDIXm 
Ecosystem Particulars 
The land is near the Mbaracayu Mountains on the border with Brazil, covering around 
225 square miles. It is in virgin state, almost totally covered by forest and therefore of 
great ecological significance. It is one of the last remaining large stands of dense 
humid sub-tropical forest in Latin America. It holds one of the richest ecosystems in 
Paraguay and has rare plant and animal species. The land area lies within a larger 
domain previously the traditional home of the nomadic Ache Indians. The area is 
known as a "genetic lifeboat", holding plants and animals previously living in the now 
largely destroyed Brazilian Coastal Atlantic rainforest 
ActivitieslPurnose 
A nature reserve will be created; and the local Ache Indians will continue to use the 
land for their traditional hunting and gathering activities. Low impact agriculture, 
beekeeping and ecotourism will be encouraged in the buffer zone of the reserve to 
enlarge the economic options of the Ache Indians. 
MEXICO 
Date (Agreement) 
Generated 
2/91 
(Debt exchanged) 
not yet 
Actors 
NGOs 
Cost 
?$1,800,000 
Secondary Market Price 
?45 cents/$ 
Conservation International 
Face value 
$4,000,000 
Redemption (Face Value) 
?% 
Gov't Agencies 
Central Bank 
(using $250,000 from BankAmerica for this swap) 
Contributors 
Funds 
$2,600,000 
BankAmerica (is donating a total of $3 million of its loans to Clover a 3 year period to 
aid rainforest conservation in Mexico, Central and South America.) 
Agreement/Activities Details 
The Mexican Government has committed itself to spend $2.6 million worth of pe os 
on a broad set of environmental projects. 
Ecosystem Particulars 
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Mexico has some of the rarest plant and animal life, and has more species than all but 
three other countries. The Selva Lacadona rain forest is the largest remaining tropical 
rain forest in North America. 
ActivitieslPurpose 
n.a. 
OTHER POTENTIAL SWAPS 
Panama 
Aid funds are pending President Bush's signature, for the purchase of up to $1 ()() mill 
of commercial debt; (to be matched by The Nature Conservancy); to endow a 
Conservation Trust Fund to protect the Panama Canal watershed and several million 
acres of tropical forests. 
Jamaica 
A National Parks Trust Fund is being established by the Central Bank to finance 
recurrent costs of protected areas management. Negotiations are taking place on a 
TNC -USAID/Jamaica funded nature swap to capitalize the trust. 
Argentina 
Central Bank has agreed to exchange $60 mill foreign debt for local currency to 
support conservation. Two equal quotas established on behalf of local NGOs 
Fundacion Neuquen and Fundacion Parodi. Negotiations as yet uncommenced. 
Uruguay 
There are hopes of establishing a $50 mill debt conversion to fund an Oceanographic 
Institute focused on research and tracking changes in the oceanographic and 
annospheric environments. Uruguay has a relatively high secondary market price for 
its debt (50 cents/$) due to its diligence in debt service. This makes swaps less likely. 
Brazil 
The current president is supportive of a current nature swap proposal , but faces 
resistance from other ministers. All previous swap proposals brought to Central Bank 
have fallen through. Hyperinflation and sensitivity to sovereignty issue has hindered 
previous transaction proposals. 
Peru 
This country has an institutionalized swap program, which is helpful for nature swaps. 
Previous swap plans with INC halted becau e of current economic crisis and political 
instability which has barred serious negotiations. 
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1986 1987 1987 Councry June June September 
~enona c).l ~7 37 
Bolivia 9 
BmiJ 61 ::9 
CUie n6 69 :S 
Colombia 0~2 85-S8 8~82 
COte d'Ivoire I~ 62 60 
Ecuador 63 ~9 33 
J:lITUJc:J 
~!e:'(:co 60 56 ·,fi 
Morocco 
~igeria :5 29 25 
Peru - .,~ , --.,) 14-17 ~I 
Philippines 50 69 -9 
Lruguay 
venezuel:! 76 70 63 
Yugosl:Jvia 79 5 60 
Source: 1. Sachs. ". ~. Jpproaches to the uon .Americ:m debt crisis". (Sc!~t.emoer 1988~ :md 
wom:mey (Janu.:uy 1988). 
ore: Two dOlS ( .. ) indicate th:}( dara are not available or are nOl sep:li.ltely reported. 
aI As of July 1988. 
132 
1988 
S~t.e:noe; 
10 
':'f> 
59 
06 
26 
37 ;) 
.!i 
-I;V 
::!i 
5~ 
61 ;r 
-I 
.+~ 
